Journal of Food Law & Policy
Volume 5

Number 2

Article 1

2009

Journal of Food Law & Policy - Fall 2009
Journal Editors

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/jflp
Part of the Food and Drug Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Editors, J. (2021). Journal of Food Law & Policy - Fall 2009. Journal of Food Law & Policy, 5(2). Retrieved
from https://scholarworks.uark.edu/jflp/vol5/iss2/1

This Entire Issue is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Food Law & Policy by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information,
please contact scholar@uark.edu.

Journal of

FOOD LAW
PO ICYFall 2009

Volume Five Number Two
CONTENTS

ARTICLES

A Healthy Diet of Preemption: The Power of the
FDA and the Battle Over Restricting High
Fructose Corn Syrup From Food and
............. Adam C. Schlosser 145
Beverages Labeled 'Natural'
Labeling of Credence Attributes in Livestock
Production: Verifying Attributes Which
are More Than "Meet the Eye"
Nicole. Olynk, ChristopherA. Wolf and Glynn T Tonsor...........

181

COMMENT

Dietary Supplements and Structure-Function
Claims: The Dysfunctional Structure
................ Matthew W Lindsey
of Current Regulation
RECENT

201

DEVELOPMENTS

United States Food Law Update: Food Allergy
Labels, Reaching Organic Equivalence,
Misbranding Litigation and

Regulatory Takings..........A. Bryan Endres and Michaela N. Tarr 223
European Union Food Law Update .........
Canadian Food Law Update

Emilie H. Leibovitch

265

................. Patricia L. Farnese 273

A HEALTHY DIET OF PREEMPTION:

THE POWER

OF THE FDA AND THE BATTLE OVER
RESTRICTING HIGH FRUCTOSE CORN SYRUP
FROM FOOD AND BEVERAGES LABELED
'NATURAL'
Adam C. Schlosser'
I. INTRODUCTION...........................................
II. FEDERAL LAW AND REGULATION PREEMPTS STATE
TORT CLAIMS ATTEMPTING TO EXCLUDE
HIGH FRUCTOSE CORN SYRUP FROM FOOD AND
...........................
BEVERAGES LABELED 'NATURAL'

146

149

A. TraditionalPreemption Analysis
...........................149
1. Express Preemption
.....................
..... 150
..... 151
....................
2. Implied Preemption
B. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp..................... 152
C. Lockwood v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.............
..... 154
D. Flaws in the Holk and Lockwood Preemption Analysis ........ 156
1. Congressional Intent Behind the Passage of the
FDCA and the NLEA
................
......... 156
2. Express Preemption Analysis in Holk and Lockwood... 157
3. Mistakes in the Lockwood Implied Preemption
Analysis
.......................................
158
E. Lockwood Erred by Not Applying the PrimaryJurisdiction
163
Doctrine......................................
III. THE FDA SHOULD PROHIBIT HIGH FRUCTOSE CORN SYRUP
IN FOOD AND BEVERAGES LABELED 'NATURAL' .......

........ 166

A. Current Trends and FDA Regulation of the Phrase 'Natural'
on Food and Beverage Labels............................. 167
B. History and Controversy of High Fructose Corn Syrup............ 168
C. Methods for the FDA to Create More Stringent Requirements
for the Appearance of 'Natural'on a Label ...
.......... 172
D. The FDA Needs to Create a Regulation Banning the Use of High
Fructose Corn Syrup in Food and Beverages Labeled 'Natural'177
V.

CONCLUSION

.................................................
145

179

146

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

1.

[VOL. 5:145

INTRODUCTION

America is unhealthy.' America faces an obesity epidemic.'
The food consumed by Americans is making them fat.' Americans,
bombarded every single day by negative headlines like these, are
becoming more and more health conscious.' This newfound commitment to health is reflected in the food and beverages Americans
purchase.
American consumers view food and beverage labels as the best
way to establish a healthy connection between the food they purchase and their lifestyle - the most important or easiest step to improve overall health and wellness.' A recent survey found thirty percent of Americans look at food and beverage labels much more than
a year ago, an additional thirty-one percent read labels slightly more
frequently, and forty-seven percent always examine the ingredients
list.' Many consumers trying to improve their overall wellness will
purchase food and beverages labeled as 'natural,' thinking the term

* The author received his J.D. from the University of Miami and currently is a
Presidential Management Fellow with the General Services Administration. He
would like to thank Professor Osamudia James for all her hard work and skill helping craft an idea into a full article. The author dedicates this article to his mother,
the greatest teacher he could ever have.
1. Jaime Hoguin, America the Unhealthy, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004
/02/26/ health/main602417.shtml (last visited Sept. 15, 2009); Mathew Reeves,
Study Finds Very Few Adults Leading Healthy Lifestyles, Apr. 25, 2005, available at
http://news.msu.edu/story/31/.
2. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, U.S. OBESITY TRENDS 1985 2007, http://www.cdc.gov/ nccdphp/dnpa/obesity/trend/maps/index.htm (last
visited Sept. 22, 2009); Obese Americans Now Outweigh the Merely Overweight, REUTERS,
Jan. 9, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/
idUSTRE50 863H20090109.
3. Paul A. Stitt, Why Are Americans So Fat, NOHA NEWS, Vol. XIX No. 2, 4, 4-6
(1994),
available at http://www.
nutrition4health.org/nohanews/NNSp94
AmericansFat.htm.
4. See Americans Point Fingers at Themselves for Obesity Problem; Consumers Do Not
Blame Food Industry, New National Survey Reveals, BUSINESS WIRE, Feb. 10, 2004,
available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-mOEIN/ is_2004_Feb_10/ai
113099519/; Adrea Miller, Child Obesity Rates Triple, THE WALTON TRIBUNE, Nov.

27,
2005,
available at
http://www.waltontribune.com/story.lasso?ewcd=
2368flf8041ae930 (examining the growing concern over childhood obesity and
providing suggestions of ways to achieve greater health).
5. See Laurie Demeritt, What Consumers Look for on Product Labels, NATURAL
PRODUCTS

INSIDER,

Aug.

27,

2008, available at http://www.naturalproducts

insider.com/articles/consumers-product-labels.html.
6. Id.
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indicates a healthier product.7 Sixty-three percent of consumers
report a preference for food labeled as 'natural.'" Food and beverage manufacturers also recognize the value of the word 'natural' and
include the phrase on as many labels as possible to maximize profits.
These factors make products labeled 'natural' one of the largest and
fastest growing segments of the food and beverage industry today,
accounting for billions of dollars in annual sales. Nonetheless, most
consumers actually do not understand the real differences, if any,
between traditional food and beverages and those bearing the term
'natural.'
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates what appears on the vast majority of food and beverage labels.' Certain labeling clams, such as 'reduced fat' or 'high fiber', must meet strict
requirements, while other claims, such as 'natural', do not receive
such intense regulation.'o The FDA chose to place few restrictions,
outside of banning artificial and synthetic ingredients and additives,
on the use of the term 'natural."'
Due to the FDA's liberal definition, confusion currently exists
as to what ingredients may be used in products labeled 'natural.'
High fructose corn syrup (HFCS) is produced by a complex scientific manufacturing process and used as an ingredient in millions of
products, many labeled 'natural.' Several consumers recently attempted to use state tort law to answer the question of whether the
use of HFCS is in accord with the FDA's definition of a 'natural'
product. The New Jersey District Court became the first court to
issue an opinion on this question in the case Holk v. Snapple Beverage
Corporation (Holk)." The Holk court ultimately dismissed the suit
7. Karen Collins, What a 'Natural' Label Really Means, MSN HEALTH AND
FITNESS, http://health.msn.com/nutrition/ articlepage.aspx?cp-documentid=10023
6030, [hereinafter What NaturalReally Means] (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).
8. How Natural is Natural?, FOOD NAVIGATOR-USA, Jan.14, 2008, available at
http://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/ Financial-Industry/How-natural-is-natural.
9. See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Food Labeling and Nutrition Overview, http://www.fda.gov/food/labeling Nutition/default.htm (last visited Sept. 22,
2009).
10. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Food Label Helps Consumers Make
forconsumers/consumerupdates/
http://www.fda.gov/
Healthier
Choices,
ucm094536.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
11. Claims of 'natural,' 'all natural,' and '100% natural' are used interchangeably
and are not regulated differently in any manner. For the purposes of this article no
changes will be recommended to this current system. All discussion will merely
mention the phrase 'natural', but will apply to all of these terms.
12. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 2009). After the initial
completion of this article, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
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after examining Congress' intent behind the passing of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and then finding the Plaintiffs state tort claims impliedly preempted by the federal statute."
Holk explained allowing such claims through state common law or
statutes requires a court to effectively regulate in a field Congress
intended the FDA to occupy exclusively and also creates obstacles to
Congress' objective in creating the FDCA."
The California Northern District Court reached the opposite
conclusion in Lockwood v. ConAgra Foods, Inc. (Lockwood) by refusing to dismiss a similar suit, which brought state tort law claims
against a manufacturer using HFCS as an ingredient on a product
labeled 'natural."' The Lockwood court first pointed out Holk
committed an error in its preemption analysis by not considering
the amendments added to the FDCA by the Nutritional Labeling
and Education Act (NLEA)." The Lockwood court found the Plaintiffs claims not impliedly preempted because: Congress, by passing
the NLEA, specifically contemplated and included state enforcement in conjunction with the federal regulations; the FDA declined
to issue a formal regulation regarding the labeling usage of 'natural'
despite several petitions and FDA-acknowledged consumer confusion; and manufacturers could comply with the FDA's existing policy on 'natural' and still follow the state laws providing the basis of
the claim."
Even though Holk failed to consider the NLEA in its analysis,
the court ultimately came to the correct conclusion by finding the
Plaintiffs claim preempted. By failing to dismiss its Plaintiffs claim,
Lockwood misconstrued Congress' intent behind the passage of the
FDCA, the NLEA, and the mandate of the FDA. If a court hears the
Lockwood case, and decides HFCS cannot be used in food and bevoverturned the initial decision of Holk. None of the reasons given by the court to
overturn the original Holk decision alter any of the analysis or conclusions of this
article.
13. See generally id.
14. Id. at 455-56.
15. Lockwood v. ConAgra Foods, Inc, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
See also Hilt v. Arizona Beverage Co., 2009 WL 449190 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2009) for a
substantially similar case to Lockwood. Plaintiff sued Arizona Beverage under California laws for using high fructose corn syrup in a beverage labeled 'natural'
(among other claims, including certain deceptive naming claims). The Hilt court
conducted a preemption analysis and denied Arizona's motion to dismiss using the
same, yet less thorough, reasoning as found in Lockwood; therefore this article
does not conduct any substantial analysis of the Hilt decision.
16. Lockwoo4, 597 F.Supp. 2d at 1034.
17. Id. at 1032-34.
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erages labeled 'natural,' the judiciary will be overstepping its authority, ignoring long standing traditions of administrative deference,
and overriding established FDA policy. The Lockwood suit, and any
similar lawsuits brought in the future, should be dismissed due to
issues of preemption and primary jurisdiction. Further, by using its
authority, and existing legal precedents and practices, the FDA must
change its current policy statement, clear up the current confusion,
and issue a firm regulation banning the use of HFCS in food and
beverages labeled 'natural.'
Part II of this article discusses the typical framework for a preemption analysis and presents the findings of the Holk and Lockwood courts. Part II then moves on to explore the flaws in those
analyses, illustrates several reasons why the Lockwood decision is
incorrect, and concludes by demonstrating any lawsuit challenging
the usage of HFCS in 'natural' food and beverages must be dismissed due to implied preemption or primary jurisdiction. Part III
examines just how the FDA should regulate the term 'natural' on
food and beverage labels, with particular emphasis placed on the
usage of HFCS. Part III concludes by providing reasons why using
HFCS as an ingredient is outside the scope of the FDA's current
policy regarding the usage of 'natural' and therefore manufacturers
must be prohibited from using HFCS as an ingredient in food and
beverages featuring the term 'natural' on the label.
II. FEDERAL LAW AND REGULATION PREEMPTS STATE TORT CLAIMS
ATTEMPTING TO EXCLUDE HIGH FRUCTOSE CORN SYRUP FROM FOOD
AND BEVERAGES LABELED 'NATURAL'

The court system cannot be used to answer the question of
whether HFCS is an acceptable ingredient in food and beverages
labeled 'natural' because adjudication in this area is preempted by
federal law or regulation. Holk, even through flawed reasoning,
reached this correct conclusion. Lockwood, despite correctly pointing out Holk's misstep, still failed in its preemption reasoning by
overlooking or misconstruing key factors.
A. TraditionalPreemptionAnalysis
The Supremacy Clause in Article VI of the United States Constitution states federal law is "the Supreme Law of the Land."'"
18.

U.S. CONsT. art. VI.
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There is a need for the Constitution and federal laws to have the
same meaning throughout every state; therefore any Congressional
act will preempt a state statute, and the Supreme Court has held
both legislative statutes and administrative regulations can preempt
state law."0 In all preemption analyses, courts begin by looking at
The deciding court must also
Congressional intent or purpose.'
remember historic police powers of the States" are traditionally not
to be superseded by a Federal Act unless Congress clearly manifested such a purpose." The primary focus of a preemption analysis
is to determine the extent to which Congress intended to replace
state law with federal law." The Supremacy Clause preempts state
or local law in three circumstances: express preemption and the twin
implied preemption categories of field and conflict preemption.
1. Express Preemption
Express preemption occurs when a federal statute or regulation
contains specific, clear language explaining when a state or local law
is to be exempted. Many federal statutes merely prohibit state or
local laws that are "inconsistent" with the federal statute or regulation." This allows states to provide regulation and enforcement in
accordance with the federal rule." Some federal statutes include

19. See Martin v. Hunter'sLessee, 14 U.S. 304, 324-27, 34043 (1816).
20. See Fidelity Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 151-55
(1982).
21. "Congressional intent or purpose is the 'ultimate touchstone' in every preemption analysis." Medtronics, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1996).
22. States' traditional police powers include the ability to define criminal law and
to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens. Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U.S. 1, 66 (2005) (Thomas, J. dissenting). See also, e.g., Lisa Kinney Helvin, Administrative Preemption in Areas of Traditional State Authority, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV.
617,623-25 (2008) (providing overview of when state action may be recognized as a
traditional police power).
23. In all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has
legislated in a field which the States have traditionally occupied the court starts with
the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
24. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (plurality opinion).

25. See, e.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (2006).
26. See, e.g., id.
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language, known as a savings clause, indicating Congress intended
to preempt some, but not all aspects of state common law.
2. Implied Preemption
The other two circumstances giving rise to preemption are considered implied preemption. Field preemption occurs when the
federal regulation is so all-encompassing there is a reasonable inference Congress purposefully left no room for state supplementation.2' Legal scholars identify several distinct questions relevant to a
court's field preemption analysis: (1) is the area in question one in
which the federal government has traditionally played a unique role;
(2) has Congress manifested a clear intent in the text or legislative
history that the federal law should be functioning exclusively in the
field in question; (3) would allowing state and local regulations in
the area actually or potentially interfere with comprehensive federal
regulatory efforts; and (4) does the law serve an important traditional state or local interest?'
The final type of implied preemption, conflict preemption, can
occur in two instances. Conflict preemption can occur when "state
law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress" or "when compliance
with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility."3"
Conflict preemption can even still exist when there is an express
preemption provision and the state law in issue is not expressly preempted.3' The state statute is then nullified to the extent it conflicts
with federal law." It is important to note the three categories of
preemption are not rigidly distinct, and "field preemption may be
understood as a species of conflict preemption: [a] state law that
falls within a pre-empted field conflicts with Congress' intent (either
express or plainly implied) to exclude state regulation. "3
Implied preemption analysis is typically very fact specific and
courts do get some leeway in conducting their conflict and field
preemption determinations. If the court "wants to avoid preemp27. JAMES T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW:
LEGISLATION, REGULATION AND LITIGATION 62-63 (American Bar Association 2006).
28. English v. GeneralElectric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
29. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 390
(Aspen Publishers, Inc. 2d ed. 2002).
30. ChicanosPorla Causa,Inc. v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2008).
31. Id. at 985.
32. English, 496 U.S. at 79.
33. Id. at 79 n. 5.
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tion, it can narrowly construe the federal objective and interpret the
state goal as different from or consistent with the federal purpose.
But if a court wants to find preemption, it can broadly view the federal purpose and preempt a vast array of state laws."" This leeway
sometimes leads to inconsistent and confusing results - even with
cases featuring relatively similar fact patterns. The Holk and Lockwood decisions are clear examples of this inconsistency and confusion.
B. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp.
The New Jersey District Court issued the first opinion for a suit
questioning whether HFCS is allowed as an ingredient in food and
beverages labeled 'natural.' Stacy Holk (Holk plaintiff) brought suit
alleging violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, unjust
enrichment, and breach of express and implied warranties stemming from Snapple Beverage Corporation's (Snapple) use of the
phrase 'All Natural' to describe its products." The Holk plaintiff
purchased two bottles of Snapple's Acai Blackberry Fruit Juice
Drink, which was labeled 'All Natural' and contained HFCS." The
Plaintiff alleged HFCS could not be considered 'natural' because it
does not "originate from natural sources, but instead [is] created
through 'enzymatically catalyzed chemical reactions in factories.'" 7
Snapple moved to dismiss the suit based on primary jurisdiction; the
court dismissed the suit based on implied preemption, never reaching the primary jurisdiction issue."
In reaching its conclusion the court examined the preemption
issue through the lens of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA)." The court began its analysis by noting the FDA promul34. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 29, at 398.
35. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 574 F.Supp. 2d 447,448-49 (D. N.J. 2008).
36. Id. at 449.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 456 n. 5. Despite winning the suit, Snapple, sensing changing consumer preferences, the potential for future lawsuits, and bad publicity, recognized
the victory as bittersweet. Snapple responded by continuing to label some of its
beverages as 'natural,' but chose to replace the HFCS with sugar so as to avoid the
future controversies and negative publicity. See also Jennifer Lee, Reading the Tea
Leaves, Snapple Refreshes Itself, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 19, 2009, available at
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/19/reading-the-tea-leaves-snapplerefreshes-itself/.
39. Congress originally passed the FDCA in 1938, giving the FDA authority to
regulate the safety of food, drugs, and cosmetics. See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, HISTORY OF THE FDA: The 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
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gated many regulations pertaining to the contents and labels of beverages." The court next noted the FDA, under the authority of the
FDCA, thoroughly defined both 'artificial flavor' and 'natural flavor.'' Finally, the court pointed out the FDA's current policy regarding the term 'natural' is to (1) "not restrict its use, except for
added color, synthetic substances, and flavors;" and (2) "that nothing artificial or synthetic (including all color additives regardless of
source) has been included in, or has been added to, a food that
would not normally be expected to be in the food." 2
Holk next moved onto its legal analysis of the preemption issue.
The court first concluded Congress, when passing the FDCA, did
not intend to expressly preempt States' interest in protecting their
consumers against deception and fraud in the sale of food and beverages; therefore, the Plaintiffs claim survived an express preemption analysis." Holk then examined whether the Plaintiffs state
claims were impliedly preempt. The court pointed out that even
though the FDA declined to undergo a rulemaking to define 'natural,' it did define 'natural flavor' and issued a policy statement describing its stance on the use of 'natural' on labels.' Further, the
FDA is obligated to follow its advisory opinions until such opinions
are amended or repudiated." The court highlighted the elaborate
regulations already established by the FDCA in regards to beverage
labeling." This fact, coupled with the FDA's policy statement describing the acceptable labeling use of 'natural,' led the court to
http://www.fda.gov/aboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm054826.htm
[hereinafter HISTORY OF 1938 FDCA] (last visited Nov. 2, 2009).
40. See Holk, supra note 35, at 450. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R § 102.33(1997) (defining
what phrases can appear on beverage labels depending on the ingredients used); 21
C.F.R. § 101.30 (listing requirements for the usage of certain phrases related to the
percentage juice declared on a beverages' label).
41. Id. at 450. Artificial flavor is "any substance, the function of which is to impart flavor, which is not derived from a spice, fruit or fruit juice, vegetable or vegetable juice, edible yeast, herb, bark, bud, root, leaf or similar plant material, meat,
fish, poultry, eggs, dairy products, or fermentation products thereof." 21 C.F.R. §
101.22(a)(1) (2000). Natural flavor is defined as "the essential oil, oleoresin, essence or extractive, protein hydolysate, distillate, any product of roasting, heating
or enzymolysis, which contains the flavoring constituents derived from" the above
list. 21 C.F.R. § 101.22(a)(3) (2000).
42. Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, General Principles, Petitions, Definition of Terms, 58 Fed. Reg. 2302, 2407 [hereinafter Food Labeling] (Jan. 6, 1993).
43. Holk, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 454.
44. Id.
45. Food and Drug Administration Advisory Opinions, 21 C.F.R § 10.85(e)
(2008).
46. Holk, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 455.
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conclude FDCA and FDA "regulations so thoroughly occupy the
field of beverage labeling... it would be unreasonable [for the court]
to infer Congress intended the states to supplement this area," and
deciding the Plaintiffs claims requires the court to effectively regulate in a field Congress intended the FDA to occupy exclusively."
Holk concluded by noting that allowing claims through state common law or statutes creates obstacles to Congress' objective in enacting the FDCA, providing yet another reason to preempt the Plaintiffs claim."
C. Lockwood v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.
A little less than one year after the Holk decision, Margot
Lockwood filed a similar suit in the California Northern District
Court alleging ConAgra Foods, Inc. (ConAgra) violated California's
Unfair Competition Law by engaging in misleading conduct resulting from the use of HFCS as an ingredient in Healthy Choice pasta
sauce labeled 'all natural.' 5 ConAgra moved to dismiss on the
grounds the Plaintiffs claims were expressly preempted, or in the
alternative impliedly preempted by the provisions added to the
FDCA by the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA).
Lockwood first noted Congress implemented the NLEA to
"clarify and strengthen [the FDA's] authority to require nutrition
labeling on foods, and to establish circumstances under which
claims may be made about the nutrients in foods."" The NLEA also
added an express preemption for state laws addressing certain subjects covered by the FDCA, including some new labeling requirements added by the NLEA." Lockwood also criticized the decision
in Holk for failing to consider the changes to the FDCA caused by
Congress' implementation of the NLEA."
Lockwood also quickly shot down ConAgra's express preemption argument. The NLEA's express preemption contains language
47. Id.
48. Id. at 456.
49. Lockwood v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1029 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
50. Id. at 1030 (citing National Council for Improved Health v. Shalala, 122 F. 3d
878, 880 (10th Cir. 1997)).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1034. Lockwood also correctly points out if the FDA did choose to
adopt formal regulations governing 'natural' labels for food and beverages it would
do so under the NLEA. Food labeling, supra note 42, at 2302. The FDA, did however, reaffirm their non-restrictive policy regarding the usage of 'natural' during the
passage of the NLEA. Id. at 2407.
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forbidding states from passing any requirement for the labeling of
food and beverages that is not already required by the FDCA." The
court explained the Plaintiffs claim as pled did not allege the pasta
sauce is misbranded or otherwise not in compliance with existing
FDCA labeling requirements; rather the claim alleged HFCS is not
produced by a natural process and therefore the pasta sauce does
not fit within the FDA's existing policy of 'natural.'" Since the Plaintiffs claim did not use California law to create a different labeling
requirement than required by the FDCA, the NLEA's added express
preemption provision did not apply."
Lockwood next examined whether the Plaintiffs claims were
impliedly preempted." Lockwood first discussed issues of field preemption and departed from the reasoning of Holk to find that Congress, with the passage of the NLEA, did not intend to occupy the
entire field of food and beverage labeling for three reasons. First,
the court pointed out the NLEA amended the FDCA to include an
express preemption provision that allowed states to issue regulations
identical to federal law." Second, Congress granted states sovereignty to independently regulate subject matters covered by the
NLEA as long as those state laws do not fall within the FDCA's express preemption provision." This includes the ability for states to
impose nutritional disclosure laws on local restaurants." Third, the
FDA, despite acknowledging consumers are sometimes misled by
the use of 'natural,' merely issued a policy statement and not a forLockmal legal requirement regarding the definition of 'natural.'
wood then addressed whether the plaintiffs claims were impliedly
preempted due to conflict preemption and held a manufacturer

53. 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (2006).
54. Lockwood, 597 F. Supp 2d at 1031.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1031-34.
57. Id. at 1032.
58. Id. at 1032-33.
59. See New York State Restaurant Ass'n v. New York City Board of Health, 556 F. 3d
114 (2nd Cir. 2009) (upholding city law requiring certain restaurants to disclose
calorie content); Press Release, State of California, Gov. Schwarzenegger Signs
Legislation Promoting Nutrition and Healthier Options (Sept. 30, 2008), available at
http://gov.ca.gov/press-release/10682 (signing legislation requiring restaurants
with twenty or more locations to disclose calorie content); Lainie Rutkow, et. al.,
Preemption and the Obesity Epidemic: State and Local Menu Labeling Laws and the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 772, 781 (2008).
60. See Lockwood 597 F. Supp. 2d at 1033-34.
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could comply with the FDA's policy on the word 'natural' while still
following the state law providing the basis for the claim."
D. Flaws in the Holk and Lockwood PreemptionAnalysis
The Holk court erred by failing to consider how the provisions
of the FDCA added by the NLEA affected their preemption analysis,
but this error did not ultimately prove fatal to the court's reasoning.
The Lockwood court, despite ostensibly conducting the proper
analysis by using the additional NLEA provisions, still did not reach
the correct conclusion in denying ConAgra's motion to dismiss.
Ultimately, the Lockwood court failed to consider the proper Congressional intent and surrounding circumstances behind the passage
of the FDCA and NLEA, which ultimately serve as clear signals the
plaintiffs state law claims needed to be preempted by the federal
regulations in question.
1. Congressional Intent Behind the Passage of the FDCA and the
NLEA
Since Congressional intent or purpose is the 'ultimate touchstone' in every preemption analysis," a brief background on the
FDCA and NLEA is a necessary starting ground. Congress, in response to the public uproar caused by Upton Sinclair's muckraking
opus, "The Jungle," passed the Federal Food and Drugs Act (FFDA)
of 1906 (and the companion Federal Meat Inspection Act) to create
the Bureau of Chemistry, the direct forerunner to the modern
FDA." The FFDA, which gave the Bureau of Chemistry power to
regulate in an area - public health and welfare - traditionally occu-

pied by states, prohibited "the interstate transport of unlawful foods
and drugs under penalty of seizure of the questionable products
and/or prosecution of the responsible parties."'

Congress passed

the FDCA in 1938, creating the modern FDA, in order to correct
the FFDA's lack of legally enforceable food standards, manufacturers' ongoing abuses in food packaging and quality, and an absence
61. See id. at 1034-35.
62. Medtronics, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
63. Walter F. Janssen, The Story of the Laws Behind the Labels, FDA Consumer,
June
1981,
available at http://www.
fda.gov/aboutFDA/WhatWeDo/
History/Overviews/ucm056044.htm.
64. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, History of the FDA: The 1906 Food and
Drugs Act and its Enforcement, http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/historyoffda/
sectionl.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2009).
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in the regulation of therapeutic medicine.' The FDCA granted the
FDA broad authority to regulate food and beverage labeling and
also prohibited the introduction, adulteration or misbranding of any
food in interstate commerce.' The FDCA did not create a private
right of action." The FDA can enforce the FDCA and its regulations
through administrative proceedings.'
In 1990, Congress passed the NLEA, giving the FDA enhanced
control over nutritional labeling on all food and beverages.' The
NLEA represented an attempt by Congress to inform consumers of
the scientific advances linking health and nutrition and to eradicate
the American market of false and misleading label information."
Prior to enactment of the NLEA, Dr. Sullivan, head of the FDA, said
his department favored uniform federal standards for food labels
that would totally override state and local laws." Congress created
NLEA amendments specifically to "establish the circumstances under which claims may be made about the nutrients in foods."" The
NLEA aimed to provide a streamlined, comprehensive system of
labeling easily understood by both consumers and manufacturers,
and also amended the FDCA to allow states to bring their own rights
of enforcement for violations of certain provisions." The NLEA also
strengthened the FDCA's preemption provision by expressly forbidding any state or local laws which impose additional requirements or
different standards of identity on food and beverage labels."
2. Express Preemption Analysis in Holk and Lockwood
Holk and Lockwood examined the same FDCA provisions"
when conducting their respective express preemption analyses and
reached the same correct conclusion: Congress did not intend to
65. History of the 1938 FDCA, supra note 39.
66. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 331, 393.
67. 21 U.S.C. § 337(a) (2006).
68. 21 C.F.R. § 7.40 (2006).
69. MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS: HOW

THE FOOD INDUSTRY

INFLUENCES

250, 250 (2007).
70. Dietary Supplements: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Agriculture of the House
Comm. on Appropriations, 103"' Cong. 1" Sess. 25 (1993) (testimony of Dr. David A.
Kessler, Commissioner Food and Drug Administration).
71. NESTLE, supra note 69, at 250.
72. National Council for Improved Health v. Shalala, 122 F. 3d 878, 880 (11th Cir.
1997).
73. 21 U.S.C. § 337 (2006).
74. 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (2006).
75. Id.
NUTRITION, AND HEALTH, REVISED AND EXPANDED EDITION
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expressly preempt the state tort law behind either Holk's or Lockwood's individual claim. The relevant FDCA section provides, "no
State or political subdivision of a State may directly or indirectly
establish under any authority or continue in effect as to any food in
interstate commerce..any requirement not identical" to certain
FDCA labeling requirements," including requirements to prevent
misbranding and false claims." None of the requirements found in
the FDCA, specifically attempt to define or regulate use of the term
'natural,' therefore, neither Holk nor Lockwood's claim fell within
the express preemption provision of the FDCA."
3.

Mistakes in the Lockwood Implied Preemption Analysis

Holk and Lockwood both conducted an implied preemption
analysis, but reached different conclusions. Holk found the FDCA's
76. Id. at § 343-1(a).
77. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.343(k) (2006) (providing food is misbranded "[i]f it bears
or contains any artificial flavoring, artificial coloring, or chemical preservative,
unless it bears label stating that fact.."); 21 U.S.C. § 343(c) (2006) (claiming a food
is mislabeled if it is an imitation of another food but does not indentify itself as an
imitation).
78. Despite the findings of both Holk and Lockwood, it is not out of the question
a court may find a substantially similar claim preempted because such a claim is in
fact adding extra requirements to the FDCA, as amended by the NLEA. "The term
'requirements'... reaches beyond positive enactments, such as statutes and regulations to embrace common-law duties." Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC., 544 U.S. 431,
443 (2005). "In contrast, an 'occurrence that merely motivates an optional decision' - such as the threat of state law damages remedy for a violation of an existing
federal requirement - does not itself qualify as a requirement." In re PepsiCo, Inc.,
Bottled Water Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation, 588 F. Supp 2d 527, 532 (S.D.
NY 2008) (citing Bates, 544 U.S. at 443). The PepsiCo court heard a consumer's
claim alleging fraudulent labeling on purified bottled water. The plaintiff claimed
state common law should not be preempted because the FDA specifically addressed
the labeling requirements for 'purified water' - the bottled water variety in question
- and chose to exempt 'purified water' from the same standards applied to the other
varieties of bottled water. The court still held the claim expressly preempts by the
federal regulation and the FDCA and rejected the plaintiffs claim that "state requirements are permitted as long the federal standard does not specifically address
the terms..at issue". In re PepsiCo, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 538. This situation seems on
its face similar to the FDA's position on HFCS' inclusion in food and beverages
labeled 'natural.' The facts of PepsiCo may, however, be considered distinguishable
because, unlike the term natural, the FDA underwent a formal rulemaking to construct labeling definitions for bottled water. The FDA specifically considered the
terms to appear on 'purified water' before finally deciding to exclude 'purified
water' from the final rule definitions, and also provided detailed reasons for this
decision. The FDA, on the other hand, explicitly declined to issue any sort of formal rules with regard to HFCS or the phrase 'natural.'
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detailed and extensive regulatory scheme combined with the FDA's
implementing regulations impliedly preempted the Plaintiffs
claims." Lockwood, in reaching the opposite conclusion, pointed
out the reasoning in Holk was flawed because the Holk court did not
consider the new NLEA preemption provisions at any point in its
implied preemption analysis.' Even with inchoate reasoning stemming from a failure to consider the added NLEA provisions, Holk
ultimately still arrived at the correct conclusion. By failing to find
the Plaintiffs claims impliedly preempt, the Lockwood court overlooked or misconstrued several key issues.
In reaching its decision against implied preemption, the Lockwood court relied heavily on the NLEA's express savings clause,
which states "the [NLEA] shall not be construed to preempt any
provision of State law, unless such provision is expressly preempted
under..." various FDCA food and beverage labeling requirements."
Lockwood points out, because of this savings clause, Congress manifested an intent not to solely occupy the field of food and beverage
nutritional labeling." The court indicated the mere presence of this
savings clause precluded the option of implied preemption." However, the Supreme Court does not give much weight to savings
clauses appearing in the same statute as a preemption provision."
In Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., the Court concluded a "savings
clause foresees - it does not foreclose - the possibility a fed-

eral..standard will preempt a state common law tort action with
which it conflicts."" The inclusion of a savings clause does nothing
to alter ordinary principles of preemption, including the standard
rules for finding a claim impliedly preempt." Further, the main
value in allowing state tort claims under a statute's savings clause is
preserving tort actions with deterrent value to achieve certain safety
standards." Neither the Holk nor Lockwood plaintiffs maintained a
concrete, actual physical injury similar to those found in other
product safety liability cases where state tort claims were allowed to
79.
80.
81.

Holk, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 454.
Lockwood, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 1032-33.
Id. at 1032 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (2006)).

82.
83.

Id. at 1033 - 34.
Id. at 1032 - 33.

84. See Sandra Zellmer, Preemptionby Stealth, 45 Hou. L. REv. 1659, 1660 (2009).
85. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 870 (2000). (finding a
claim preempt by "declin[ing] to give broad effect to a savings clause where doing
so would upset the careful regulatory scheme established by federal law").
86. Id. at 870-74.
87. Id. at 870.
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fill in the safety voids of federal regulation.' Moreover, the lack of
clear detrimental effects from HFCS consumption obviates the need
for these same state tort laws."
Congress did not expect to leave the entire field of food related
consumer protection in the hands of the FDA, but did intend to give
the FDA control of the entire field of establishing health and nutritional labeling claims on food and beverages.' Congress recognized
state enforcement of FDA-created label standards is necessary to
overcome the lack of a private remedy in the FDCA." Simply passing legislation - merely having it in the books - is not the same as

actual enforcement; the rules need to have teeth and those teeth
need to bite. Congress, and the FDA itself, freely acknowledged a
lack of available resources to properly enforce all labeling regulations," so it was only natural states be given the power to create private rights of action to carry out their traditional duties of protecting their citizens. Congress intended the NLEA to add state common law tort actions to enforce the federal standards of the FDCA."
However, when litigation wields state common law as a method to
supplement existing federal labeling standards, courts have repeatedly dismissed such suits. This is true, especially, when, much like
Lockwood, adjudicating the case would add or alter requirements to

88. See generally Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC., 544 U.S. 431 (2005) (holding
claims alleging damages from harmful pesticides brought under state tort law are
not preempted by the Federal Fungicide, Insecticide and Rodenticide Act);
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002) (holding the Federal Boat Safety Act
did not preempt all state law design defect damages). It is important to note, however, that neither of those statutes is as broad as the FDCA.
89. See discussion infra Part III.B.
90. The FDA's traditional mission statement is to develop policy and regulations
for nutritional labeling and food standards within the United States. U.S. Food and
Drug Administration, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, About FDA:
CFSAN-What We Do, availableat http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/onplds.html. See
also Claudia L. Andre, What's in That Guacamole?How Bates and the Power of Preemption Will Affect Litigation Against the Food Industry, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 227, 251
(2007).
91. 21 U.S.C. § 337 specifically allows states to bring certain actions themselves.
92. See Mary Mosquera, Lawmakers Say Budget Underfunds FDA, FEDERAL
COMPUTER WEEKS, Feb. 5, 2008, available at http://fcw.com/articles/2008/02/05/

lawmakers-say-budget-underfunds-fda.aspx [hereinafter Budget Underfunds FDA].
93. See Vermont Pure Holdings, LTD. v. Nestle Waters North America, Inc., 2006 WL
839486, 6-8 (D. Mass. 2006) (holding states can issue laws to supplement existing
federal regulations pertaining to bottled water). Cf. Mills v. Giant of Md., LLC, 441
F. Supp 2d 104, 105 (D.D.C. 2006) (dismissing a suit attempting to use state common law to add certain warnings to labels on containers of milk).
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the FDCA's and FDA's established national, uniform, food and beverage labeling scheme.'
Lockwood also incorrectly found against implied preemption
based on the power of states to regulate subject matters addressed
by the NLEA, but also outside the FDCA's express preemption provision. For example, state and local governments are free to pass
their own regulations governing restaurants and menu disclosures."
The food served in restaurants, as well as prepared food served in
supermarkets or other chain eateries, is completely different than
the packaged food and beverages regulated by the FDCA and FDA
regulations. Packaged food and beverages, which are the products
covered by the FDCA, will be sold throughout the United States,
while the food and beverages falling under the areas left open by the
NLEA amendments are purchased and consumed within a single
state. This distinction is important because any federal law or regulation with the goal of creating a uniform national system preempts
any state law that discriminates or places impositions on interstate
commerce." Allowing states or local governments to pass their own
menu disclosure laws does nothing to limit interstate commerce.
Allowing state tort claims to alter the usage of HFCS in one state
will force manufacturers to completely change their production
methods in that state, and may even expose the manufacturer to
unexpected state tort liability merely from placing their product in
the stream of commerce. Clearly, Congress did not intend to intentionally allow state common law supplementation if such additions
would burden interstate commerce.
Lockwood also took issue with the FDA's repeated decisions
not to undergo a formal rulemaking to regulate the label usage of
'natural.' The court stated this repeated inaction indicated an intent
not to occupy the field. There is a fear by some courts that if the
federal government fails to act, and a court holds state law preempted by this federal inaction, an area of public health or safety
94. See Mills, 441 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D.D.C. 2006) (dismissing a suit to place warnings on milk on the grounds the plaintiffs were trying to add requirements not
required by the FDCA); In re PepsiCo, Inc., Bottled Water Marketing and Sales Practices
Litigation, 588 F. Supp 2d 527 (S.D. NY 2008) (holding the FDCA preempted additional requirements imposed by plaintiffs state tort law claim based in an area
where the FDA previously issued a rule on labeling requirements).
95. New York State Restaurant,supra note 59.
96. See Robert L. Glicksman, Nothing is Real: Protecting the Regulatory Void
Through Federal Preemption by Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 5, 20-21 (explaining the
Supreme Court often uses a justification for preemption that mirrors that of the
Commerce Clause).
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will go unregulated." This fear does not apply to the current controversy because the usage of HFCS is already regulated by the FDA.
The FDA has periodically reviewed its policy and decided on maintaining the current course of action." Despite, the reasoning of
Lockwood, there is no current regulatory gap affecting the health and
safety of citizens. Consumers may be confused by the meaning of
the term 'natural' on food and beverages, but the FDA, not the
states, is expressly charged under the FDCA and NLEA with rectifying this confusion. If a manufacturer included HFCS as an ingredient in a product labeled 'natural,' but failed to disclose HFCS on the
ingredient list, a citizen can bring suit using state fraud claims, provided the state law is identical to the FDCA's misbranding or ingredient disclosure provisions.' Or if a manufacturer knowingly used
an adulterated ingredient, a private citizen can seek damages based
on state tort law.oo States are still left with the power to use their
state common law to enforce any violations of the FDA policy and
regulation that may affect their citizens' health or safety.
Lockwood's reasoning also ignores traditional notions of administrative deference."' Congress granted the FDA the power to
choose when to - and by association the power not to - issue regula-

tions creating the reasonable definition for any food or beverage.
The relevant FDCA provision reads, "Whenever in the judgment of
the Secretary such action will promote honesty and fair dealing in
the interest of consumers, he shall promulgate regulations fixing
and establishing for any food..a reasonable definition and standard
of identity, [or] a reasonable standard of quality[.]"" The FDA used
its administrative judgment to issue a policy statement on the usage
of 'natural,' and then determined, based on its resource availability,
to leave the policy statement in place, despite its alleged defects.
This decision does not mean the FDA chose not to occupy this field,

97. Id. at 8.
98. Food Labeling, supra note 42.
99. 21 U.S.C. § 343(k) (2000).
100. See In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d 1170, 1179 (Cal. 2008) (holding
neither the FDCA nor the NLEA added amendments shall be interpreted to preempt food safety laws).
101. See Medtronics, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996); Massachusetts v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). See also Blake B. Johnson, The Supreme Beef
Case: An Opportunity to Rethink FederalFood Safety Regulation, 16 LOy. CONSUMER L.
REV. 159 (2004); Carl Tobias, FDA Regulatory Compliance Reconsidered, 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 1003 (2008).
102. 21 C.F.R. § 341 (2001).
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it merely decided its current level of occupation is proper. Lockwood failed in its reasoning by not respecting the FDA's decision.
Finally, Lockwood shot down the idea of conflict preemption by
stating a manufacturer could comply with the FDA's policy on 'natural' and still comply with the state law - as postulated in the case by
the plaintiff. 3 The Lockwood court also explained the plaintiffs interpretation is not an obstacle to the accomplishment of the objectives of the FDCA.'" Both these findings represent an epic failure in
reasoning. Prior to implementation of the NLEA, Congress considered the overall effect on manufacturers, including potential new
costs incurred, which would result from the NLEA's passage.'
Congress based its considerations solely upon new national federal
laws, not a myriad of patchwork state labeling requirements. If state
tort claims can be used to create 'natural' definitions that are different than the policy statements issued by the FDA, then it follows
state tort claims can be used to alter any definitions that the FDA
purposefully and strategically left some wiggle room. This system
greatly hinders manufacturers' ability to know how to properly label
their products. Manufacturers are then exposed to huge amounts of
potential liability merely from inserting their products into the
stream of commerce. These two factors completely frustrate the
purpose behind the FDA's advisory system.'" The purpose of the
NLEA is to inform and educate, not confuse. Allowing for many
distinct state common law requirements for the usage of HFCS in
food and beverages labeled 'natural' frustrates this purpose. Standards can then be different in every state, leaving consumers with
the responsibility of figuring out what state their 'natural' food or
beverage came from, then keeping up with the labeling requirement
for that state, and finally trying to figure out if HFCS could be used
as an ingredient under that state's requirements.
E. Lockwood Erred by Not Applying the PrimaeryJurisdictionDoctrine
The primary jurisdiction doctrine also provides grounds for any
court to dismiss a state tort law claim based on the use of HFCS in a

103. Lockwood, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 1034.
104. Id.
105. See generally Administrative Law Review, The Impact of the Nutrition Labeling
and Education Act of 1990 on the Food Industry, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 605(1995) (discussing cost to manufacturers of the implementation of the NLEA and efforts of these
companies to lobby Congress).
106. 21 C.F.R. § 10.85 (2009).
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'natural' food or beverage. Primary jurisdiction allows for the
proper relationship between courts and administrative agencies.'
Primary jurisdiction encourages more informed legal decisions
through greater judicial utilization of administrative expertise, and
also maintains the uniform treatment of a regulatory scheme by leaving critical decisions to the appropriate agency.'" The doctrine is
prudential and a court can consider whether to apply it whenever a
claim originates in the courts, and "enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme,
have been placed within the special competence of an administrative
body."'" In these situations, "the court may refer specific questions
to the administrative body responsible for deciding such questions.""' A judge, when contemplating whether to apply the primary
jurisdiction doctrine, must look towards the possibility that different
courts addressing the same regulatory issue will reach different results and these results may undermine the regulatory scheme."' The
judge also must consider whether the issue is "within the conventional experience of judges.""2
Holk found the Plaintiffs claim impliedly preempted and thus
never reached the issue of primary jurisdiction because the Plaintiffs claims were found impliedly preempted."' Lockwood cited recent primary jurisdiction jurisprudence finding the "court [may stay]
proceedings or dismiss the case without prejudice, so that the parties may seek an administrative ruling.""' Lockwood then pointed out
there is no need to apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine because
the FDA has repeatedly declined requests to formally define 'natural' due to lack of resources and other more pressing concerns."'
Lockwood, however, overlooked the fact the FDA has already issued a
statement on the labeling use of 'natural.' Over time, manufacturers
and other interested parties asked the FDA to examine that deci-

107. U.S. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63 (1956).
108. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 672 (2003) (Breyer, J.
concurring).
109. W. Pac RR, 352 U.S. at 64.
110. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 574 F.Supp. 2d 447, 452 (D.N.J. 2008).
111. For a general background on the usage of the primary jurisdiction doctrine
see Aaron J. Lockwood, The Primary jurisdiction Doctrine: Competing Standards of
Appellate Review, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 707, 732 (2007).
112. FarE. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574 (1952).
113. Holk, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 455 n. 5.
114. Lockwood, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 1034-35 (citing Clark v. Time Warner Cable,
523 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2008)).
115. Lockwood, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 1035.
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sion, and, after using its expertise on food and beverage labeling
and the best use of its own resources, the FDA consistently decided
the current policy of 'natural' is best left in place, without any additions or alterations. A court must not substitute its policy judgment
for that of the FDA, even if the FDA's judgment results in inaction.
An agency decision on how to best use its own resources must be
given deference by a court."' In Cohen v. McDonalds Corp., a court
dismissed a suit because settling the plaintiffs claim required the
court to fill holes in the NLEA the federal government had declined
to yet fill."' That decision emphasized that a state court could not
substitute its judgment for that of the FDA and any other result creates a danger of non-uniformity."' It is not a court's duty - nor
should it possess the power - to create or change a policy statement
in an area that an agency already considered settled. For these reasons, Lockwood's initial determination to not apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine is incorrect.
Lockwood also found nothing involved in the Plaintiffs claim
can be considered a highly technical area where the FDA has greater
technical expertise than the court."' The judge must merely decide
whether the label claims are considered misleading under California
state law, and judges decide claims about misleading labeling all the
time.' By reaching this conclusion, Lockwood greatly oversimplifies
the real issue at hand. No judge could decide whether the label
found on the Healthy Choice Pasta Sauce is misleading without first
deciding whether HFCS is considered 'natural' under the FDA's current guidance documents - a decision that cannot be accomplished
without employing a highly scientific analysis."' A judge deciding
whether the complex scientific reactions used to create and refine
HFCS are considered 'natural' will be conducting this highly scientific and technical analysis in an area the FDA undoubtedly possesses substantially greater experience and knowledge. The judge is
essentially undertaking the job of an FDA scientist. The FDA itself
asserts science is a key foundation of any decision, and its scientists

116. Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007)
(citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984)).
117. Cohen v. McDonalds Corp., 808 N.E.2d 1, 9-10 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
118. Id. at 10.
119. Lockwood, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 1035.
120. Id.
121. See infra Part III.D.
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are rigorously trained.'" A judge must defer to the expertise of the
FDA and its scientists and apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine
rather than reaching a decision on whether HFCS can be used as an
ingredient in food and beverages labeled natural. A federal agency
specializing in food and beverage labeling is better equipped to
handle issues of label reform than the judiciary.
The FDA, for the previously discussed reasons of implied preemption and primary jurisdiction, possesses the power to regulate
the usage of the term 'natural' on food and beverage labels. States
do possess some power in this field, but this power is merely supplemental power; used to create additional means to enforce the
national policy set by the FDA or regulate areas, like local restaurant
nutritional disclosure requirements, purposefully left open by the
FDCA. Under the FDCA, states can still protect their citizens'
health and safety by allowing for common law enforcement against
adulterated or misbranded food and beverages. Private citizens,
however, may not use these state common law remedies to create or
alter established federal definitions or regulations. The judiciary
cannot use these claims to change the FDA's policy on the usage of
HFCS corn syrup as an ingredient in food and beverages labeled as
natural. The tort system is intended to compensate those wronged
or force other wrongdoers to pay the social costs of their activities.
Allowing state tort claims to alter FDA policy statements - stances
relied upon for several years by manufacturers - is in effect punishing manufacturers for following federal law and allowing judges to
turn thoroughly vetted, carefully crafted Congressional into confusing piecemeal. State tort claims must not be allowed to interfere
with the strong federal interest in allowing a federal agency to create
its own policy and regulation, especially when the duty underlying
the state tort claim involves the relationship between the manufacturer and the federal agency.'"
III. THE FDA SHOULD PROHIBIT HIGH FRUCTOSE CORN SYRUP IN
FOOD AND BEVERAGES LABELED 'NATURAL'

The FDA must create a firm, unassailable answer to the question of whether HFCS can be included as an ingredient in food and
beverages brandishing the label phrase 'natural.' The 'natural' food
122. See Linda Bren, FDA Science: Protecting America's Health, FDA Consumer,
March-April 2003, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m1370/
is_237/ai99148091 1.
123. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintifs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001).
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and beverage market already features thousands of products, and is
growing rapidly. Manufacturers have used HFCS liberally as a
sweetener in almost every type of food and beverage imaginable
since the mid-1970's, including those labeled 'natural,' but health
and consumer advocates recently began to tout the detrimental effects of HFCS consumption on health. Consumers often purchase
these 'natural' products under the belief the product conjures some
sort of health benefit. The FDA, charged with regulating the vast
majority of products labeled 'natural' must take action to correct
consumer misconceptions and prevent unnecessary controversy while carefully avoiding the typical pitfalls surrounding any attempt
to create a new labeling regulation. Ultimately, the FDA must reach
a firm regulatory conclusion that HFCS cannot be used as an ingredient on food and beverages labeled 'natural.'
A. Current Trends and FDA Regulation of the Phrase 'Natural'on Food
and Beverage Labels
A consumer walking into any supermarket will find a dizzying
array of products sporting labels claiming 'natural.' Recent reports
have, in fact, suggested at least 55,000 products use the word natural
on their label.'
The sale of 'natural' food and beverages far outpaced the sale of food and beverages labeled 'organic,' with estimated 2008 sales of $22.3 billion compared to $4.9 billion, respectively. 2 The sales figures for 'natural' represent a ten percent increase over 2007 sales and a thirty-seven percent increase from 2004
sales.'2 1 Sales for 'natural' labeled food and beverages are predicted
to continue to increase even further while sale of organic labeled
food and beverages appears to be leveling off.27
124. Brandweek.com, 'Natural' Beats 'Organic' in Food Sales, http://www.
brandweek.com/bw/content display/news-and-features/green-marketing/e3ilc36b
1b7ff4e76c1d373280605794dc0 [hereinafter NaturalBeats Organic] (last visited Sept.
21, 2009).
125. Id. Other studies do indicate different sales figures and illustrate the total
amount of sales for the 'natural' and 'organic' labels can fluctuate greatly depending on the types of products included. See Food Marketing Institute, Natural and
Organic Sales (2007), available at http://www.fmi.org/media/bg/natural
organic foods.pdf (totaling 2006 sales of 'organic' labeled food and beverages at
$16.9 billion); see also Meredith Niles, New Data Show 2008 Organic Sales Will Reach
$32.9 Billion, GRisT, Sept. 11, 2008, available at http://www.grist.org/article/theorganic-times-are-a-changin (grouping 'natural' and 'organic' food sales together
and finding 2008 combined sales projected to reach $32.9 billion).
126. Natural Beats Organic, supra note 123.
127. Id.
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Consumers generally perceive 'natural' food and beverages as
healthier than other products, but the 'natural' label often confers
no health benefits and in some cases may even be less healthy than
food and beverages not bearing such a label.'" The FDA's current
policy on the use of the word 'natural' is not to restrict its use except
for banning the addition of any added color, artificial or synthetic
substances not normally expected to be in the food or beverage."
This somewhat amorphous definition means manufacturers can easily craft their products to fit within the existing labeling regulations.
However, this creative process often comes at the expense of consumers - albeit, consumers being misled by their own perceptions.
For example, both fat and salt are naturally occurring substances,
meaning inherently unhealthy food and beverages, like potato chips,
can be labeled 'natural."" These 'natural' products often contain
much greater amounts of fat and salt than their 'un-natural' counterparts, completely undermining one of the main reasons consumers choose to purchase the 'natural' product.' The FDA itself admits consumers thinking 'natural' implies health benefits are confused by the term, but the FDA also explains 'natural' has a carefully
considered, and currently settled regulatory meaning.' Despite this
confusion, the FDA has denied requests to create a formal definition
citing a lack of resources and more pressing concerns in areas like
food safety.'
B. History and Controversy of High Fructose Corn Syrup

Adding to the confusion over the label use of 'natural' is the
FDA's current stance on whether products incorporating HFCS can
be labeled 'natural.' Scientists first created HFCS in 1957, and re128. See What Natural Really Means, supra note 7.
129. See 21 C.F.R. § 101.22 (1993) (created during the 1993 passage of the
NLEA).
130. What Natural Really Means, supra note 7.
131. Id.
132. United States Food and Drug Administration, Food Label Helps Consumers
Make Healthier Choices, http://www.fda.gov/consumer/updates/foodlabels
032708.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2009).
133. See Lorraine Heller, 'Natural' Will Remain Undefined Says FDA, FOOD
NAVIGAToR-USA, Jan. 4, 2008, available at http://www.foodnavigatorusa.com/Financial-Industry/Natural-will-remain-undefined-says-FDA;
see
also
Lorraine Heller, HFCS is Not 'Natural, Says FDA, FOOD NAVIGATOR-USA, Apr. 2,
2008, available at http:// www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Financial-Industry/HFCS-isnot-natural-says-FDA [hereinafter HFCS Not Natural] (mentioning petitions from
Sara Lee and the Sugar Refiners).
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fined the manufacturing process to reach its present day efficiency
in the 197o's.' HFCS, aided by exceptionally favorable government
policy, quickly became the sweetener of choice for American food
and beverage manufacturers."' HFCS provides certain advantages
to food and beverage manufacturers: it is sweeter and easier to mix
than sugar; acts as a preservative and can extend product shelf life;
and is more economical to purchase and transport.'3
More and
more products began to take advantage of these benefits and the
average American's yearly HFCS consumption increased every year
until a 1998 peak of about sixty pounds per person. 3 7 Today,
Americans consume more HFCS than almost any other country,
amounting to about forty-two pounds per person per year.'" One in
ten products ingested by Americans contains HFCS as an ingredient; including foods as unexpected as hamburger buns and 'healthy'
granola bars."'
Doctors, scientists, and dieticians recently began linking HFCS
with America's ever-increasing obesity and health problems.1 4o ReguFructose Corn Syrup, http://www.oukosher.org/index.php/
134. High
common/article/2489 (last visited Nov. 19, 2009); LindaJoyce Forristal, The Murky
World of High-Fructose Corn Syrup, WISE TRADITIONS IN FOOD, FARMING, AND THE
2001), available at http://www.westonaprice.org/
HEALING ARTS (Fall
motherlinda/cornsyrup. html [hereinafter Murky World].
135. Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), one of the pioneering producers of HFCS,
and also one of America's largest corn producers, was arguably one of the most
politically connected companies in the 1970's and 1980's. Then CEO Dwayne Andreas was considered a good friend of Ronald Reagan. Soon after taking office,
then president Reagan instituted a harsh sugar import quota, which greatly increased the price of sugar and forced major soft drink manufacturers to switch to
HFCS as a sweetener. Today ADM controls about one-third of the domestic HFCS
market, which brings ADM about $529 million in yearly profit. See Tom Philpott,
The Story Behind the Corn Industry's Annoying Ad Blitz, GRIST, Oct. 17, 2008
http://www.grist.org/article/the-bitter-with-the-sweet/ [hereinafter Ad Blitz] (last
visited Nov. 19, 2009).
136. Murky World, supra note 134; Guess What's Lurking in Your Food,
http://www.highfructosecornsyrup.org/2009/02/guess-whats-lurking-in-your-food.
html (last visited Nov. 19, 2009) (explaining when coke switched to HFCS in 1983 it
is estimated they saved $750 million).
137. Ad Blitz, supra note 135.
138. Karen Gaudette, Is High-Fructose Corn Syrup Making Us Fat?, SEArrLE TIMES,
Feb. 7, 2007, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/foodwine/
2003559833_syrupo7.html.
139. Ad Blitz, supra note 135; Dr. Lonnie Lowry, Thank You for Guzzling Corn
Syrup,
TMUSCLE,
http://www.tmuscle.com/freeonlinearticle/sports-body[hereinafter
training-performance-nutrition/thank-you-for-guzzling-corn-syrup
Guzzling Corn Syrup] (last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
140. See generally George A. Bray et al., Consumption of High-Fructose Corn Syrup in
Beverages May Play a Role in the Epidemic of Obesity, 79 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION
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larly consuming products containing high amounts of HFCS can be
a cause of type two diabetes, high blood pressure, and coronary artery disease."' Studies also show high amounts of ingested HFCS
can lead to leptin resistance."' Leptin is a hormone that helps the
body regulate hunger and energy expenditure."' When a body becomes resistant to leptin, rapid weight gain and obesity quickly follow."' Increased fructose consumption also leads to disruption of
cell functioning and aging."' Some critics point out the widespread
use of HFCS may be damaging to the environment as well as consumers' health."'
The supposed deleterious health effects and laboratory origins
of HFCS have led many to argue food and beverages using HFCS as
an ingredient should not be allowed to use the word 'natural' on the
label."' The Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) fired
the first salvo in the natural war against HFCS, threatening suit
against manufacturers Kraft and Cadbury Schweppes. CSPI alleged
fraud because Kraft and Cadbury Schweppes labeled their respective
beverages, Capri Sun, and 7Up, as 'natural' despite ingredients
prominently featuring, among other seemingly synthetic ingredi-

537, 537-43 (2004), available at http://www.ajcn.org/cgi/ content/fuIl/79/4/537
[hereinafter Consumption of HFCS]; Carolyn Poirot, High-Fructose Corn Syrup Fueling
Obesity

Epidemic, Doctors Say,

SEATTLE

TIMES,

Dec.

4,

2005,

available at

http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/ health/2002658491 healthsyrupO4.html;
but cf Daniel Engber, Dark Sugar: The Decline and Fall of High-Fructose Corn Syrup,
SLATE, April 28, 2009, available at http://www.slate.com/id/2216796/ (noting the
perceived detrimental effects of a diet containing large amounts of HFCS, but also
finding those claims lacking hard evidence and nothing indicates HFCS is any more
detrimental to health than normal sugar); Ad Blitz, supra note 135 (noting almost all
studies on HFCS appear to be somewhat flawed based on the fact sources of funding typically come from biased sources like the Corn Refiners or the Sugar Refiners).
141. Katherine Zeratsky, High-Fructose Corn Syrup: What are the Concerns?, Nutrition and Healthy Eating, http:// www.mayoclinic.com/health/high-fructose-cornsyrup/an01588 (last visited Sept. 18, 2009).
142. Consumption of HFCS, supra note 139 at 538; Christine Gulifoy, Fructose Sets
Table for Weight Gain Without Warning, GENETIC ENGINEERING AND BIOTECHNOLOGY
NEWS, Oct. 16, 2008, available at http://www.genengnews. com/news/
bnitem.aspx?name=43618189 [hereinafter Fructose Sets Table].
143. Fructose Sets Table, supra note 141.
144. Id.
145. Guzzling Corn Syrup, supra note 138.
146. Eviana Hartman, High-Fructose Corn Syrup: Not So Sweet for the Planet, THE
WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 9, 2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

dyn/content/article/2008/03/06/AR2008030603294.html.
147. HFSC Not Natural, supra note 132.
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ents, HFCS."" Both companies recognized the potential negative
publicity and damages were not worth the potential new sales created from the usage of the phrase 'natural,' and quickly agreed to
remove the word 'natural' from their respective beverages' labels
before the suits could move beyond the initial stages."'
The Corn Refiners Association (CRA) recently began to push
back against the negativity, launching an eighteen month campaign,
costing between $20-30 million, and targeting moms.'" The campaign included a very intensive Internet presence."' HFCS has also
begun to garner some very unlikely defenders. Marion Nestle, a
nutritionist and author of several food policy books and articles, says
HFCS is undeserving of all the scrutiny.1 She says HFCS causes a
similar effect on the human body as sugar, and a more likely culprit
causing the decrease in American health is the widespread consumption of sweeteners in general.'13 CSPI recently stated, although
148. Press Release, Center for Science in the Public Interest, Kraft is Sued for
Jan. 8, 2007, available at
Falsely Calling Capri Sun Drink "All Natural,"
http://www.cspinet.org/new/200701081.html; Press Release, Center for Science in
the Public Interest, CSPI to Sue Cadbury Schweppes Over "All Natural" 7UP, May
11, 2006, availableat http:// www.cspinet.org/new/200605111.html.
149. Meg Marco, Capri Sun: High-Fructose Corn Syrup No Longer "Natural",THE
CONSUMERIST, Jan. 23, 2007, available at http://consumerist.com/consumer/capriJessica Fraser, 7UP
sun/highfructose-corn-syrup-no-longer-natural-230839.php;
Drops "All Natural" Claim After CSPI Threatens Lawsuit, NATURAL NEWS, Jan. 17,
2007, availableat http://www.naturalnews.com/021443.html; see also supra note 38
and accompanying text.
150. Ad Blitz, supra note 135. The ads featured on www.sweetsurpirse.com depict
several outdoor scenarios. In several ads a child is offered an ice pop or fruit drink
containing HFCS and their mother objects, with as much gusto as if their child was
offered drugs. The snack offering mother then launches into a speech about how
HFCS comes from corn so it is 'natural,' safe, and no more harmful than sugar.
Newly informed, the first mother then gladly gives their child the HFCS-laden
snack.
151. See The Facts about High Fructose Corn Syrup, www.sweetsurpise.com (last
visited Sept. 27, 2009). The President of the Corn Refiners Association, charged
with damage control duty, left the very first reader comment for an article slightly
critical of HFCA. See Ad Blitz, supra note 135. Also, when entering a search on
Google for high fructose corn syrup the featured advertisement at the top of the
page is for www.sweetsurprise.com. See Google, High Fructose Corn Syrup,
http://www.google.com/search?sourceid=navclient&aq=lh&oq=high+f&ie=UTF8&rlz=1T4GGIHenUS264US265&q=high+fructose+corn+syrup (last visited Sept.
27, 2009).
152. See Lisa McLaughlin, Is High-Fructose Corn Syrup Really Good for You?, TIME,
2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/health/article/
Sept. 17,
0,8599,1841910,00.html [hereinafter Is HFCS Goodfor You?].
153. See id.; see also Melanie Warner, A Sweetener with a Bad Rap, NEW YORK TIMES,
July 2, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/02/business/
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it strongly maintains HFCS cannot be included in foods and beverages labeled 'natural', HFCS and sugar appear to be nutritionally
similar."
Two recent statements by the FDA did nothing but add to the
confusion. A website specializing in food and beverage issues submitted a request, through a FDA process which allows manufacturers with doubts on the usage of certain ingredients to request guidance, asking whether, under the current definitions, HFCS could be
considered natural.'" The FDA responded by stating the typical
process used to produce HFCS "would not be consistent with our...
policy regarding the use of the term 'natural.""" This statement
caused an immediate reaction from the powerful CRA.'" Based on
a different HFCS production process submitted by the Archer
Daniels Midland Company (ADM), a prominent and outspoken
CRA member, the FDA promptly (within three months) backtracked
and reverted to its original stance that HFCS production fit under
the current definition of 'natural." 8
C. Methods for the FDA to Create More Stringent Requirementsfor the
Appearance of 'Natural'on a Label
The recent lawsuits, coupled with widespread consumer confusion - acknowledged by even the FDA itself - indicate the FDA must

meet its statutory mandate by taking action to settle the current controversy surrounding the use of HFCS as an ingredient in food and
beverages labeled 'natural.'
Congress passed the NLEA with the
goal of educating consumers about misleading labels and also informing Americans about the connection between their health and
the foods and beverages they purchase.'
Creating easy to understand labels is a duty Congress clearly intended for the FDA. The
yourmoney/02syrup.html. But see Guzzling Corn Syrup, supra note 139 (explaining
HFCS is metabolized differently than sugar).
154. See Is HFCS Goodfor You?, supra note 152.
155. HFSC Not Natural,supra note 133.
156. Id.
157. Laura Crowley, HFCS is Natural, Says FDA in a Letter, Food Navigator-USA,
July
8,
2008, available at http://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/FinancialIndustry/HFCS-is-natural-says-FDA-in-a-letter [hereinafter HFCS is Natural].
158. Id. See also Letter from Geraldine A. June, Supervisor FDA Product Evaluation and Labeling Team, to Audrae Erickson, President Corn Refiners Association,
July 8, 2008, available at http://www.corn.org/FDAdecision7-7-08. pdf [hereinafter
HFCS Letter].
159. National Councilfor Improved Health v. Shalala, 122 F.3d 878, 880 (10th Cir.
1997).
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FDA also recognizes this important responsibility toward consumers,
as Barbara Schneeman, Ph.D., Director of the FDA's Office of Nutrition, Labeling, and Dietary Supplements, recently explained, "the
food label is one of the most valuable tools consumers have."1" The
FDA is also required to provide manufacturers with guidance to ensure food and beverage production practices fall within federal requirements."' The FDA, by not crafting a firm answer to whether
HFCS can be used as an ingredient in food and beverages labeled
'natural' is failing both of these tasks. However, a careful consideration of the optimal dedication of agency resources is necessary before the FDA chooses the best path to rectify this shortcoming.
The FDA previously attempted to stringently regulate 'natural'
during the passage and implementation of the NLEA before ultimately settling on the current policy due to resource limitations.'"
The FDA regulates an unfathomably large amount of products,
which account for about $1 trillion in consumer spending every
year, or twenty-five cents of every consumer dollar spent in AmerDespite this wide swath of responsibility, the FDA is freica.'

160. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Food Label Helps Consumers Make Healthier Choices, http://www.fda.gov/ forconsumers/consumerupdates/ucm094536.htm
(last visited Sept. 27, 2009).
161. 21 C.F.R. § 10.85 (2009).
162. Food Labeling, supra note 42. See Proposed Trade Regulation Rule; explanation of Proceeding and Analysis: Statement of Issues; Opportunity to Submit Data,
Views or Arguments, 39 Fed. Reg. 39,842, 39.844 (proposed Nov. 11, 1974) (to be
codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 437). Proposed Trade Regulation Rule 40 Fed. Reg.
23,086, 23,090 (proposed May 28, 1975) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 437). Final
Notice Regarding Proposed Trade Regulation Rule, 41 Fed. Reg. 8,980, 8,982 (Mar.
2, 1976) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 437). The FTC ultimately terminated the
rulemaking in 1983 because of the difficulty in defining 'natural' in manner that
would be meaningful to a consumer in the wide variety of situations that manufacturers use the term 'natural.' See Termination of Proposed Trade Regulation; Rule
on Food Advertising, 48 Fed. Reg. 23,270 (proposed May 24, 1983) (to be codified
at 16 C.F.R. 437) (explaining consumers do not expect the same thing from 'natural' apples that they do from 'natural' ice cream). The FTC ultimately concluded to
concentrate their resources on "more serious consumer protection problems. Id.
163. Jane E. Henney, M.D., Comm's of Food and Drugs, U.S. Food and Drug
Admin., Remarks at the Ass'n of Am. Medical Colleges Council of Teaching Hospitals Spring Meeting (May 11, 2000) (transcript available at http://www.
See also Nicole Gavotte and
fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/ucm054216.htm).
Duane Stafford, Obama Budget Boosts Food-Safety with Record FDA Hike (update2),
apps/news?pid
bloomberg.com, May 7, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/
=20601202&sid=aqJqlXskQm4A(last visited Sep. 26, 2009).
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Members of
quently described as "chronically underfunded.""
Congress referred to recent FDA budget as "grossly inadequate" to
meet the extensive demands placed upon the agency.'" The FDA
2009 budget saw only a $130 million increase from 2008; all of this
new money is already earmarked for issues of food protection,
medical device safety, and administrative costs." President Obama
has indicated renewed commitment to the FDA.'" However, President Obama and Congress dedicated no money in the American
and Reinvestment Act specifically to the FDA.I" Further, the majority of this newfound presidential commitment revolves around a
renewed vigor to strengthen America's food safety, especially in
light of the recent tainted peanut and pistachio- fueled salmonella
scares.'" Despite these limitations, the FDA cannot continue with
the current weak and waffling policy on HFCS. The FDA must follow the Congressional intent behind the passage of the NLEA and
remove the ambiguity surrounding whether HFCS can be considered a 'natural' ingredient.
Both Sara Lee Corporation and the Sugar Refiners of America
recently petitioned the FDA to harmonize its definition of natural
with that of the USDA in order to maintain consistency across federal agencies regarding the usage of 'natural."o The USDA curMary Mosquera, Lawmakers Say Budget Underfunds FDA, FEDERAL COMPUTER
Feb. 5, 2008, available at http://fcw.com/articles/2008/02/05/lawmakerssay-budget-underfunds-fda.aspx.
165. Id.; see also Lisa Richwine, Obama Picks FDA Chief Starts Food Safety Panel,
2009,
available
at
http://www.reuters.com/
REUTERS,
March
14,
article/idUSTRE52DOKJ20090314 [hereinafter Obama Picks FDA Chief ] .
166. U.S. Food and Drug Admin., 2009 FDA Budget Summary Fact Sheet (2009),
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/BudgetReports/
2009FDABudgetSummary/ucm111422.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2009).
167. See Jeremy P. Jacobs, Obama Vows to Improve the FDA, THE HILL, March 14,
2009, http://thehill.com/leading-the-news/obama-vows-to-improve-the-fda-2009-0314.html [hereinafter Obama Vows to Improve the FDA] (last visited Sept. 26, 2009). See
also Obama Picks FDA Chief, supra note 165.
168. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, H-R-1, 111th Cong.
(2009) (enacted), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
ARRA-publicjreview.
169. See Obama Vows to Improve the FDA, supra note 167; Obama Picks FDA Chief,
supra note 165.
170. See A. Bryan Endres, United States Food Law Update: Labeling Controversies,
Biotechnology Litigation, and the Safety of Imported Food, 3 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 253, 269270 (2007); Sara Lee Corp., Citizen Petition Requesting FDA to Develop Requirements for the Use of the Term "Natural" Consistent with the USDA's Food Safety
Service
(Apr. 9,
2007), available at www.fda.gov/
and
Inspection
ohrms/dockets/dockets/07p0147/07p-0147-ackOO01-voll.pdf; HFCS Not Natural,
supra note 132.
164.
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rently regulates 'natural' labeling claims on meat and poultry.'
These policies are substantially similar to the FDA policy, but impose an additional requirement that meat or poultry be 'minimally
processed."' However, the USDA regulates a significantly smaller
variety of products than the FDA. In fact, very few USDA products
even feature multiple ingredients,'" and almost no USDA product
uses HFCS as an ingredient, so the FDA cannot easily use the
USDA's 'natural' definition to solve the current problem."'
A rulemaking procedure to define 'natural,' however, is not the
answer either because any agency attempting to formulate a standard regulatory definition for a broad category of food conjures
upon itself an enormous crunch of agency resources - both monetary and personnel.7 The USDA encountered this problem first
hand when it attempted to create formal regulations for the label
usage of 'organic.' Congress first charged the USDA with creating a
set of organic farming standards with the passage of the Organic
Foods Production Act as part of the 1990 Farm Bill."' The USDA's
initial attempt to craft a definition was met with the most comments

of any regulation in USDA history: over 275,000.'" More than ten
years passed before the USDA issued a final rule in 2002.'" Both
'organic' and 'natural' have similar markets and are used on millions

171. USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service, Meat and Poultry Labeling
Terms, http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Fact Sheets/Meat_&_PoultryLabelingTerms/
index.asp (last visited Sept. 27, 2009).
172. Id.
173. See id. (listing the different USDA label requirements for meat and poultry).
174. The USDA is currently in the midst of a rulemaking to remove specific ingredients from the definition of 'natural' and the FDA may eventually be able to
use this rulemaking as a loose template for an alternative method to regulate HFCS
without having to undertake a massive full blown 'natural' definition. See Product
Labeling Definition of the Term "Natural", 71 Fed. Reg. 233, 70, 504-04 (Dec. 5,
2008), availableat http-//www.thefederal register.com/d.p/2006-12-05-06-9546.
175. See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative
Law, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1749 (2007) (describing traditional procedures and obstacles an agency faces when undergoing a rulemaking); Mark Seidenfeld, A Table of
Requirementsfor FederalAdministrative Rulemaking, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 533, 36-37
(2000) (summarizing the exact requirements every agency must fulfill during a
rulemaking).
176. Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-624, (codified at 7 USC
§ 6501-6522 2000).
177. Michelle T. Friedland, You Call That Organic? - The USDA's Misleading Food
Regulations, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 379, 383 (2005).
178. USDA Economic Research Service, Final Organic Rule Governs Marketing
and Production, http://www.ers.usda. gov/features/organic/ (last visited Sept. 27,
2009).
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of products, so the FDA can reasonably infer from the USDA's
tribulations what an attempt to define the term 'natural' might cost.
The FDA, currently spread thin due to a lack of resources, and
charged by the new administration with shifting their mission and
majority of new resources heavily towards food safety, cannot afford
to waste twelve years of precious resources and personnel on formally defining 'natural."' Undertaking a formal - or even informal
notice and comment - rulemaking to define the usage of every food
and beverage labeled 'natural' will exacerbate the current resource
problems frequently cited by the FDA.'o
The FDA also cannot merely issue another advisory opinion or
guidance document on whether HFCS is 'natural.' The FDA flipflopped their stance twice in a matter of months, weakening the current policy and creating uncertainty.'"' Manufacturers need the FDA
to take a reliable stance to avoid multi-million dollar lawsuits despite
acting in good faith and ostensibly following FDA regulations.

179. Due to the massively growing 'natural' label food market and the potential
for controversy and confusion surrounding the meaning of 'natural' the FDA will
eventually need to find resources to create a formal rule for natural, and this may
very well happen in the near future if the current administration keeps its promise
to continue to raise FDA funding. Creating a formal definition of 'natural' is even
more important with the recent focus on using the legislative process to quell
America's growing obesity problem placing an emphasis the connection between
food and health and leading towards the creation of ideas like New York's potential
new 'obesity tax' on soda. See David Leonhardt, Soda Tax a Tempting Target, NEW
www.nytimes.com/
YORK TIMES, May 19, 2009, available at http://
2009/05/20/business/economy/20eonhardt.html?_r-2&ref=business.
See also
generally Benjamin Montgomery, The American Obesity Epidemic: Why the U.S. Government Must Attack the CriticalProblems of Overweight and Obesity Through Legislation,
4 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 375 (2008) (putting forth various suggestion on how
government can use legislation to curb obesity and other self-induced health problems); David G. Yosifon, Legal Theoretic Inadequacy and Obesity Epidemic Analysis, 15
GEO. MASON L. REV. 681 (2008) (explaining the effects of laws on human behaviors,
with particular attention paid to the affect on obesity creating habits).
180. See Seidenfeld, supra note 175.
181. In response to a 2006 petition by the Sugar Refiners Association the FDA
cites their longstanding policy on the usage of HFCS in natural. See Letter from
Audrae Erickson, President, Corn Refiners Association, to FDA Dockets Management
Branch
(Nov.
14,
2006),
available at
http://www.fda.gov/
ohrms/DOCKETS/dockets/06p0094/06p-0094-c000004-voll.pdf.
The FDA reversed this longtime stance with a guidance letter written in April 2008 explaining
HFCS may not be considered natural. See HFSC Not Natural, supra note 132. But
then, after a meeting with an Archer Daniels Midland executive, the FDA quickly
reversed back to their original position within a few months. See HFCS is Natural,
supra note 157; HFCS Letter, supra note 158.
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Some scholars also criticize the FDA for using guidance documents
to create "de facto rules" that avoid procedural safeguards.' 2
The FDA need not undergo a complex and lengthy rulemaking
process to create a formal definition of 'natural' to solve this HFCS
controversy, but can still provide an optimal solution by conducting
an informal notice and comment rulemaking to determine whether
HFCS is considered synthetic or artificial, regardless of the process
used for creation. Finding HFCS synthetic precludes it from being
used as an ingredient in products labeled 'natural' and avoids the
need to create a regulatory definition for the entire class of 'natural'
products. Determining whether HFCS is synthetic is also more of a
marketing issue for labeling usage and can then avoid the loaded
question of whether the consumption of HFCS is truly detrimental
to ones' health. This means many comments can be avoided, greatly
truncating the notice and comment process. Choosing this smallscale regulation path will ultimately prove optimal because it is the
quickest and most budget conscious method to provide a firm answer and obviate the potential for ample controversy in a hot topic
area that the FDA is mandated to govern.
D. The FDA Needs to Create a Regulation Banning the Use of High Fructose Corn Syrup in Food and Beverages Labeled 'Natural'
Any decision the FDA makes on the usage of HFCS must take
into account both the scientific origins of HFCS as well as consumers' expectations for a 'natural' product. The FDA's current policy
on 'natural' is not based on a traditional dictionary definition of the
words natural and synthetic,'" but the majority of Americans nevertheless think food and beverages labeled 'natural' are healthier
products, or at the very least do not contain ingredients formulated
through a multiple-step laboratory process.'" Not only is HFCS not
found in nature, but the HFCS production uses chemical processes
and laboratory created enzymes, or as described in Holk: "enzymatically catalyzed chemical reactions in factories.""
182. Lars Noah, The Little Agency that Could (Act with Indifference to Constitutional
and Statutory Strictures), 93 CORNELL L. REv. 901, 905 (2008).
183. Food Labeling, supra note 42. Even dictionaries have a hard time defining
'natural.'
Dictonary.com lists 38 separate definitions, http://dictionary.
reference.com/browse/natural?qsrc-2888 (last visited Mar. 30, 2010), and Merriam
Webster lists 15 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/natural (last visited
Mar. 30, 2010).
184. See What NaturalReally Means, supra note 7.
185. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 574 F.Supp. 2d 447, 449 (D. N.J. 2008).
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The modern HFCS production method starts with the fructose
found in corn.'" HFCS manufactures begin the production process
by treating cornstarch with a purified enzyme, alpha-amylase, producing shorter chains of sugar called polysaccharides." Then another enzyme, glucoamylase, breaks the polysaccharides down even
further, into glucose. A third enzyme, glucose-isomerase is then
used to convert the glucose into a mixture of about forty-two percent fructose and between fifty and fifty-two percent glucose, with
some other sugars mixed in. Glucose-isomerase is expensive, so
unlike the first two enzymes which are simply added to the mixture,
glucose-isomerase is packed into columns with a synthetic fixing
agent, and the sugar mixture is passed over it. The glucoseisomerase is reused until it loses its activity. Two other steps, involving a liquid chromatography and back-blending are used to convert
the forty-two percent fructose mixture into industry standard HFCS.
CRA argues none of these 'synthetic fixing agents' actually
comes into contact with the soon-to-be HFCS, and the artificial
agents are washed away before the end product is created.'" The
mere presence, and requirement, of these artificial fixing agents, is
however, mocking the FDA's current policy on 'natural.' Clearly a
synthetic ingredient is being added and included in the food, but
HFCS escapes scrutiny by removing or washing the synthetic ingredient from the end product."' The FDA needs to close this washing
process loop hole.
The FDA also admits HFCS can be created from different processes, one method falling within the current 'natural' usage policy
and other methods falling outside that policy.'" The FDA does not
have the resources to determine which process a manufacture used
to create the HFCS that ultimately ends up in food or beverages
labeled natural."' If the FDA itself cannot easily identify whether a
particular HFCS production process is the process falling within the
'natural' definition, consumers stand little or no chance. Therefore,
in order to live up to the Congressional mandates of the FDCA and
186. Murky World, supra note 134.
187. Holk, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 450; Murky World, supra note 134.
188. HFCS Letter, supra note 158.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See FDA, Guide to Inspection of Manufacturers of Miscellaneous Food Products - Volume II, http://www.fda. gov/ora/Inspect ref/igs/foodsp2a.html (last
visited Sept. 16, 2009) (listing FDA inspection techniques and requirements); see also
Obama Picks FDA Chief, supra note 165 (explaining the FDA only possesses the resources to inspect 7,000 out of approximately 150,000 food-processing plants).
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NLEA, based on the science behind the production of HFCS, and
consumer perceptions, the FDA must undertake a rulemaking, and
after considering all the evidence, issue formal regulations declaring
HFCS 'synthetic' or artificial and ineligible for use in food and beverages labeled 'natural.'
V. CONCLUSION

Americans today are facing a health crisis and are turning to
the food they eat to rectify this problem. These same Americans are
increasingly using food and beverage labels as a means to achieve
their goals of improved health. Consumers put great stock in the
supposed health benefits of food and beverages labeled 'natural'
without knowing the true contents of these same 'natural' products.
The FDA, however, has a statutory mandate to educate consumers
about the relation between the food they purchase and its label, and
also protect against misleading labeling. Congress also gave the
FDA the express power to create, and also modify, federally standardized labeling requirements. Well-settled standardized labels
benefit both consumers and manufacturers alike. Nonetheless, the
administrative world is not perfect, and the FDA must make tough
choices on how to best achieve its mandates and still balance the
often competing interests of manufacturers and consumers.
Consumers, frustrated with the results of this balancing act, recently attempted to use state tort law to challenge the FDA's flimsy
definition of 'natural.' These suits ignore the FDA's carefully considered policy choices relating to the phrase 'natural,' as well as
Congress' intention to give the FDA the sole power to make these
choices. Holk, properly recognizing the ultimate preemptory power
of both FDA regulations and the FDCA, dismissed the claim by its
plaintiff. Lockwood failed to realize the myriad of reasons why its
plaintiffs claim should be dismissed due to implied preemption.
Congressional intent through the passage of the FDCA and NLEA,
combined with the FDA's regulations and policy statements on the
use of the term 'natural' - even if considered by some to be inadequate or inconsistent - preempts state laws. Judges should also not
attempt to color in potential gray areas involving the definition of
'natural' and the usage of HFCS. They should instead defer to
agency expertise and apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. In
the future, similar suits should be dismissed for these preemptory
reasons, and in the alternative due to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
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A tempest of controversy is brewing around the usage of HFCS,
and many parties are claiming HFCS just is not 'natural.' The FDA
needs to flex its ultimate decision making muscle and create a firm
regulation pertaining to the usage of HFCS. The FDA can quell any
controversy or confusion by finding HFCS synthetic and thus not
allowed in food and beverages wishing to use the labeling term
'natural.' In the end, the word corn is truly the only part of High
Fructose Corn Syrup that fits any definition of 'natural.'
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INTRODUCTION

Americans are increasingly sensitive to the conditions under
which the foods they purchase and consume are produced. It is
becoming commonplace for consumers to incorporate perceived
environmental impacts,' animal welfare concerns,' and other process
attributes' into food purchase decisions. Increased interest in production practices and technologies employed in food production
has been seen in the U.S. specifically concerning irradiation, antibiotics, and hormone and pesticide use.' Perhaps one of the most
controversial technologies employed in food production today is the
use of genetic engineering.' Not surprisingly, consumers are particularly sensitive about practices employed or technologies used in
foods produced specifically for infants or young children,' making
labeling and marketing of products for such special-interest segments of the population an area of continued controversy.
With regards to livestock, consumers are interested in the production practices employed for raising meat and milk in the U.S.
and the resulting animal welfare implications.! Analyses of the
treatment of chickens with regard to cages for laying hens,' gestation
crates used in pork production,' systems for dairy cattle used in milk
production," treatment of dairy calves," and production systems for
1.

See generally Chris

Foster

et

al.,

ENVIRONMENTAL

IMPACTS

OF FOOD

PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPION: A REPORT TO THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT,

FOOD,

AND

RURAL AFFAIRS,

(2006)

available at http://

randd.defra.gov.uk/

document.aspx?Document=ev02007_4601_FRP.pdf.
2. See Gaverick Matheny & Cheryl Leahy, Farm-Animal Welfare, Legislation, and
Trade, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 325, 347-48 (2007).

3. Consumers are concerned with whether food is grown locally, on a family
farm, produced by laborers paid a livable wage, produced in the U.S., etc.
4. Rodolfo M. Nayga, Jr., Sociodemographic Influences on Consumer Concern for
Food Safety: The Case of Irradiation,Antibiotics, Hormones, and Pesticides, 18 REV. OF
AGIC. ECON. 467 (1996).
5. Diane Thue-Vasquez, Genetic Engineering and Food Labeling: A Continuing
Controversy, 10 SANJOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 77, 80 (2000).
6. See David B. Schweikhardt & William P. Browne, Politics by Other Means: The
Emergence of a New Politics of Food in the United States, 23 REV. OF AGRIc. ECON. 302,
312-313 (2001).
7. See Gaverick Matheny & Cheryl Leahy, Farm-Animal Welfare, Legislation, and
Trade, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 325, 356 (2007).

8. Id. at 330-31.
9. Id. at 331.
10. Julie Morrow, An Overview of Current Dairy Welfare Concerns from the
North American Perspective (2002) available at http://www.nal.usda.gov/
awic/pubs/dairy/overview.htm.
11. Id.
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rearing veal calves" are abundant. Today's increasingly savvy consumers are concerned about the treatment of livestock or welfare of
animals used to produce meat and milk products. 3 As information
regarding welfare implications of production practices employed on
farms producing meat and milk for the American public becomes
more abundant and easily accessible, it is conceivable that consumers will continue to include such information in making their purchasing decisions.
Complicating the discussion regarding animal welfare implications of production systems is the lack of ability to verify each claim
by traditional methods." Many of the animal rearing, handling, and
housing claims made are credence attributes of the production
processes employed in animal rearing. The welfare of animals associated with food production is often highlighted as a credence
attribute due the inability of the consumer to detect the conditions
under which the animal was raised when either purchasing or consuming an animal product, such as meat or milk. Producers wishing to label their products as possessing these attributes must find
ways to convey to the consumer that the claims they are making can
be substantiated. One such method available for producers today is
to participate in a Process Verified Program (PVP) and label their
production processes with the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Process Verified term and logo."
This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the Grain Inspectors, Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) PVP with spe-

12. Matheny & Leahy, supra note 7, at 337.
13. See generally L. J. Frewer et al., Consumer Attitudes Towards the Development of
Animal-Friendly Husbandry Systems 18 J. AGR. ENVIRON. ETHICS, 18, 4, 345-46 (2005).
14. Traditional methods used to verify statements regarding production systems
refer to testing of some kind to determine if the labeling is truthful and not misleading to consumers. Furthermore, the "test" would need to be accepted by the
governing agency in order to be valid in this context. As technology advances it is
likely that there will be periods in time in which a "test" is available although it is
not yet recognized by the governing agency.
15. Credence attributes refer to attributes which cannot be observed by the consumer at the point of sale or after consumption.
16. Alois Ch. et al., 2003, Consumers' Perception of Credence Attributes in
Quality Labeling of Food available at http://oega.boku.ac.at/fileadmin/
user upload/Tagung/2003/gimplinger.pdf.
17. Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration Federal Grain
Inspection Service, USDA Directive 9180.79. App. I - Process Verified Program(Jan.
2005) available at http://archive.gipsa.usda.gov/ reference-library/directives/918079.pdf.
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cific focus on livestock production systems." Key limitations of the
current PVP system of verification are highlighted and market solutions, as well as regulatory solutions, are proposed and analyzed.
With such interest by consumers in the welfare implications of various production practices, animal rearing systems, and animal handling practices or facilities employed, there is a need for in-depth
analysis regarding possible mechanisms available to label lawfully
production practices which cannot be verified through traditional
methods. Without the ability to test meat or milk and determine the
production practices employed, housing system used, or welfare
implications of animal rearing practices on the animal, producers
must find alternative ways to verify claims regarding production systems and production practices.
Part I outlines credence and process attributes and highlights
the difficulties involved with verifying and labeling such attributes.
Part II evaluates market movements towards credence goods in
animal products, such as meat and milk, including the responses of
the producer and retailer to changes in consumer demand. Part III
provides an analysis of the existing PVP verification and labeling
system and examples of current PVPs in use. Part IV investigates
the incentives for verification of credence attributes in livestock
production for both the retailers and the producers. Part V evaluates possible solutions, including market-based and legislatively imposed solutions, for dealing with the verification of credence attribute claims regarding livestock products.
I. CREDENCE AND PROCESS ATrRIBUTES: AN OVERVIEW

Credence attributes refer to attributes which cannot be observed by the consumer at the point of sale or after consumption."
In other words, credence attributes are indiscernible to the consumer before purchase, during, and even after consumption. It is
widely accepted that, "[c]redence attributes can describe content or

18. Arguably, production practices regarding grains, fruits, vegetables, and other
food products face labeling and verification issues regarding credence attributes
and production processes employed. However, due to the vast differences between
production systems for livestock versus crops livestock production processes alone
will be focused upon in this paper.
19. Alois Ch. Gimplinger, Klaus Salhofer, and Stefan Vogel, Consumers' Perception of Credence Attributes in Quality Labeling of Food(2003) available at
http://oega.boku.ac.at/fileadmin/user-upload/Tagung/2003/ gimplinger.pdf.

2009]1

ATTRIBUTES IN LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION

185

process characteristics of the product."2 Content attributes refer to
the physical properties of a given product or food.2 ' The protein
content of a piece of chicken or fish is an example of a content attribute, which may not be easily discernable by the consumer. Process attributes, a subset of credence attributes, refer to the specific
production processes used.' Process attributes are often difficult to
detect,3 as they are attributes specific to the production of a prod-

uct, and not the product itself. In fact, in many cases, "neither consumers nor special testing equipment can detect process attributes."2 ' An example of a process attribute is "earth-friendly" management practices; the attribute refers to the practices used rather
than the product itself.
II. MARKET MOVEMENTS TOWARDS CREDENCE ATTRIBUTES IN
LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION

A market can be defined loosely as any set of arrangement
where buyers and sellers are allowed to communicate and arrange
the exchange of goods, services, or resources. A well functioning
market allows consumers to signal to producers what they desire
and are willing to pay for. Changes in consumer demand signal
through market channels to producers (or sellers) changes in consumer tastes and preferences.
Changes in policies and production practices by food producers
have been increasingly consumer-demand driven rather than governed by changing regulations.2 ' The growth in "politics by other
means - politics practiced through the market" has allowed interest
groups to pursue political objectives through the market system
rather than through more traditional legislative channels.' Recent
changes in production systems for dairy and meat products (among
other food products) can be attributed to market pressures, rather
20. Elise Golan, Barry Krissoff & Fred Kuchler, Food Traceability: One Ingredient
in a Safe and Efficient Food Suppy, AMBER WAVES (Apr. 2004) available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/April04/ Features/FoodTraceability.htm.
21. Id.
22. Atos Origin, TRACEABILITY SOLUTIONS FOR THE FOOD, DRINK AND LIFE
5-6 (2004) available at http://www.atosorigin.com/
SCIENCES INDUSTRIES,
NR/rdonlyres/7895D198-48CB-49BA-A2EE-D313E247A
E78/0/sp-cpgTraceability.pdf.
23. Id. at 6.
24. Food Traceability,supra note 20.
25. Schweikhardt & Browne supra note 6, at 302-03.
26. Id. at 304.
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than changes in legislation. The recent movement away from rBST
use in milk production in various regions of the U.S. is an example
of changes in production systems initiated via the market rather
than through changes in regulations."
A. Consumer Demandfor Processes
"Consumer sovereignty," as defined by economist William Hutt,
refers to "the controlling power exercised by free individuals in
choosing between ends, over the custodians of the community's resources."" As stated by Douglas A. Kysar, "[i]t is not immediately
obvious, therefore, why the sphere of influence entrusted to consumers should be held to stop at the physical dimensions of the
product, excluding all aspects of the product's processing history
that do not directly bear on its price, safety, or functionality."2 9 If
consumers are free to choose according to their tastes and preferences, why should those tastes and preferences be limited to the
physical (or testable) dimensions of the products which they purchase? Consumers, as evident in purchasing decisions, are certainly
capable of placing value on production processes.
Although preferences for processes are sometimes seemingly
"discounted" due to an inability to test for product differences, history shows that consumers do indeed have preferences for credence
attributes. Numerous studies have investigated consumer preferences for various credence attributes, including "eco-friendly, no use
of growth hormones, non-genetically-modified, and shade-grown"
claims." While results from studies investigating consumer preferences vary, there is a general consensus that certain segments of the
population are willing to pay more for foods which are labeled as
having certain credence attributes."
27. See generally Clayton Cook-Mowery, Nicole J. Olynk, & Christopher A. Wolf,
Farm-Level Contractingfor Production Process Attributes: An analysis of RBST in Milk
Production, 14 JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW AND POLICY 177 (2008).

28. William Hutt, The Concept of Consumers' Sovereignty, 50 ECoN. J. 66, 66
(1940).
29. Douglas A. Kysar, Preferencesfor Processes: the Process/ProductDistinction and the
Regulation of Consumer Choice CORNELL L. SCHOOL LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPERS,

PAPER 8 at 5 (Cornell L. School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 2004) available
at http://sr.nellco.org/cornell/lsrp/papers/8.
30. Wendy J. Umberger et al., Country-of-Origin Labeling of Beef Products: U.S.
Consumers' Perceptions, Paper Presented at the 2003 FAMPS Conference (March 2021, 2003) available at http://www.iowafarm bureau.com/programs/commodity/
pdf/cool-usconsumerperceptions.pdf.
31. Id.
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B. RetailerResponse to Consumer Demand
The literature examining retailer responses to consumer demand is large and diverse; however, an overriding theme is that retailers respond to consumer demand and, fundamentally, must provide a product which consumers are willing to purchase. Many meat
products, for example, are differentiated according to product attributes." Consumers may have some willingness to pay for content
attributes, but they also have some willingness to pay for credence
attributes. Retailers are able to respond to "politics practiced
through the market"" relatively quickly (in comparison to legislative
changes) and alter the production systems used for the products
they sell, thereby effecting change in animal welfare standards in the
industry." In the U.S., the largest reforms for animal welfare standards for food production animals were initiated by restaurants.
Retailers take their reputations on claims regarding production
practices used in producing or processing the food products which
it sells. Further, the visibility and name recognition of retailers
makes them targets for campaigns for change in production processes. Such recognition in the public eye means that retailers may
be driven to compete for ever-increasing standards and levels of
animal welfare." In short, retailers are competing to offer the "best"
options to consumers in the way of credence attributes. This
movement is simply another example of retailers moving to serve
changing tastes and preferences of consumers; the difference is that
now consumers are voicing preferences for processes rather than
simply commodity products.
Given the high value of consumer goodwill and trust in retailer
names, retailers must be cognizant of the potential liabilities associated with "standing behind" a false or misleading claim. With all
that the retailers have at stake in their reputation and consumer
goodwill and trust, retailers will likely seek ways to verify producer
and processor claims regarding production practices, especially
those processes to which consumers are highly sensitive, such as
animal welfare.
32. John D. Lawrence, The Cost of Meeting Consumer Demand, 2004 IOWA BEEF
38
available at http://www.beefimprovement.org/proceedings/
04proceedings/lawrence.pdf.
33. Schweikhardt & Browne, supra note 6, at 304.
34. Note that standards here are not regulatory standards per say, but are the
processes which are accepted as standard within an industry.
35. Matheny & Leahy, supra note 7 at 356.
36. Id.
CENTER,

188

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 5:181

C. ProducerResponses to RetailerDemand
Individual producers must make decisions regarding changes
which are initiated by the retailer in response to the consumer demands which the retailer perceives. " In short, the individual producer has the retailer as its consumer." In order to sell in the market, the producer must provide a product for which the retailer has
demand."
A key component of the decision facing the individual producer
is the assessment of the costs and benefits of changing production
processes employed. Food producers will make decisions regarding
whether or not to supply a product or certain product attributes
based upon comparison of the cost of doing so versus the additional
payment received for doing so.
III. LIVESTOCK AND USDA PROCESS VERIFIED PROGRAMS40

The GIPSA has official procedures in place for verification of
products and services associated with marketing these products."
Verification services through GIPSA are voluntary and provided to
producers, marketers, processors, and other associated service providers of agricultural products for a fee." Given the mission of the
GIPSA to facilitate marketing of agricultural commodities, GIPSA
recognizes that standard testing and grading services do not adequately address emerging practices for marketing U.S. agricultural
products." "In response to changing consumer demands, the market is adopting a variety of new marketing mechanisms, such as
identity preservation, to augment traditional marketing approaches."" Overall, GIPSA's stated goal is to "add value in this

37. Cook-Mowery, Olynk, & Wolf, supra note 27 at 187.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. OFFICIAL LISTING OF APPROVED USDA PROCESS VERIFIED PROGRAMS. Last regetvised Sept. 1, 2009 available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/
file?dDocName=STELPRD3320450.
41. United States Department of Agriculture Grain Inspection, Packers and
Stockyards Administration Federal Grain Inspection Service, Directive 9180.79, 1
(Jan. 29, 2007) available at http://archive.gipsa.usda.gov/reference-library/
directives/9180-79.pdf.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2.
44. Id.
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evolving marketplace by augmenting, not supplanting, existing marketing practices.""
A. Process Verified Program Overview
The USDA states that, "[iln light of the ever-changing consumer, successful livestock producers must adapt their production
practices to consider consumers' lifestyles, preferences, and taste.""
The USDA offers a service by which a third party verifies a company's documented quality management program through audits to
aid producers in verifying production processes used on-farm." The
PVP uses a label with "USDA Process Verified" to boost confidence
of consumers in the product which they are purchasing."
The PVP is a voluntary program available at a fee to producers,
marketers, processors, and associated service providers of agricultural products to provide "verification of an organization's quality
management system where the organization" 1) shows an ability to
provide a product that meets customer and applicable regulatory
requirements, 2) aims to improve customer satisfaction through its
management system, and 3) identifies specific claims to use with the
USDA Process Verified term and logo." Operations with multiple
sites, which are expanding their quality management systems to include a group of locations, are able to use the USDA Multi-Site Verification Program (MSVP) which provides assurance that all parties
involved are following the PVP.s0
The guidelines provided for PVP participation are purposefully
generic as they are intended to apply to all organizations which provide a product or service regardless of the type of operation, size of
operation, or product provided." Such broad guidelines for PVP
45. Id.
46. United

STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, VERIFICATION SERVICES OF THE

2 (2008) available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/
AMS1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5065676.
47. GIPSA Directive, supra note 41 at 2.
48. United States Department of Agriculture Grain Inspection, Packers and
Stockyards Administration Federal Grain Inspection Service Directive 9180.79.
APPENDIX 1 -- Process Verified Program, 1-29-07 available at http://archive.
gipsa.usda.gov/reference-library/directives/9180-79.pdf.
49. Id.
50. United States Department of Agriculture Grain Inspection, Packers and
Stockyards Administration Federal Grain Inspection Service Directive 9180.79.
APPENDIX 2 - Multi-Site Verification Program, 1-29-07 available at
http://archive.gipsa.usda.gov/reference-library/directives/9180-79.pdf.
51. GIPSA Directive, supra note 41.
LIVESTOCK AND SEED PROGRAM
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development provide the opportunity for a wide variety of operations to use the UDSA Process Verified logo and benefit from the
PVP. However, difficulties may arise particularly within industries
where specific knowledge regarding processes may be required to
address adequately consumer concerns in process labeling.
Extensive guidance is given by GIPSA regarding requirements
and components of a PVP. Of particular interest in this analysis
are the "Process Verified Points" which top management must ensure "are established and stated in the quality manual and included
as part of the overall quality management system and must add
value to the product or service, [as well as] be substantive, verifiable,
repeatable and be within the scope of GIPSA's authority."" Further,
and importantly, "'Process Verified Points' may not be requirements
of regulations, the USDA Process Verified Program requirements,
or standards under which organizations in the same industry generally operate."" In short, USDA PVPs are limited to those programs
in which the process verified points are identified by the supplier
and are supported by a documented quality management system."
B. Process Verified ProgramLivestock Examples in Use
Currently reported claims verified by the USDA include age,
source, feeding practices, or raising and processing claims." Specifically, examples of claims associated with process verified points
given by the USDA and AMS are "grass (forage) fed, [n]ever-ever
claims such as [n]o antibiotics, [n]o [g]rowth [p]romotants
([h]ormones), and [n]o [a]nimal [b]y-products [a]dministered,
[b]reed.""
Even more specifically, claims listed as verified by the USDA
PVP which relate to livestock include "Unit of production traceability," "Source verified cattle," "Age verified cattle," "All pigs are
traceable to Farm of Origin," "Selected for meat quality," and "Genetic Validation."" Clearly wide ranges of claims are being verified
by the USDA PVP. The producers themselves must submit plans for
quality management and submit materials on how such claims can

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Programs,supra note 40, at 1, 5, and 8.
57. Verification Services, supra note 46, at 2.
58. Programs,supra note 40, at 4, 5, and 10.
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be verified." Due to the wide range of claims which are verified,
and the complexity of some of those claims, is the PVP program
becoming too diverse to adequately address all of the claims it verifies (even with the help of on-site audits)?
C. Potential Challenges of Process Verified Program Use in Livestock
Several challenges arise in the analysis of the PVP currently in
place for the verification of claims made by livestock producers. An
overarching question of whether the consumer places trust in the
USDA label remains. If such trust is eroded, the PVP term and logo
has less credibility in the marketplace.
The USDA PVP, as it currently operates, is quite general. Agricultural producers of all products, if using an approved PVP, use the
same term and logo on their labels. As competition among producers to provide credence process attributes increases, the general
verification statement by the USDA may be "too general" to distinguish the verification of processes in livestock versus other agricultural products. In other words, consumers may place higher value
on verification programs which are specific to a product, such as
meat or milk. A potential outcome of the general label is that in the
event of a negative episode involving mislabeling of process attributes, which either cannot be verified by the entity claiming to verify
the claim or which are found to be wrong, there is potential for
spillover due to the same label being used for all products. Further,
as processes become more complex in some arenas, such as livestock production practices, the potential for a mistake increases
unless specialized individuals are verifying their programs and process claims.
A problem inherent to all verification techniques, and not specific to the USDA PVP, is that retailers and consumers must trust
the verifying party in order for verification to be worthwhile.' Admittedly, there exists potential for erosion of consumer trust if any
claim, regardless of the method of verification, is found to be false
or unable to be verified. The argument made here is simply that to
mitigate the risks of a false or unverifiable claim being labeled incorrectly, individuals with knowledge and expertise specific to a given

59. GIPSA Directive App. 1, supra note 48, at 1.
60. Even in the event that consumers and retailers trust the verifying party completely, it is possible that the verification is not "worthwhile" if the costs of the verification are larger than the benefits of having the claim verified.
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production system or given agricultural sector should be employed,
and specialized verification systems and labels should be used.
IV. INCENTIVE TO VERIFY?

Several well-established and growing consumer advocate groups
exist as proponents of animal welfare. Recent changes in production practices have been increasingly driven by consumer demand
rather than by changes in regulations." This trend toward changes
in practices, in response to consumer groups rather than solely in
response to changes in regulation affected by more traditional
means, provides support for the expectation of continued change in
practices in response to animal welfare advocate groups. Additionally, this trend means that there are interested and committed
groups who are "policing" producers to make sure that claims made
regarding processes in livestock for food production are verifiable
and not misleading to consumers.
A. Retailers
Given the high value of consumers' goodwill and trust in retailers' names, retailers must be cognizant of the potential liabilities
associated with "standing behind" a false or misleading claim. With
all that the retailers have at stake in their reputation and consumer
goodwill and trust, retailers will likely seek ways to verify producer
and processor claims regarding production practices, especially
those processes to which consumers are highly sensitive, such as
animal welfare. Retailers may move toward putting forth more effort in verifying claims or stricter guidelines for products they put
their name on due to a desire to maintain their reputation and avoid
liabilities associated with misrepresenting products they sell. With
the consolidation and concentration of market power among retailers in the food industry, it is conceivable that verification of claims
could even become a "condition of sale."6 2
Retailer incentives for verification of claims regarding process
attributes, and the processes employed in production of, transportation of, and handling of the food they sell are fundamentally driven
by a desire to not be associated with a "misbranded" or mislabeled
product. " Proving that a product is mislabeled in the context of a
61.
62.
63.

See Schweikhardt & Browne supra note 6, at 303.
Lawrence, supra note 32, at 39.
Cook-Mowery, Olynk, & Wolf, supra note 27.
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credence attribute of the production process is likely more difficult
than proving mislabeling of physical content, but it is not impossible. A single disgruntled employee would be all that it takes to
bring scrutiny on labeling of production process attributes. While
the perceived risks of such a situation occurring may seem low to
some retailers, it is worthwhile to examine potential alternatives to
the existing PVP system which may strengthen labeling claims in the
eyes of the consumers.
B. Producers

Retailers have incentives for requiring verification of labeled
production process claims on products which they sell. The producers of the products themselves also have incentive for labeling
and verifying claims on production process attributes of the products which they produce. Producers want consumers to believe the
label claims. Further, producers want to maintain credibility, and
therefore do not want to make claims which they cannot verify.
First and foremost, before producers can provide products to consumers, producers must convince retailers that adequate demand
exists for their products and that the claims made with regard to
their products are verifiable (in a way in which consumers trust).
V. POSSIBLE MARKET OR LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS"

As consumers demand changes in food production processes
and retailers demand changes from producers in order to fulfill
consumer demands, the question of how the retailer is going to verify the producer claims becomes paramount. Regulations have been
put into place to assure certain standards of treatment of livestock.
Standards of treatment assuring humane treatment or a specified
level of animal welfare are not the focus of this analysis. However,
regulations put into place which limit the availability of production
processes (particularly regulations which limit the availability of
processes or technologies to producers within a certain geographic
region) are of interest in this context as such regulations are ad-

64.

Chad Carr, Larry Eubanks, and Ryan Dijkhuis. Specialty Meat Marketing

Claims: What's the Diference? ANIMAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT, FLORIDA COOPERATIVE
EXTENSION SERVICE, INSTITUTE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL SCIENCES, U.FLA., Sept.

2007 at AN191 availableat http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/ pdffiles/AN/ANI 9100.pdf.
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dressing the potential challenges associated with the current system
in place to verify production practices employed.'
A key element to consider is that there appear to be efficiency
and social welfare arguments which support the continued involvement of the USDA in commodity standards and grading and certification services.' Still in question is whether the USDA grading and
certification programs benefits outweigh their costs." Overall, given
that the USDA is currently involved in verifying processes, and that
there appear to be benefits associated with continued USDA involvement, a complete abandonment of USDA involvement in verifying processes used on livestock operations is unlikely to be beneficial overall. A complete abandonment of USDA involvement in
verifying processes would likely necessitate involvement of another
party, thereby leading to another set of questions.
"[T]raceability is a valuable tool in supporting the marketing
and labeling of process credence attributes because such attributes
are only verifiable through recordkeeping."'
Traceability allows
retailers and consumers alike to verify the processes used in the
production and processing of meat and milk products. A major
hurdle to effectively being able to verify processes employed is the
quality of the records available or the credibility of the records in
the eyes of consumers. With the goal of traceability in mind, several
possible options exist for improving the current system of labeling
and verifying credence process attributes.
A. Make No Changes to the Current System
The simplest option available for labeling and verifying process
attributes is to maintain the system that is already in place, wherein
livestock and other production systems all participate in the same
65. While regulation which would limit the available set of technologies or production systems for a producer would alleviate some consumer concerns on verifying the use of certain practices, it also limits the choice set for consumers. For
example, regulations which would make the use of crates for housing pigs during
gestation illegal would provide assurance to consumers purchasing pork that the
pigs were raised without crates, although such regulation also eliminates the possibility for consumers to select and purchase pork raised in crates. The real focus of
this analysis is on ways of verifying production practices, rather than a review of
practices which are eliminated from the producers' choice set.
66. Kenneth C. Clayton & Warren P. Preston, The PoliticalEconomy of Differentiating Markets: Facing Reality Inside the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 85(3) AMER. J.
AGR. EcoN. 737, 741 (2003).
67. Id.
68. Food Traceability, supra note 20 at 6.
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PVP with the same USDA Process Verified logo. The current system
provides the backing of the USDA to the processes claimed by the
producer. However, as increasingly complex livestock production
systems become part of the program, maintenance of high standards
in evaluating programs may become increasingly difficult. As increasing numbers of livestock producers seek to verify increasing
numbers of diverse claims under the PVP, the potential for errors
which could erode consumer confidence in all USDA backed claims
rises.
1. Retailers
Currently retailers are not uniformly requiring verification of
process attribute claims prior to selling that product. However,
given continued consolidation and concentration of market power,
requiring verification before a product is carried is a plausible option in the future." Given that the possibility exists for retailers to
require verification in order to protect their own reputations, maintenance of the current system in the long run will depend on
whether the current PVP provides enough assurance, with "enough"
being determined by the retailers.
2. Producers
Producers are continuously trying to distinguish themselves
from their competition. Producers adopting processes which are
accepted or selected by consumer groups are distinguishing their
products. The current USDA Process Verified term and logo does
not distinguish producers by product. Depending upon how consumers view the label by the USDA versus other more specific labels
intended to "verify" claims made by producers, they may desire specific labels to distinguish their products.
From the standpoint of the individual livestock producer, the
potential for spillover effects in the case of a mislabeling incident is
likely of relatively small concern; however, the potential for negative
consequences exists. For example, a beef producer may be verifying
completely different Process Verified Points than a grain elevator,
although since they use the same USDA Process Verified term and
logo, risks for spillover effects to the beef producers' credibility exist
in the event that the grain elevator's claims are found to be wrong.
69.

Lawrence, supra note 32, at 39.
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B. Legislative Changes to USDA Process Verified Programs Approval'
A potential option for strengthening the labeling of credence
attributes in livestock products is to differentiate the USDA Livestock Process Verified Programs. Livestock production systems are
becoming increasingly complex and the Process Verified Points
highlighted by livestock producers are often specific to livestock operations. For example, if a claim being verified is that cattle have a
minimum percentage of Angus Genetics," the personnel overseeing
such a program will likely need a different skill set than if overseeing
trait tests for inbound specialty grains to an elevator.' Possible options to overcome these issues of increasing complexity and necessity for different skill sets and experience by regulating agencies include the development of branches of the USDA PVP and/or the
development of verification "models" for simplifying the claims
which can be verified under the PVP.
1. Development of Verification "Models"
The guidelines provided for PVP participation are purposefully
generic as they are intended to apply to all organizations which provide a product or service regardless of the type of operation, size of
operation, or product provided." Such broad explanations in the
guidelines for PVP development and submission allow a large number of different types of operations to benefit from the PVP, but
potential difficulties may arise when specific knowledge regarding
processes may be required to address consumer concerns.
A possible solution to address the increasing complexity of the
Process Verified Points is to develop "models" which can be used to
expedite application to and approval of PVP, as well as simplify the
regulation and oversight of such operations. For example, livestock
operations which intend to include "age verified cattle"' could enroll in a program designed around age verification of cattle." By
enrolling in a specific program, the transaction costs of the regulatory agency could be decreased as a more "standardized" combination of Process Verified Points would be verified. Perhaps more
70. See generally Clayton and Preston, supra note 66.
71. Programs, supra note 40 at 1.
72. Id. at 2.
73. GIPSA Directive App. 1, supra note 48, at 1.
74. Programs, supra note 40, at 4.
75. This is a very simple example, although potentially many combinations of
verification points could be included.
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importantly, enrolling a more specific program would allow more
specific labeling, such as USDA Age Verified Cattle Assurance Program, for example.
2. Development of Branches of USDA Process Verified Programs
Building "models" for Process Verified Points does create a
more "tailored" program for producers of a given agricultural product; however, PVP flexibility is lost. A potential remedy to the single
term and logo for the PVP which does not limit flexibility of the
program is to develop "branches" of the USDA PVP. By developing
different labels and tailoring requirements to different sectors of
agricultural production the flexibility of the program to verify points
which the producer himself designates is maintained, although some
specificity for the product in question is added. Development of
"branches", such as the USDA Livestock Process Verified Program,
would provide the differentiation among agricultural products, a
distinctive label for different types of products, and maintain flexibility for the producer to "build his/her own program." The development of "branches" of the USDA for process verification would
likely gain increased consumer support versus other legislative options because it would ensure that people with more experience with
a given area of agriculture are involved in the process verification.
C. Private Labeling (Market Solutions)
Market solutions to concerns regarding animal welfare for farm
animals, or animals used for food production have been used extensively. "[S]elf-regulation and work to meet consumer expectations
has helped develop processes that improve the welfare conditions of
all animals-from the farm, through the transportation process, and
to the plant."" Thus far, many changes in livestock production have
been driven by the market." Several options exist for self-regulation
or self-verification through direct information provided to consumers or employing a third party for verification. Note that since
USDA is currently involved in verifying processes and that there
appear to be benefits associated with continued USDA involvement,
76. Angela J. Geiman, "It's the right thing to do": Why the Animal Agriculture
Industry Should Not Oppose Science-Based Regulations Protecting the Welfare of Animals
Raisedfor Food, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 128, 130 (2008).
77. See Schweikhardt & Browne, supra note 6, at 302-03; Cook-Mowery, Olynk,
and Wolf, supra note 27, at 82.
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a complete abandonment of USDA involvement in verifying processes used on livestock operations is unlikely to be beneficial overall.
Private verification and market solutions are likely to be additional
options, although not replacements for, USDA PVP labeling.
1. Self Verification Methods
Technologies available at relatively low cost to producers today
would allow self-verification methods which are arguably more convincing to the general public. With self verification by producers,
labels or other advertising could communicate to consumers the
entity responsible for verification (and possibly the processes employed). For example, American Humane Association fellow John J.
McGlone, Ph.D. testified at a congressional hearing with regards to
live video feeds from animal-processing facilities." Private firms
could certainly adopt strategies such as video surveillance or livefeed video to verify claims regarding housing, handling practices,
and animal rearing practices in place on a given operation. Such
methods may seem extreme, although if a producer is making an
extremely novel claim, such methods may build consumer confidence in the producer and eliminate concerns regarding mislabeling
of production process attributes.
At its most simplistic, self-verification could include in-depth record keeping in the form of a journal or notes. Such methods are
unlikely to convince consumers of the credibility of producer statements since the producer has incentive to misrepresent the attributes of a product. Stronger methods such as video logs and pictures
may provide necessary support for production process claims, although whether such methods would suffice without outside audits
and verification is likely to depend heavily on the particular process
being verified. For example, if it is being verified that animals are
grass fed, records of cattle movements in pastures and pictures of
facilities may suffice. If verification of genetics used is desired, however, simple records kept by a producer may not be convincing to
consumers or retailers.

78. Press Release, American Humane Association, American Humane Expert
Proposes Live Video Feeds for Meat Industry in Testimony to U.S. House Subcommittee,
http://www.americanhumane.org/abour-us/newroom/newsreleases/08testimony.html?printrt (last visited Aug. 19, 2009).
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2. Third Party Private Verification
When American Humane Association fellow John J. McGlone,
Ph.D. testified at a congressional hearing with regards to live video
feeds from animal-processing facilities, he talked about the benefits
of having an independent third-party organization monitor live
video feeds of animal-processing facilities.' Third-party verification
by private companies, similar to the USDA PVP, would seek to provide outside verification that claims regarding process attributes
were credible.
Potential benefits to having an outside third-party verification
system, rather than the USDA through PVP, is that transaction costs
may be decreased if the time required to participate and costs of
participation are less than that of a USDA PVP. Further, if a thirdparty is hired, there may be more flexibility in "process-specific" labeling because likely a producer would need to label his own processes and would then include a statement regarding "verified by .."
Challenges would also exist with a third-party verification system. Unless a third party has already established a reputation in the
industry, producers cannot be certain how much credibility consumers and retailers will place on claims which are verified by a private third-party. Problems may also arise if third-party verifiers are
unfamiliar with animal agriculture and the processes and technologies employed in modern production systems. Such unfamiliarity
may erode consumer confidence in verification by private third parties. Overarching all of these concerns are questions regarding
whether the consumer would discount verification performed by a
private third party versus verification by the USDA and a PVP.
CONCLUSION

An incident involving mislabeled credence process attributes
would erode consumer confidence in the labeling and verification of
such process attributes and in the retailers selling these mislabeled
products. Currently, with the PVP system in place, an incident in
one area of agriculture could have consequences on and influence
consumer confidence on claims made in other areas of agriculture.
As production process claims become more complex and as an increasing number of producers seek to verify production processes
there may be increased potential for mislabeling. Retailers and livestock producers alike want to avoid the negative consumer senti79.

Id.
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ments that could result from an incident in which claims made on
labels could not be verified. Therefore, changes to the PVP should
be explored to develop options for verification which are specific to
livestock production practices. Verification schemes employing
third-party verification are also likely to gain popularity, although
costs associated with such programs are largely unknown. Adaptations to the current USDA PVP, in the way of development of
branches of the program for different segments of agriculture, provide an effective option for the development of livestock production
specific claims, verification methods, and labeling schemes. Specific
costs associated with changes to the PVP are also admittedly unknown, although modifications to the USDA PVP appear most likely
to provide a swift and effective verification for livestock producers
as the backbone of the program is already in place.

DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS AND STRUCTUREFUNCTION CLAIMS: THE DYSFUNCTIONAL
STRUCTURE OF CURRENT REGULATION
Matthew W. Lindsey*

I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty percent of Americans report using one of the more
than thirty thousand dietary supplement products generated by an
estimated one thousand manufacturers, contributing to an industry
exceeding twenty billion dollars globally.' Fueled by increasing public interest in individual health, dietary supplement manufacturers in
the United States (U.S.) continue to exploit the weaknesses in the
way the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates these products. Dietary supplement manufacturers perpetuate the perceived
safety of supplements through the advertisement of structurefunction claims, which many consumers mistakenly assume to be the
same as FDA-regulated health claims.
Structure-function claims are a subset of health claims, and while
the FDA has yet to provide a precise definition, these claims may be
identified as any assertion that states, suggests, or implies the role of
a food category, a food, or one of its constituents in the growth, de-

* Matthew W. Lindsey is a May 2010 Juris Doctor candidate at the University
of Arkansas School of Law, Fayetteville, Arkansas. This comment received the
University of Arkansas Journal of Food Law &Policy's 2009 Annual Arent Fox/Dale
Bumpers Excellence in Writing Award. The author would like to thank Professor
Robert B. Leflar for his direction in the preparation of this comment. The author
would also like to thank his wife Blair for her unwavering encouragement and support.
1. Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, A Drug By Any Other Name..: Paradoxes in
Dietary Supplement Risk Regulation, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 165, 165 (2006); see also
Katherine Wong, New Mandatory Reporting Requirements for Dietary Supplements and
NonprescriptionDrugs Solve Very Little, 35J.L. MED. & ETHics 336, 336 (2007).
2. See discussion infta Part III.A.3-III.A.4.
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velopment, or normal physiological function of the body.! Stated
differently, a structure-function claim asserts that a specific food or
ingredient aids in the normal functioning of the body. Conversely, a
disease or risk reduction claim states, suggests, or implies that the
consumption of a specific food or ingredient significantly reduces
the development of a human disease.' For example, the claim "a diet
high in calcium may reduce the risk of osteoporosis" is a risk reduction claim, while the claim "a diet high in calcium aids in the growth
and maintenance of bones" is a structure-function claim.'
The average consumer's inability to distinguish between disease
and structure-function claims combined with a lack of premarket
approval for dietary supplements has allowed dangerous products
into the market leading to preventable deaths.' Unlike prescription
medications, dietary supplements are not subjected to premarket
scientific analysis or clinical trials before the FDA approves a product for consumer use.! Instead, the FDA restricts or prohibits the
sale of a certain supplement only after the agency receives welldocumented reports of health risks associated with the product.'
3. See 21 U.S.C § 343(r)(6) (2000) (explaining, "a statement for a dietary supplement may be made if...[it] describes the role of a nutrient or dietary ingredient
intended to affect the structure or function in humans"); see also 21 C.F.R. §
101.93(f) (2000) (restating the types of structure-function claims allowable under
§343(r)(6)). For a detailed source of information explaining the lack of a precise
definition for structure-function claims, see CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY AND APPLIED
NUTRITION, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (FDA), STRUCTURE/FUNCTION CLAIMS:
SMALL ENTITY COMPLIANCE GUIDE, (Jan. 2002), available at www.fda.gov/

ohrms/dockets/98fr/98n-0044.gdlOOO.pdf.
4. See 21 C.F.R. § 101.93 (g)(1) (2000) (defining disease as, "damage to an organ, part, structure, or system of the body such that it does not function properly");
see also 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.93(g)(2)(i)-101.93(g)(2)(x) (2000) (listing ten criteria for
determining whether a statement is a disease claim). For an explanation of these
ten criterion, see CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY AND APPLIED NUTRITION, supra note 3, at
4-11; see generally Nicole Coutrelis, The Legal Status and Regulatory Context of "Health
Foods" in the European Union, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 35, 48 (2003).
5. Martijn B. Katan & Nicole M. de Roos, Toward Evidence-Based Health Claims
for Foods, 299 Sc. MAG., 206, 207 (2003), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/
cgi/reprint/299/5604/206.pdf.
6. See discussion infra Part III.
7. Peter Cohen, Science, Politics, and the Regulation of Dietary Supplements: It's
Time to Repeal DSHEA, 31 AM.J.L & MED. 175, 182 (2005).
8. See generally Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994
(DSHEA), Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 Stat. 4325, [hereinafter DSHEA] (codified as
various amended sections of 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (1994)). To date, ephedra is the
only supplement to have been banned by the FDA when the ingredient was declared adulterated under the provisions of the DSHEA. See also Consumer Reports,
Dangerous Supplements: Still at Large, (May 2004) available at http://
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By contrast, manufacturers in the European Union (EU) are ex-

cluded from including health claims on their product labels.' However, policymakers in the EU are making progress as the scheduled
effective date for the EU Health Claims Directive approaches."o Due
to go into force January 1, 2010, the Health Claims Directive requires the support of Member States to administer and enforce food
law regulations adopted by the European Parliament." Similar to
the FDA, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) seeks to ensure the safety of the food supply.'2 Any general similarities end
there. Unlike the FDA, the EFSA is an independent agency providing scientific advice and gathering data related to the potential risks
a dietary supplement may pose to humans before the product is available for purchase."
In 1994, the FDA began drawing attention to the risks associated with the consumption of ephedra in a series of consumer reports and medical bulletins." Ten years and at least 155 ephedrarelated deaths later, the FDA finally banned the sale of dietary supplements containing the ephedrine alkaloid on April 12, 2004.'" The
www.consumerreports.org/cro/food/diet-nutrition/dangerous-supplements/dangerous-supplements-504/overview/index.htm (quoting Bruce Silverglade, legal director for the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI), "[T]he standards for
demonstrating a supplement is hazardous are so high that it can take the FDA years

to build a case"); see also Reilley Michelle Dunne, How Much Regulation Can We Swallow? The Ban on Ephedra and How it May Affect Your Access to Dietary Supplements, 31
J. LEGIS. 351, 374 (2005); see also Henry Miller & David Longtin, Death by Dietary
Supplement: How to Regulate a Booming Industry, 102 POLICY REVIEW 15, 16 (2000).
9. Katan & de Roos, supra note 5, at 206 (explaining the traditional European
view that foods are either harmful or harmless, therefore, claims that dietary supplements can treat or prevent disease are forbidden).
10. Regulation 1924/2006, 2006 O.J. (L 404) 9 (EC) [hereinafter Health Claims
Directive].
11. Steve Keane, Can a Consumer's Right to Know Survive the WTO?: The Case of
Food Labeling, 16 TRANSNAT'L & CONTEMP. PROBS. 291, 294 (2006).

12. Emilie H. Leibovitch, Food Safety Regulation in the European Union: Toward
Unavoidable Centralizationof Regulatory Powers, 43 TEX. INT'L L.J. 429, 434 (2008).
13. Id.
14. See U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Adverse Events with Ephedra
and Other Botanical Dietary Supplements, FDA Medical Bulletin (Sept. 1994), available
at http://www.fda.gov/Food/DietarySupplements/ Alerts/ucm 1 1208.htm (noting
the FDA received an increasing number of reports of adverse reactions associated
with the use of products containing ephedra); See also Noah, supra note 1, at 182.
15. 21 C.F.R. § 119.1 (2004) (stating, "dietary supplements containing ephedrine
alkaloids are adulterated under section 402(f)(1)(A) of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act); see also Carol Rados, Ephedra Ban: No Shortage of Reasons, FDA
CONSUMER
MAGAZINE
(March/April
2004) available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/Lps1609/www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2004/203ephedra.htm
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causes for the delays were threefold: 1) the FDA's inability to link
undesirable effects with specific supplements; 2) the lack of premarket approval for dietary supplements; and 3) the consumer perception that all dietary supplements safely increase desirable aspects of
proper bodily function.
Part II describes the regulatory and market conditions preceding the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994
(DSHEA) in the U.S. and the European Food Supplement Directive
of 2002 in the EU. Part III discusses the current risks that remain
despite attempts at regulation, as well as the potential for future
harm to consumers due to insufficient governmental involvement
and regulation within the dietary supplement industry. Part IV then
compares the various regulatory schemes implemented and proposed in both markets designed to police the sale of dietary supplements. Finally, Part V suggests that both premarket approval and
prohibition of structure-function claims are necessary to ensure the
public's safety. This Article provides a comparative analysis whereby
the strengths and weaknesses of both the U.S. and EU regulatory
schemes may be examined in order to improve the effectiveness of
regulation.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Prior to the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of
1994 (DSHEA), the FDA regulated dietary supplements as food additives under the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act and required premarket approval before products entered the marketplace." Then,
in 1989, the FDA linked over 1,500 cases of permanent disability
and at least thirty-eight deaths to L-Tryptophan" supplements.
I (reflecting final rule to ban dietary supplements containing ephedra effective April
12, 2004); see also Mark Moran, Did Delay of Ephedra Ban Cause Unnecessary Deaths?,
39

PSYCHIATRIC

NEWS

3,

24

(2004)

available

at

http://pn.psychiatry

online.org/cgi/content/full/39/3/24.
16. Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1992).
17. L-Tryptophan is an essential amino acid, which can be used to treat insomnia
and anxiety when taken as a supplement. See generally Center for Food Safety and
Applied Nutrition, U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Economic Characterization of the Dietary Supplement Industry Final Report, at Table 4-3 (March 1999) available at http://www.rti.org/pubs/econ char.pdf.
18. Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Information Paper on L-tryptophan and 5-hydroxy-L-tryptophan (Feb.
2001) available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/ds-trypl.html; see also, Jennifer
Akre Hill, Comment, Creating Balance: Problems Within DSHEA and Suggestions for
Reform, 2 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 361, 370 (2006).
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Fearing the dietary supplement industry was in danger, manufacturers responded with a massive lobbying campaign designed to fight
greater FDA regulation." Part of this campaign included a series of
television advertisements depicting actor "Mel Gibson handcuffed
by FDA agents for possessing vitamins".'

Backed by Senator Orin

Hatch of Utah, the home base of many supplement manufacturers,
the DSHEA was passed over the objections of the FDA." The
DSHEA established dietary supplements as a new class of food
product not subject to the regulations applied to food additives or
drugs." In essence, the DSHEA took away the authority of the FDA
to regulate dietary substances before they entered the marketplace,
and replaced it with a system in which the FDA is limited to retroactively removing products after the harm has already occurred. The
result: Congress substantially reduced governmental oversight of
dietary supplements when it decided consumers are capable of making informed decisions regarding the supplements they may choose
to take." Then, Congress passed the Dietary Supplement and Nonprescription Drug Consumer Protection Act of 2007 (DSNDCPA of
2007) in an effort to address the shortcomings of the DSHEA.2' The
DSNDCPA of 2007 attempts to limit the shortcomings of the
DSHEA by requiring manufacturers to report instances of undesirable effects associated with the use of dietary supplements.

19.

Henry Miller & David Longtin, Death by Dietary Supplement: How to Regulate a

Booming Industry, 102 POLICY REVIEW 15, 16 (2000).

20. Id.
21. Id.; See generally Loren Israelsen & Thomas Aarts, DSHEA Ten Years Later:
Now
What?, NUTRTION
BUS.
J., June 2004, available at http://
www.supplementquality.com/editorials/DSHEA-anniversary.html (explaining the
DSHEA was a "political Hail Mary" and that "last-minute deal making resulted in
the addition of the structure-function claim disclaimer").
22. See S. Rep. No. 103-410, at 2 (1994) (explaining the purpose of DSHEA is
"to clarify that dietary supplements are not drugs or food additives, that dietary
supplements should not be regulated as drugs, and that burden of proof is on the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to prove that a product is unsafe before it
can be removed from the marketplace"); see also Miller & Longtin, supra note 19, at
16.
23. Wong, supra note 1, at 336-37.
24. Dietary Supplement and Nonprescription Drug Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 109-462 (2007) (codified as amended section of 21 U.S.C. § 371 (2007))
[hereinafter DSNDCPA of 2007]. Although the Dietary Supplement and Nonprescription Drug Consumer Protection Act of 2007 is commonly referred to as
DSNDCPA, this Article uses DSNDCPA of 2007 to help distinguish it from the
DSHEA.
25. See infra Part IV.
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By contrast, the traditional EU approach strictly limits the availability and advertising of dietary supplements. Passed in 2002, the
EU Food Supplement Directive, Directive 2002/46/EC (Food Supplement Directive), proclaims the need to protect consumers from
unsafe products that mislead, and to prevent presenting food as
medicine.2 ' However, during this same period, many European governments began promoting the use of certain dietary supplements."
For instance, it is illegal for manufacturers to state that a supplement high in folic acid reduces the risk of birth defects," yet many
European governments advocate that would-be mothers take these
supplements.'
In response to the multiplicity of rules and policies among the
EU Member States and the prohibition of certain claims supported
by significant scientific authority," the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) pushed Regulation 1924/2006 (Health Claims Directive)
through the European Council (EC) in December 2006." The Health
Claims Directive seeks to create a framework for standardizing and
eventually permitting health and structure-function claims on food
labels.' The EFSA's charge is to implement nutrient profiles and
criteria by January 1, 2010 in order to govern proposed claims."
26. Council Directive 2002/46, 2002 O.J. (L 183) 51 (EC) [hereinafter Food
Supplement Directive].
27. See e.g., Richard A. Hubner, et al., Should Folic Acid Fortification be Mandatory?
J. 1253 (2007), available at http://www.
No, 334 BRITISH MED.
bmj.com/cgi/reprint/334/7606/1253 (explaining "the UK's Food Standards
Agency recently proposed mandatory folic acid fortification of some foods"); see
also Bruce Jancin, Added Folic Acid Lowers Congenital Heart Defects Risk: Preconceptual
Supplementation Backed, 43 OB.GYN. NEWS 24 (2008) (noting the recent media campaign by the Dutch government to encourage women take folic acid before conception).
28. See Council Directive 2000/13, art. 2, §1b, 2000 O.J. (L 109) 29 (EC) (Stating labeling must not attribute to any food ..the property of preventing, treating or
curing a human disease, or refer to such properties").
29. Katan, & de Roos, supra note 5, at 206.
30. For instance, it is well recognized that folic acid supplements prevent birth
defects for mothers who do not receive enough of the vitamin through their regular
diet. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Dept. of Health and Human
Services, Facts about Folic Acid, http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/folicacid/basics.htm
(last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
31. Commission Regulation 1924/2006, 2006 O.J. (L 404) 9 (EC) [hereinafter
Health Claims Directive].
32. Christian Falk, United States: The New EU Health Claims Regulation: Tightened
Rules for Advertising and Labeling of Foodstuffs, Faegre & Benson LLP (Sep. 8, 2008),
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=65996 (last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
33. Jon Felce, European Union Food Labeling and Packaging: The Need to Strike a
Balance, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 113, 115 (2008).
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III. THE DANGER OF CONSUMERS' INACCURATE PERCEPTION OF
DIETARY SUPPLEMENT LABELING AND HEALTH CLAIMS

Nevertheless, new requirements and regulations covering ingredients with the potential for use in dietary supplements might
not be enough to protect consumers from their inaccurate beliefs
regarding structure-function claims and government involvement in
the dietary supplement industry. Research shows that many consumers misunderstand the role of government in regulating supplements, do not understand the required disclaimers on labels that
contain structure-function claims, do not discuss supplement use
with their medical providers, and often concurrently take supplements and prescription medications without realizing the very real
possibility of dangerous interactions.'
A. ConsumerMisperception
Dietary supplements, like drugs, have risks and side effects, but
are generally self-prescribed." This is especially worrisome considering the amount of inaccurate information about the safe use and
potential risks of supplements. Adverse reactions to supplement use
resulted in 26,000 calls to U.S. poison control centers in 2007, with
at least one death attributable to supplement exposure."
1. Megadosing
One common misperception is that because dietary supplements are sold over the counter (OTC), some with no direction on
the label, they are safe to take even in high doses." This is commonly known as megadosing," and many people continue to take
large doses of various supplements such as vitamin C." Although

34. See infra Part III.A.1-III.B
35. American Cancer Society, Dietary Supplements: How to Know What is Safe,
http://www.cancer.org/docroot/ETO/content/ETO_5_3xHow-toKnowWhat_
Is Safe Choosing-andUsing-DietarySupplements.asp (last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. For an overview of megadosing, sometimes referred to as "megavitamin
therapy", see generally BC Cancer Agency, Vitamin Therapy, Megadose/ Orthomolecular
Therapies/Vitamin
http://www.bccancer.bc.ca/PPI/Unconventional
Therapy,
TherapyMegadoseOrthomolecularTherapy.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
39. Douglas RM, et al., Vitamin C for Preventing and Treating the Common Cold
2007
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there has never been any scientific evidence to show large doses of
vitamin C can prevent or cure the common cold, many people still
believe this is true.o In fact, megadosing certain vitamins and minerals has actually been shown to cause dangerous side effects." Too
much vitamin C can interfere with the body's ability to absorb copper, a metal essential to the body's proper functioning." Too much
phosphorous can inhibit the absorption of calcium, a mineral vital
to the maintenance of healthy bones, while high doses of vitamins A,
D, and K are not easily digested by the body and can quickly reach
toxic levels."
2. All Natural
Another common mistaken belief is that supplements marketed
as "all natural" are safe to take in any amount." This is simply not
true. Just because something is natural does not mean that it is
good for you. Different parts of plants contain many different
chemicals, which can have very different effects on humans." The
popular supplement ginkgo biloba, named after the tree from which
it is derived, is usually consumed as an extract prepared from the
dried leaves." However, people do not generally consume the tree's
fruit, and research links ingestion of the seed to fatal human poisoning." Additionally, ginkgo biloba extract (GBE) is a highly concentrated substance that appears to be more effective in treating health
ailments." While not considered all natural because of the alteration from its natural state, GBE is generally preferred over ingesting

http://medschool.umaryland.edu/integrative/cochrane-reviews/cochrane-revcommoncold.asp.
40. American Cancer Society, supra note 35.
41. See Miranda Hitti, FDA Flags Megadose of Selenium Supplement, WEBMD
HEALTH NEWS (Apr. 9, 2008), http://www.webmd.com/news/20080409/fda-flagssupplement-selenium-mega-dose (last visited Nov. 3, 2009) (noting selenium may
boost the immune system, but too much can lead to hair loss, muscle cramps,
fatigue, and skin blisters).
42. American Cancer Society, supra note 35.
43. Id.
44. Cohen, supra note 7, at 196 (indicating it is not uncommon for dietary supplements claiming to be "all natural" contaminated with synthetic materials).
45. American Cancer Society, supra note 35.
46. University of Maryland Medical Center, Complementary Medicine: Echinacea,
http://www.umm.edu/altmed/ articles/ginkgo-biloba-000247.htm (last visited Nov.
3, 2009) [hereinafter Ginkgo biloba].
47. Id.
48. Id.
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the leaves themselves. Therefore, all natural supplements are often
not as effective or helpful because they have not been refined to
remove dangerous chemicals or parts of a plant that do not contribute to the desired effects."
There can also be allergic reactions to substances that are all
natural. Some consumers take bee pollen to prevent hay fever, increase energy, and to aid in memory.' The problem is some people
have serious allergies to various pollens without knowing it."
Documented reports have linked fatal reactions to the consumption
of bee pollen." With no scientific evidence supporting the idea that
bee pollen has benefits, combined with the risk of death, it is hard
to understand why some consumers buy the product."
People also tend to think that supplements such as echinacea'
and ginkgo biloba," ingested for their medicinal effects for thousands of years, must be safe due to their continued use and popularity." The truth is that while occasional use of these substances may
provide relief for certain conditions, it has not been until recently
that the medical profession has looked at the long-term effects of
daily use in higher doses." Without additional research, the side
effects of long-term supplement use remain uncertain.
3. Governmental Regulation
One of the most disturbing instances of consumer misperception is the belief the FDA approves dietary supplements. In a recent
survey, ten percent of respondents indicated they believed dietary
supplements required FDA approval, while forty-two percent were

49. American Cancer Society, supra note 35.
50. See William Jarvis, Bee Pollen, NATIONAL COUNCIL AGAINST HEALTH FRAUD
1996, http://www.ncahf.org/ articles/a-b/beepollen.html (last visited Nov. 3,
2009).
51. See id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Echinacea supplements are commonly ingested for their ability to promote a
healthy immune system, relieve pain, reduce inflammation, as well as its effects as
an antioxidant. See Ginkgo biloba, supra note 46.
55. See id. Ginkgo biloba is primarily used to increase blood flow to the brain,
with evidence suggesting it improves memory and learning among Alzheimer's
patients. See University of Maryland Medical Center, supra note 46.
56. American Cancer Society, supra note 35.
57. Id.
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unsure whether a product required approval or not." However, as
recently as 2001 another study found thirty-five percent of respondents believed the FDA approved dietary supplements." Although
the data from the more recent survey may seem to indicate confusion among consumers regarding governmental regulation is decreasing, it is worth noting that studies on the issue are scarce and
differing methodologies between experiments might explain the
disparity between these two results. Indeed, it is troubling any consumers believe dietary supplements are FDA-approved.
The 2001 study also found that an individual's education had a
direct impact on his or her belief that the government approved
supplements.'
Individuals whose highest level of education was
high school were over two-times more likely to be mistaken when
compared with those possessing a college education." This misunderstanding may provide a false sense of security regarding the
safety of dietary supplements. When people assume a product is
safe it only increases the likelihood injury will occur.
4. Labeling Confusion and Ineffectiveness
The DSHEA requires all products with structure-function claims
contain the disclaimer, "This statement has not been evaluated by
the Food and Drug Administration. This product is not intended to
diagnose, treat, cure, or prevent any disease." 2 In 2005, researchers
conducted the first published experiments to determine how consumers interpret the different labels found on food and supplement
products." The analysis hypothesizes that once a consumer has developed a belief, new information is interpreted in a manner that
will confirm the preexisting belief.' For example, a purchaser may
hold the belief government watches out for consumers, and would

Bimal H. Ashar, et al., Patient's Understandingof the Regulation of Dietary SupJOURNAL OF COMMUNITY
HEALTH 22, 25 (2008) available at
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/570150_4.
59. Id. at 27.
60. Id. at 25.
61. Id. at 26.
62. 21 C.F.R. § 101.93(c) (2000).
63. Karen France & Paula Bone, Policy Makers' Paradigms and Evidence from Consumer Interpretations of Dietary Supplement Labels, 39 J. OF CONSUMER AFF. 27, 34
(2005).
64. Id. The hypothesis relies on confirmatory bias theory, which predicts new
information is interpreted in a way to avoid information and explanations contradictory to prior beliefs.
58.

plements, 33
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not allow dangerous products to enter the marketplace.' This trust
in government may lead the purchaser to discount any disclaimer
found on a product's label.'
Another instance was recorded when a particular supplement,
such as the popular cold remedy Airborne," received publicity over
its ability to prevent a particular disease.'
Under these circumstances, consumers were more likely to believe in the product's ability to prevent or treat a disease regardless of the DSHEA disclaimer." This indicates that where publicity and the FDA disclaimer come into contradiction people give more credibility to
positive press over a government warning. Also interesting is the
fact that people who place higher importance on disease prevention
and healthy living attributed more significance to structure-function
and disease claims." Additionally, the studies found heavy supplement users are more likely to believe the FDA evaluates dietary supplements despite the fact they are the ones most exposed to the
DSHEA disclaimer." The evidence collected during the study led
researchers to conclude consumers made no distinction between
non-regulated structure-function claims and FDA-approved disease
claims." This leads to the conclusion Congress was incorrect in
finding consumers were capable of making informed decisions regarding the dietary supplements they choose to take. The data suggests people do not pay attention to the FDA disclaimer, and therefore need protection from themselves and their mistaken beliefs.
B. Failureto Disclose Supplement Use to Physicians
The fact consumers are uncertain as to the meaning of heath
and structure-function claims, as well as the misunderstanding and
65. Id. at 35.
66. Id. at 36.
67. Infra note 69.
68. France & Bone, supra note 63, at 36.
69. Id. As an example, the initial buzz surrounding Airborne, a supplement
which touted its ability to prevent and cure the common cold, caused consumers to
purchase the product en masse. Although the product bore the required FDA
disclaimer, the public perception was that the product was effective until significant
scientific research concluded Airborne's ability to prevent or cure the common cold
was unsubstantiated. Eventually, a class action lawsuit was initiated by those who
were misled. See Airborne Settlement, Settlement Information and Claim Filing Website, http://www.airbornehealthsettlement.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
70. France & Bone, supra note 63, at 34.
71. Id. at 47.
72. Id. at 46.
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ineffectiveness of disclaimers is exacerbated by the fact that people
who use supplements generally do not share this information with
their health care providers." Surveys indicate that as many as fortynine percent of Americans aged fifty-seven through eighty-five years
of age reported taking a dietary supplement in the preceding twelve
months." While most reported using a multivitamin, these seemingly safe substances are not without their risks. Of the four percent
who believed they suffered an adverse reaction due to supplement
usage, over thirteen percent attributed it to multivitamins or multiminerals." Moreover, studies indicate those who use prescription
drugs were more likely to be taking dietary supplements concurrently."
Evidence suggests consumers of dietary supplements are less
likely to reveal supplement usage when compared to prescription or
OTC medication." This is problematic because generally there are
no tests conducted on dietary supplements to determine potential
adverse interactions with prescription medication that can cause
dangerous reactions or death." Many medical professionals are also
unaware of the potential risks involved from mixing dietary supplements and prescription drugs." This creates a dangerous situation
where the true effects of supplements go unreported.
A recent study revealed fifty-two percent of people in the U.S.
between the ages of fifty-seven and eighty-five concurrently took
prescription medications and dietary supplements." The article
notes the lack of current information regarding the simultaneous
use of drugs and supplements is sparse, which may contribute to the
adverse reactions." The study concludes by finding four percent of
the individuals who participated in the survey were at risk of having
a major adverse interaction.'

73. J.L. Greger, Dietary Supplement Use: Consumer Characteristicsand Interests, 131

J. OF NUTRITION 1339S, 1342S (2001).
74. Babgaleh Timbo et al., Dietary Supplements in a National Survey: Prevalence of
Use and Reports of Adverse Events, 106 J. AM. DIETETIC Ass'N 12, 1966 (2006).
75. Id. at 1966.
76. Id. at 1972.
77. Id.
78. Cohen, supra note 7, at 195-96.
79. Noah, supra note 1, at 193.
80. Timbo, supra note 74, at 1972.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1966.
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The fact many doctors do not ask their patients whether they
are currently taking a dietary supplement exacerbates the problem."
One reason many doctors do not ask patients about supplement use
is that they do not believe in the effectiveness of alternative medicines.' Another reason commonly cited by physicians is that they
do not know enough about dietary supplements to give an informed
opinion to a patient who does inform them of supplement usage."
However, as the instances of adverse supplement-drug interactions
continue to increase, more sources are becoming available for doctors to consult before a recommendation is given to the patient.'
When patients do not inform their doctor of their supplement
usage, the doctor is not receiving the information he or she needs to
make an accurate diagnosis. Supplement use has even been shown
to increase the symptoms and severity of diseases when combined
with prescription drugs." Thus, failure to report supplement use
and adverse events has led to inaccurate figures that under-represent
the harm done by dietary supplements." Moreover, this lack of reporting perpetuates a cycle that denies medical professionals and
nutritionists the information necessary to understand potential
harmful drug-supplement interactions.
C. Industry Practice
The risk of concurrent use of dietary supplements and prescription drugs continues to increase as supplements enter into new areas of the food supply. As early as 1998, major corporations began
attempting to enter the supplement market in an effort to avoid the

Stacey Butterfield, If PhysiciansDon't Ask, Patients Won't Tell About CAM, ACP
(Nov./Dec. 2007) available at http://www.acpinternist.org/archives/
2007/11/ask.htm.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. For example, certain dietary supplements are known to increase the risk of
internal bleeding when taken with prescription blood thinners. See Nutrition
Counseling Services, Dietary Supplements, http://nutritionsowa.com/dietarysupplements.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
88. Keane, supra note 11, at 295.
83.

OBSERVER
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greater FDA regulation associated with functional foods." Functional foods are products fortified with minerals, vitamins, or dietary
supplements and require that any ingredient provide taste, aroma,
nutritional value, or have a technological effect on the food such as
preservation, color, etc."
Campbell Soup Company marketed its popular V8 Juice with
the structure-function claim that the antioxidants contained in the
product help slow normal aging." Not only would this statement fail
to qualify as an FDA-approved health claim concerning the consumption of fruits and vegetables due to its high levels of sodium,
the label is especially misleading because diets high in sodium have
been linked to high blood pressure, which is associated with aging.'
Campbell Soup is not alone. Another company marketed a line
of soup known as "Kitchen Prescription," which includes chicken
and noodle with Echinacea and split pea with St. John's Wort." Yet
another example is a caffeinated gum branded "Stay Alert,"" which
is being marketed as a dietary supplement. Caffeine is only approved for food use in non-alcoholic carbonated beverages, but because dietary supplements are not regulated as foods, manufacturers
seem to have found a loophole with this product containing the
name of a conventional food (gum) and sold alongside other chewing gums."
By labeling a product as a supplement, the manufacturer is able
to avoid Generally Recognized As Safe requirements that these substances are not dangerous when used as food ingredients." Moreover, the addition of dietary supplements into food categories people generally believe to be safe could increase the perception that
the supplements themselves are safe. Furthermore, as consumers
find dietary supplements introduced into new and different markets, the risk for adverse events and drug interactions may increase
as more people encounter these products.

89. Center for Science in the Public Interest, United States - A Good System Gone
Bad: Marketplace Implications and Consumer Impact, http://www.cspinet.org/
reports/functional-foods/usamarket.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2010).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Stay Alert Gum, http://www.stayalertgum.com (last visited March 9,
2009).
95. Center for Science in the Public Interest, supra note 89.
96. Id.
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The FDA's delay in banning ephedra caused a few states within
the U.S. to pass their own laws banning the sale of the supplement."
In the years following the FDA's own ban of ephedra, it became clear
the current voluntary reporting system for companies with information regarding undesirable effects of supplement use was unworkable." Congress responded with the Dietary Supplement and Nonprescription Drug Consumer Protection Act of 2007 (DSNDCPA of
2007)." The DSNDCPA of 2007 requires the mandatory filing of
Adverse Event Reports (AER) by manufacturers within fifteen days of
receiving such information from consumers.'" In order to facilitate
reporting, manufacturers are required to include contact information on the labels of the supplements they produce.'o' Six months
after the implementation of mandatory AER reporting, the FDA announced over six hundred adverse events with at least five deaths
attributable to the ingestion of dietary supplements."
A. Weaknesses of Current U.S. Regulation
Most experts contend that even the new mandatory reporting
guidelines promulgated by the DSNDCPA of 2007 do not produce
figures that accurately represent the true number of adverse events

97. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 602/1 (Supp. 1 2009); See, e.g., Jim Ritter,
Ephedra Sales Banned in Illinois: Linked to Strokes, Herbal Stimulant is Sold in Other
States,

CHICAGO

SUN-TIMES,

(May

26,

2003)

available

at

http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/ IP2-1485246.html (explaining Illinois became
the first state to ban ephedra); see also N.Y. GENERAL BUSINESS LAw § 391-0 (Supp. 1
2009); see, e.g., Chuck Bell, Consumers Union Applauds New York State Law Banning
Ephedra, CONSUMER UNION, Aug. 25, 2003, available at http://www.
consumersunion.org/pub/core-product-safety/000285.html (applauding New York
as the second state to ban the sale of ephedra); see also CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY
CODE § 110423.100 (2004); see e.g. Jennifer Morey, Statewide Ephedra Ban Now in
Effect, THE TIMES-STANDARD, Jan. 4, 2004 (explaining the California law which took
effect two months before the FDA ban became effective).
98. Hill, supra note 18, at 380 (indicating the Inspector General for the Department of Health and Human Services believed the voluntary system revealed less
than one percent all negative reactions to dietary supplement use).
99. DSMDCPA of 2007, supra note 24.
100. 21 U.S.C. § 379aa-1(c)(1) (2006).
101. 21 C.F.R. § 101.93(a) (2000).
102. ORTHOMOLECULAR MEDICINE NEWS SERVICE, FDA Claims "Food Supplement"
Deaths; Hides Details from Public, Oct. 9, 2008, available at http://www.
orthomolecular.org/resources/omns/v04nl3.shtml.
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linked to the consumption of dietary supplements.'" This is due, in
part, to the FDA's history of minimal monitoring of dietary supplements post-DSHEA." As of 2004, the FDA's supplement division
consisted of sixty staff members working under a $10 million dollar
budget in an attempt to regulate an industry with revenues exceeding $19 billion dollars annually.' In comparison, the FDA employs
forty-eight times as many people and spends forty-three times the
amount of money to regulate the drug industry, which sees revenues
only twelve times greater than the dietary supplement industry.'"
Prior to the passage of the DSNDCPA of 2007, all FDA data on
adverse events was solely the product of voluntary reporting submitted by the manufacturers of the supplements themselves.' 7 Two
scholars analogize this to the IRS relying on taxpayers to provide
information on their own underreporting of income.'
In fact, recent court documents show makers of the best-selling brand of
ephedra supplement Metabolife'" received more than 13,000 customer complaints regarding the product with none of these reports
ever disclosed to the FDA."o With such a lengthy history of underreported adverse events, it will take time for mandatory reporting to
create a difference in the regulation of supplements."'
What is surprising is that the FDA has refused to disclose the
information it receives regarding adverse events to the public or the

103. Wong, supra note 1, at 337.
104. See generally id.; see also Barbara A. Noah, A Review of the New York State Task
Force on Life & the Law's Report Dietary Supplements: Balancing Consumer Choice &
Safety, 33J.L. MED. & ETHICS 860, 862 (2005) (indicating that before mandatory reporting the FDA received reports of less than one percent of all adverse events
associated with dietary supplements).
105. Consumer Rep., Dangerous Supplements: Still at Large, (May 2004) availableat
http-//www.consumerreports.org/cro/food/diet-nutrition/dangerous-supplements/
dangerous-supplements-504/overview/index.htm.
106. Id. (quoting William Hubbard, FDA associate commissioner for policy and
planning as saying, "The law has never been fully funded...[t]here's never been the
resources to do all the things the law would command us to do").
107. Hill, supra note 18, at 380.
108. Miller & Longtin, supra note 19, at 17.
109. ISI Brands, Metabolife, http://www.metabolife.com/ (last visited Nov. 23,
2009).
110. Associated Press, Criminal Investigation Sought for Diet Supplement Seller,
U.S.A. TODAY Aug. 15, 2002, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/
health/2002-08-15-ephedra-x.htm (indicating supplement manufacturer denied
FDA requests for access to reports of adverse reactions over a period of several
years until the Justice Department became involve in a criminal investigation).
111. Wong, supra note 1, at 337.
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medical profession."' Now that the FDA is actively soliciting reports
of adverse events, one would assume this information would be
available to consumers so they may educate themselves and make
informed decisions, consistent with the spirit of the DSHEA."'
However, this is not the case, and the FDA has refused to release the
details of which specific supplements are causing problems."' Without full accountability for AERs, it seems the DSNDCPA of 2007 will
change little in the way the FDA regulates dietary supplements. After all, even if the system works as intended, it will only serve to notify the FDA when a particular product causes harm to consumers
rather than giving the FDA the ability to prevent these substances
from entering the market and injuring consumers in the first place.
B. The EU Approach
It is possible to view the EU approach of using a "positive list"
as existing on the opposite end of the spectrum when it comes to
regulation of dietary supplements. Between 1980 and 2000, Germany tested more than 300 herbal remedies, finding approximately
two-thirds to be safe and at least minimally effective."' However,
even those substances approved for consumer use are regulated in
the same way as prescription drugs."' Consumer desire for greater
access to alternative medicines and herbal remedies, as well as pressure from European supplement manufacturers, led to the creation
of the EFSA and the passage of the Health Claims Directive set to
take effect in 2009."' The Health Claims Directive focuses on the
ingredients used in manufacturing vitamins and minerals, maximum
112.
113.

ORTHOMOLECULAR MEDICINE NEWS SERVICE, supra note 102.
Id. While the FDA does release information identifying specific products the

agency has determined present a health risk, it does not release the details of the

Adverse Event Reports themselves. This appears to be in conflict with the Freedom
of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000)), but that issue is beyond the scope of
this Article.
114. ORTHOMOLECULAR MEDICINE NEWS SERVICE, supra note 102.
115. Miller & Longtin, supra note 19, at 16. Similar tests have been conducted in
various countries across the EU including Ireland, see M.M. O'Brien, et al., The
North/South Ireland Food Consumption Survey, 4 PUBLIC HEALTH NUTRITION 5b, 1069
(2001), and the United Kingdom, see Angela E. Johnson, et al., Dietary Supplement
Use Later in Life, 102 BRrTSH FOODJOURNAL 40 (2000).
116. Miller & Longtin, supra note 19, at 16.
117. Health Claims Directive, supra note 31; See also Leibovitch, supra note 12, at
435 (explaining that food scares during the 1990s and a lack of consistency in regulation between countries were also contributing factors to the creation of the
EFSA).
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allowable dosages, labeling, presentation, and advertising of food
supplements."' In order to standardize manufacturing and marketing of supplements amongst Member States, the EFSA created a
"positive list" to be used by the manufacturers of food supplements."9 To date, the EFSA has approved 112 ingredients, adding
them to the growing positive list.'o As ingredients are added, the
EFSA implicitly grants approval to manufacturers currently producing supplements containing substances on the positive list that con2
tinued production after the Health Claims Directive is allowed.'1
However, those manufacturers who produce supplements that
contain ingredients not included on the positive list may find it difficult to get those substances added. Studies estimate the required
testing necessary to get an ingredient onto the positive list costs between $110,000 and $350,000 USD, and can take two to three
years.'22 This presents a substantial obstacle to companies that currently make supplements with ingredients not on the positive list,
and will probably be enough to force many to end production of
certain supplements.'2 The Health Claims Directive also involves
the creation of nutrient profiles with which supplements must comply in order to make certain claims.2 This has the potential to price
out small and medium sized businesses from making any claims at
all, leaving the larger manufacturers with a considerable advantage
when it comes to innovation and development of new claims. 2 1
These negative aspects of the Health Claims Directive seem to
outweigh any potential benefits. However, manufacturers and distributors should profit from a more secure legal environment created by close regulation of claims. 2 1 More importantly, consumers
will benefit from the standardization of claims, labeling, ingredients,
and manufacturing processes of supplements.'2 ' Additionally, a vast

118. Fiona LeCong, Food Supplements Directive: An Attempt to Restore the Public
Confidence in Food Law, 29 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 105, 108 (2007).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. These "positive lists" are found in Annexes I and II of the Food Supplements
Directive; see also LeCong, supra note 118, at 108.
122. Lecong, supra note 118, at 109.
123. Id.
124. Felce, supra note 33, at 115.
125. Id. at 116.
126. Leibovitch, supra note 12, at 436.
127. Keane, supra note 11, at 295.
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majority of nutrient claims will likely be unaffected as they already
12
meet the proposed requirements of the Health Claims Directive."
V. THE NEED TO BAN STRUCTURE-FUNCTION CLAIMS AND REQUIRE
PREMARKET APPROVAL FOR SUPPLEMENTS

Taken together, the facts overwhelmingly indicate the need to
ban structure-function claims in the U.S. and prevent their future
use in the EU relating to all food products and dietary supplements.
The fact that the average consumer cannot distinguish a structurefunction claim from a disease claim alone should be enough to warrant their prohibition. If a specific claim has scientific support, it
should qualify as an approved health claim. It is simply too confusing to have a system with two different types of claims, both making
very similar assertions, but where one is almost completely unregulated. Either a substance prevents, treats, or cures a disease, or it
does not. If scientific evidence shows it does, manufacturers should
be permitted to make that claim on a product's label. If there is not
enough scientific evidence, manufacturers should not be allowed to
make any type of health claim. The evidence and research clearly
indicate disclaimers are not effective at conveying the intended message to the consumer."
A. Recommendations for the U.S.
To effect change, President Obama will need to create proposals
that specifically seek to reform the regulation of dietary supplements
and overhaul the struggling FDA. Although Senators Hatch and
Harkin continue to defend the DSHEA," many members of Congress have been vocal in their criticisms of the statute.' There is a
lot to be learned from the failures of the DSHEA including the pitfalls of vague definitions and a lack of effective regulatory authority.

128. Felce, supra note 33, at 116.
129. See supra Part III.A.4.
130. See Loren Israelsen, What Obama Means for FunctionalFoods and Supplements:
Part I, Nutraingredients-USA, (Jan. 20, 2009), http://www.nutraingredientsusa.com/On-your-radar/The-Obama-effect/What-Obama-means-for-functionalfoods-and-supplements-Part-1. (last visited Feb. 19, 2009).
131. Henry Waxman (D-Calif.) has been an outspoken critic of dietary supplements. See Israelsen, supra note 130. Another DSHEA opponent is Senator Richard Durbin (D-Ill.), who happens to be one of the first key political figures to endorse Obama. Id.
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Changes to the current structure of regulation should include a
return to a system of premarket approval for all dietary supplements. The current regulatory scheme is obviously inefficient, with
the FDA resorting to advisory opinions and warnings instead of preventing dangerous supplements from reaching the shelves." Additionally, the costs would not be as prohibitive as industry lobbyists
suggest. The FDA has already found many of the supplements currently sold safely promote good health and may help prevent disease.'" A system of premarket approval would also shift the costs of
supplement safety to the manufacturer.
Although the use of a positive list has its benefits, premarket
approval will provide consumers with the protection they need. This
is because there is little research on many of the ingredients found
in dietary supplements. To add a specific ingredient to a positive
list ignores the fact that some of these substances may cause dangerous interactions when mixed with other ingredients already on a
positive list. Therefore, a system of premarket approval is best to
avoid this potentially fatal possibility.
The most efficient way to achieve these changes in the U.S. is by
repealing the DSHEA and replacing it with new legislation.
Instead of trying to prove a specific supplement is unsafe, the FDA
should have the authority to require proof products are safe before
introduction to the public. This new legislation should provide an
exact definition of what constitutes a dietary supplement in order to
eliminate the uncertainty and the loopholes that currently exist.
B. Conclusion
These changes in the law will help to ensure that consumers of
dietary supplements are well informed, not misled, and have access
to products that are proven safe. This provides both legal security

132. The FDA has released reports of potential adverse effects associated with a
dietary supplement as recently as January 27, 2009. See U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), FDA Warns Consumers Against Dietary Supplement Containing
Undeclared Drug, FDA NEWS (2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/
topics/NEWS/2009/NEW01950.html (warning consumers about the risks of a
dietary supplement containing Sibutramine, a controlled substance with risks of
abuse and potentially dangerous health conditions).
133. See Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Health Claims that Meet Significant Scientific Agreement
(SSA), http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/lab-ssa.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2009).
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and certainty to companies who choose to manufacture these sup-

plements. Proper regulation of the dietary supplement industry will
allow numerous benefits to consumers while decreasing the instances of confusion and harm.

UNITED STATES FOOD LAW UPDATE:

FOOD

ALLERGY LABELS, REACHING ORGANIC
EQUIVALENCE, MISBRANDING LITIGATION AND
REGULATORY TAKINGS
A. Bryan Endres*and Michaela N. Tarr*
I. INTRODUCTION

The start of 2009 found the nation transitioning to a new presidential administration, speculating on the impact new appointees to
the executive branch may have on regulatory priorities and monitoring a bill' making its way through Congress that seeks a substantial
overhaul of the food regulatory system. This version of the Food
Law Update will analyze two major developments in food allergy labeling: finalization of rules requiring the labeling of Cochineal extract/carmine and an analysis of the proposed "gluten-free" product
labels. The update next discusses the execution of an equivalency
agreement between the United States and Canada with respect to
organic certification. Both countries expect this agreement to facilitate further development of the organic industry in their respective
nations. Finally, this update profiles four important cases decided
during the first six months of 2009. The first two cases involve allegations of misbranding. The third case resolves a preemption issue
centered on the role of state unfair competition claims as secondary
enforcement models for the national organic program. The final
* Assistant Professor of Agricultural Law, University of Illinois, Department of
Agricultural and Consumer Economics. This research is supported by the Cooperative State Research Education & Extension Service, USDA, Project No. ILLU470-309. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed
in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the view of
the funding agency.
** Legal Research Associate, University of Illinois, Department of Agricultural
and Consumer Economics.
1. See Food Safety Enhancement Act of 2009, H.R. 2749, 11' Cong. (passed
House on July 30, 2009 and referred to Senate).
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case addresses another constitutional element-the intersection of
food safety regulations with the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment.
As in previous editions of this update, necessity dictates that
not every change is included; rather, the authors limited their analysis to significant changes within the broader context of food production, distribution, and retail. The intent behind this series of updates is to provide a starting point for scholars, practitioners, food
scientists, and policymakers determined to understand the shaping
of food law in modern society. Tracing the development of food
law through these updates also builds an important historical context for the overall development of the discipline.
II. FOOD ALLERGY LABELS: DEVELOPMENTS IN COLOR AND
ALLERGEN LABELING REGULATIONS

The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA),' as
amended by the Color Additives Amendments of 1960,' requires the
disclosure of dyes, pigments or other substances that, when added
to food, are capable of imparting color.' Product labels, accordingly, must declare the presence of all color additives.' Although
certified colors' must be disclosed in the ingredient statement by
specific name,' manufacturers may declare the presence of certification-exempt colors by specific name and purpose (e.g., beet juice
added for color) or with the general phrase "artificial color" or "artificial color added."' Some certification-exempt colors, however, may
trigger adverse health consequences such as allergies. The Food
Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act of 2004 (FALCPA)'
further amended the FFDCA to address this issue. Specifically, the
FALCPA requires food labels to indicate the presence of the eight
major food allergens,o and authorizes the FDA to mandate via regu2. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et. seq. (1938).
3. Color Additive Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. 86-618, Title I, § 102(a)(3), 74
Stat. 398 (1960).
4. 21 U.S.C. § 321(t) (2006) (defining a color additive).
5. 21 U.S.C. § 343 (m); 21 U.S.C. § 379e(b)(1) (2006).
6. See 21 C.F.R. Part 74 (2009) (listing "certified colors").
7. 21 C.F.R. § 101.22(k)(1) (2009).
8. 21 C.F.R. § 101.22(k)(2) (2009).
9. Pub. L. No. 108-282, Title II, §206, 118 Stat 910(2004).
10. Pub. L. No. 108-282, § 203 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 343(w)(1))(2004). Major
food allergens include milk, eggs, fish, crustacean shellfish, tree nuts, wheat, peanuts, soybeans and any food ingredient that contains proteins derived from these
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lation the labeling of color additives that contain a non-major food
allergen." The FALCPA further directed the FDA to develop standards for "gluten-free" product labels.'2 The following sections discuss the FDA's FALCPA-based rulemaking activities that mandate
the listing by name of cochineal extract and carmine, rather the
general term "artificial color" and the creation of standards for a
"gluten-free" product label to facilitate dietary choices for individuals suffering from celiac disease."
The implementation of these specific regulatory provisions illustrates government's continued progression in developing a
greater sensitivity to the special needs of small segments of the
population-groups that might otherwise lack market power to demand private labeling schemes and, therefore, depend upon regulatory agencies for protection. Interestingly, a second aspect of the
cochineal extract/carmine labeling rule-mandatory disclosure of
the animal origin of the product-although demanded by many in
the vegetarian community who submitted comments to the proposed rule, did not make the final rule, as the agency continued" to
limit most mandatory labeling requirements to food safety/health
issues."
A. A Brief History of Color Additive Use and Regulation
Color additives derived from natural sources have been a part
of society since ancient times. Early Egyptians used colors to create
cosmetics, and individuals have added artificial colors to wine beginning in at least 300 B.C.'6 The USDA's Bureau of Chemistry, in
1881, began research on the use of colors in food, with the government eventually authorizing the first use of color additives in butter
products (except highly refined oil or products explicitly exempted). 21 U.S.C. §
3
21(qq)(2 0 0 6).
11. Pub. L. No. 108-282, § 203 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 343(x) (2004)).
12. Pub. L. No. 108-282, § 206 (2004).
13. See Pub. L. No. 108-292, § 202(6) (2004).
14. One exception is the FDA's mandatory labeling rule for irradiated foods.
For a discussion of recent developments regarding labeling rules for irradiated
food, see A. Bryan Endres, Food Law Update: Food Safety Planning,Attribute Labeling
and the IrradiationDebate, 4 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 129, 149-153 (2008).
15. 74 Fed. Reg. 207, 209-210 (Jan. 5, 2009) (discussing whether to include in
mandatory labels the fact that cochineal extract and carmine are insect or animal
derived).
16. FDA, Color Additive:, FDA's Regulatory Process and Historical Perspective, available at http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/ColorAdditives/ RegulatoryProcessHistoricalPerspectives/default.htm [hereinafter ColorAdditives].
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and cheese." Early regulatory efforts, however, failed to identify
that several commonly used color additives contained toxic levels of
lead, arsenic, mercury and other carcinogens.'"
The Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906" prohibited the use of
colors in food products to conceal damage or inferiority or poisonous colors in confectionaries.2" The USDA subsequently approved
seven colors for use in food and created a voluntary certification
program for new colors. In 1927, responsibility for enforcing the
Act transferred to the newly created FDA, which by 1931 had approved fifteen certified colors." Although the 1938 FFDCA imposed some limits on the use of color additives, including a mandatory certification program for batch colors," many potential safety
issues remained largely unregulated.
In 1950, amidst widespread reports of orange color additives in
Halloween candy causing illnesses in children, the FDA engaged in a
process to reevaluate all prior listed color additives.2 ' As noted
above, the Color Additives Amendment of 1960 provided the
agency with new statutory authority to regulate the approval, conditions for use, and subsequent labeling of color additives in food,
drug and cosmetic products.
Moreover, FALCPA provided the
FDA with additional authority to impose labeling rules relating to
color additives that may contain an allergen."

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.
Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906).
Pub. L. No. 59-384 § 7 (1906).
Color Additives, supra note 16 (citing USDA Food Inspection Decision 76).
Id.
Id.

24.

Id.

Representative Delaney also held a series of hearings on the possible

carcinogenicity of food additives, culminating in passage of a "Delaney Clause" with
respect to safety evaluations/approval of both food and color additives, prohibiting
the use of any substance found to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal.
See 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A)(2006) (food additive Delaney Clause); 21 U.S.C. §
379e(b)(5)(B) (2006) (color additive Delaney Clause).
25. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 379e (2006) (outlining approval procedures for color
additives); 21 C.F.R. Parts 73 & 74 (2009) (outlining labeling rules for color additives). Perhaps due to the highly technical nature of color additive regulations in
the United States, color additive violations remain a common reason for detaining
imported products offered for entry. STEVEN STRAUSS, STRAUSS's FEDERAL DRUG
LAWS AND EXAMINATION REVIEW 317 (CRC Press 2000).
26. Amendment of Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 108-282,
§ 203 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 343(x) (2006)).
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B. CochinealExtract and Carmine
Cochineal extract and carmine ("CC") are colorings obtained
from the dried body of the female cochineal insect.' Specifically,
cochineal extract is "the concentrated solution obtained after removing the alcohol from an aqueous-alcoholic extract of cochineal."" Similarly, carmine is a lake' on an aluminum hydroxide
substrate of carminic acid, obtained by an aqueous extraction of
cochineal."0 The process of extracting carminic acid from the cochineal is complex. The process begins with killing the cochineal female insects just prior to the egg-laying stage, either by immersion in
hot water or by exposure to sunlight, steam, or the heat of an oven."
"Each method produces a different color which results in the varied
appearance of the commercial cochineal."" Subsequent drying reduces net weight up to 70%," with carminic acid comprising up to
22% of the dried product." As an indication of scale, the production of one kilogram of refined colorant requires approximately
80,000 to 100,000 cochineal insects." Once extracted, manufacturers use CC as a dye in a wide variety of the foods, drugs, and cosmetics. First approved in 1967," common uses of CC in food production include: red, pink, and purple candy, yogurt, ice cream,

27. Listing of Color Additives Exempt from Certification Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Labeling; Cochineal Extract and Carmine Declaration, 71 Fed. Reg. 4839,
4840 (Jan. 20, 2006). The cochineal lives on cactus plants in Peru, the Canary Islands, and other tropical and subtropical regions in South America and Mexico.
Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI), FDA Urged to Improve Labeling of or
Ban Carmine Food Coloring (Aug. 24, 1998), available at http://www.
cspinet.org/new/carmine 8_24_98.htm.
28. 21 C.F.R. § 73.100 (2009).
29. A "lake" is a color extended on a substratum by absorption, coprecipitation,
or chemical combination that does not involve simple mixing processes. 21 C.F.R.
§ 70.3(1) (2009).
30. 21 C.F.R. § 73.100 (2009).
31. COCHINEAL, CARMINE, CARMINIC ACID (E120), available at http://foodinfo.net/uk/colour/cochineal.htm.
32. Id.
33. COCHINEAL (dactylopious coccus), availableat http://www.cochineal.org.
34. FRANCISCO DELGADO-VARGAS & OCTAVIO PAREDES-LOPEZ, NATURAL COLORANTS FOR FOOD AND NUTRACEUTICAL USES 245 (CRC Press 2003).
35. Id. at 246.
36. See 32 Fed. Reg. 6131 (April 19, 1967) (approving carmine and codified at 21
C.F.R. § 8.317 (food and cosmetic use) and 21 C.F.R. § 8.6009 (drug use)); 33 Fed.
Reg. 18577 (Dec. 14, 1968) (approving cochineal extract and codifying in same
sections of C.F.R. as carmine).
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fruit beverages, butter, cheese, jam, jelly, sausages, and chewing
37
gum.
Despite its varied uses in food products, CC has been under
siege for the better part of the last decade due to several studies that
concluded a small percentage of individuals may suffer severe and
potentially life-threatening allergic reactions to CC exposure." As
noted above, food processors may disclose use of non-certified colors such as CC with the term "color added" or a similar informative
phrase that makes it clear to consumers that a color additive is present in the food product." Absent specific listing of "cochineal extract" or "carmine" on the product label, this segment of the population runs the risk of a severe allergic reaction without warning.
Moreover, the implementing regulations for non-certified color labeling generally exempts the listing of color additives on butter,
cheese and ice cream, further exposing CC-sensitive consumers to
undisclosed risk.o
Although researchers published the first documented allergic
reaction to CC in 1961, the issue did not engender significant public
attention until a 1998 CSPI petition to the FDA requesting (1) listing
of CC by name in the ingredient list; (2) disclosing the animal origin
of the product; (3) undertaking a scientific review of the reactions to
CC and determining if elimination as a food ingredient is possible;
and (4) if necessary, banning the use of CC.4 ' CSPI submitted a secCarmine; Cochineal Extract, http://www.cspinet.org/reports/
37. CSPI,
chemcuisine.htm/ (last visited at Nov. 14, 2009); See also CSPI, supra note 27; Cochi(E120), available at http://www.foodneal, Carmine, Carminic Acid
info.net/uk/colour/cochineal.htm (last visited at Nov. 14, 2009).
38. See 71 Fed. Reg. 4839, 4841-3 (noting and describing a total of 35 cases of
hypersensitivity to CC published in the scientific and medical literature or reported
directly to the FDA); J.B. Greig, WHO Food Additives Series 46: Cochineal Extract,
http://www.inchem.org/
available at
Carminic Acid,"
Carmine, and
documents/jecfa/jecmono/ v46je03.htm#_46032140 (describing a series of studies
summarized by the UK Food Standards Agency leading to the agency's conclusion
that "cochineal extract, carmines, and, possibly, carminic acid in foods and beverages may initiate or provoke allergic reactions in some individuals. Because some
of the adverse reactions are severe, it considered that appropriate information, for
example noting the presence of the color in foods and beverages should be provided to alert individuals who are allergic to these compounds"); J.L. Baldwin et. al.,
Popsicle-InducedAnaphylaxis Due To Carmine Dye Allergy, 79 ANNALS ALLERGY ASTHMA

IMMUNOLOGY 415 (1997) (describing allergic reaction to CC).
39. 71 Fed. Reg. 4839, 4844 (describing the requirements of 21 C.F.R.
§101.22(k)(2)).
40. Id. (describing the requirements of 21 C.F.R. §101.22(k)(3)).
41. Id. at 4843 (citing a petition by CSPI dated Aug. 24, 1998, Docket No. 98P0724); see also CSPI, supra note 27.

20091

U.S. FOOD LAW UPDATE

229

ond petition in October 2001-prior to the 2004 enactment of
FALPCA-requesting the FDA to require the declaration of food
allergens on ingredient labels and establish good manufacturing
practices (GMPs) to prevent the inadvertent introduction of allergens into otherwise non-allergenic foods.
The FDA responded to the CSPI petition on January 30, 2006
in the form of a proposed rule mandating the labeling by name of
CC in food and cosmetic products." The proposed rule included a
label requirement for butter, cheese and ice cream-products generally excluded from color additive labels." The FDA, however, did
not propose the requirement of labeling the animal origin of CC,
nor did the agency engage in a scientific review regarding options
for the elimination of CC as a food ingredient."
Almost three years later, and after receiving only 159 comments
(eighty-three of which were form letters), the FDA issued its final
rule for CC labeling." The final form of this rule, effective a full
twenty-four months after publication," is identical to the agency's
proposed rule." This leads one to question why the agency needed
three years to finalize its rule, and subsequently defer actual compliance for almost five years from the date of the proposed rule. Of
course, the agency must balance multiple responsibilities and set
42. CSPI, Food Safety Comments & Petitions:Regulatory Comments and Petitions, Oct.
4, 2001, availableat http://www.cspinet.org/foodsafety/allergenic-substances.html.
The FDA also has limited enforcement authority over color additives through the
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-188, Title III, § 305(a) that requires domestic and foreign manufacturers of color additives used as ingredients in foods to register with FDA. 21
U.S.C. § 350d(a).
43. 71 Fed. Reg. 4839. Labeling the use of CC in drugs will follow via separate
rulemaking. Id. at 4845.
44. 71 Fed. Reg. 4839, 4846 (Jan. 30, 2006) (proposing an amendment to 21
C.F.R. § 73.100(d)(2)).
45. Id. at 4845 (addressing each of the four elements of the 1998 CSPI petition).
CSPI's comment to the proposed rule supported the labeling requirement, but
"urge[d the agency] to reconsider its refusal to ban these two color additives as a
way to protect those consumers who do not know they are allergic to them." CSPI,
Comment on proposed rule to require labeling of cochineal extract and carmine, FDA
Docket Number 1998P-0724 (28 Aug. 1998), available at http://www.fda.gov/
OHRMS/DOCKETS/dockets/98p0724/98p-0724-cOO001 1-voll.pdf.
46. Listing of Color Additives Exempt from Certification Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Labeling; Cochineal Extract and Carmine Declaration , 74 Fed. Reg. 207, 208
(Jan. 5, 2009).
47. 74 Fed. Reg. 207, 210-11 (Jan. 5, 2009) (responding to comments seeking
alternative effective date).
48. 74 Fed. Reg. 207, 216-17 (Jan. 5, 2009) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. §§
73.100(d); 73.2087(c); 101.22(k)(2)).
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priorities in an increasingly complex, global food supply chain. But

to the extent the agency must balance accuracy with efficiency, the
CC rule making process stands out as apparent low hanging fruit it
could have resolved in a more expeditious manner, thereby achieving its food safety objectives. The rather thin explanation for delaying implementation for twenty-four months based on the supposi-

tion that "[m]any manufacturers may have significant inventories of
[non-compliant] labels"" seems incredulous, given the length of time
the agency debated the proposed change.
Prolonged delay in crafting a relatively narrow, straightforward
set of rules for isolated food ingredients not only delays implementation of key public health provisions, but also frustrates a public
increasingly dissatisfied"0 with the performance of the agency. The
analysis of the still-pending (as of this writing) gluten-free labeling
rules below is yet another example of extended delay in finalizing

agency rules-in this case rules specifically directed by Congress.
C. Labeling Rules for "Gluten-Free"Products
Pursuant to a mandate embedded within the 2004 FALCPA,"
the FDA issued proposed rules for the voluntary labeling of glutenfree products in 2007." The FALCPA directed the FDA to propose
the rule within two years of passage of the Act and to issue a final
rule within four years." As the law passed in August 2004, the gluten-free labeling rules are now well overdue. Currently, "manufacturers have different and inconsistent definitions of the term 'gluten-free.""' As a result, consumers with celiac disease and their care49. 74 Fed. Reg. 207, 210-11(Jan. 5, 2009).
50. Precise polling data is not available, but recent studies note a decline in public confidence in the FDA over the past few years. Despite this decline, the public
still regards the agency as more trustworthy than industry in managing risks associated with new technologies. See The National Women's Health Information Center,
Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. Public Lacks Confidence in FDA:
Poll, April 30, 2009, available at http://www.womenshealth.gov/news/
english/626405.htm; Peter D. Hart research Associates, Inc., Awareness of And Attitudes Toward Nanotechnology And Federal Regulatory Agencies, at 5,Sept. 25, 2007,
availableat http://www. pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/
Nanotechnologies/HartNanoPoll_2007.pdf.
51. FALCPA, supra note 9.
52. 72 Fed. Reg. 2795 (Jan. 23, 2007).
53. FALCPA, supra note 9.
54. 72 Fed. Reg. 2795, 2801 (Jan. 23, 2007) (discussing industry confusion and
the lack of an industry-wide private standard for foods bearing a gluten-free label
claim).
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givers may not always rely on "gluten-free" labeling claims to make
purchasing decisions. Both consumers and food processors, therefore, would benefit from a standardized definition of the term to
facilitate efficient satisfaction of the market demand for gluten-free
foods." Recent enforcement letters from the FDA to manufactures
marketing spelt-based" products as gluten-free is further evidence of
the need to establish consistent, workable definitions to protect consumer health and aid development of a market for gluten-free products.5

1. The Proposed Rule
The proposed rule has two primary components. First, it categorically excludes certain grains and proteins from foods labeled
"gluten-free" and sets a threshold for residual levels of gluten in certain products. Second, the rule establishes guidelines for using the
term "gluten-free" on foods that are inherently free of gluten.
a. Defining Gluten Free, Gluten, and ProhibitedGrains
The proposed rules authorize a "Gluten-free" label on foods not
containing: prohibited grains; an ingredient derived from prohibited grains that has not had the gluten" removed during processing
to a level of less than 20ppm (i.e., 20 micrograms or less gluten per
gram of food); or a final product containing more than 20ppm of

55. Id.
56. The technical name for spelt is Triticum spelta L. FDA Warning Letter to
Everything Spelt Company, Inc. 30-Mar-07. The term "wheat" in section 201(qq) of
the FFDCA means any species in the genus Triticum. Id. Thus, for the purposes of
section 201(qq), wheat includes grains such as spelt. Id. See also National Institute
of Health, What I Need to Know About Celiac Disease, 6 (2007) (noting that spelt is a
food product celiac sufferers should avoid).
57. FDA Warning Letter to Jerusalem Manufacturing Nature Foods & Wholesalavailable at http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/
2008,
2,
Sept.
ers,
Inc.,
See also FDA
EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/2008/UCM1048149.htm.
Warning Letter to Everything Spelt Company, Inc. March 30, 2007, available at
LetActions/Warning
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/Enforcement
ters/2007/UCM076545.htm (warning letter for failure to label spelt as a "wheat"
product).
58. "Gluten" is defined as the proteins that naturally occur in a prohibited grain
and that may cause adverse health effects in persons with celiac disease (e.g.,
prolamins and glutelins). 72 Fed. Reg. 2795, 2801 (Jan. 23, 2007) (to be codified at
21 C.F.R. § 101.91(a)(2)).
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gluten." The rule further defines "Prohibited grain" as any of the
following grains or their crossbred hybrids:
(1) wheat, meaning any species belonging to the genus Triticum;
(2) rye, meaning any species belonging to the genus Secale; and
(3) barley, meaning any species belonging to the genus Hordeum.'

The proposal specifically, but not exclusively, identifies barley, common wheat, durum wheat, einkorn wheat, emmer wheat, kamut, rye,
spelt wheat, and triticale as prohibited grains." The federal register
notice further lists farina, semolina, hydrolyzed wheat protein, barley extra and malt vinegar as examples of ingredients derived from
prohibited grains and presumed to contain gluten because they have
not been treated to remove the gluten." Other foods, such as food
starch and wheat starch, however, which are treated to remove gluten, would only be allowed if they contain less than twenty ppm gluten.
Although oats contain small amounts of gluten, the FDA proposed to exclude oats from the list of prohibited grains based on the
apparent ability of the vast majority of individuals with celiac disease
to tolerate oats consumption. Further supporting this decision was
the ability of oats to add some degree of variety and nutrition in an
otherwise very limited diet."
The proposal, however, cautions manufacturers that nonprohibited grains may contain gluten because of commingling during harvest, transport, or storage.' This is a special concern in oat
production due to crop rotation (i.e., growing oats in rotation with
wheat, rye and barley), use of shared harvest, transportation and
storage facilities, and the general close proximity of oats to prohibited grains." Despite this widespread commingling, the agency believes that with the implementation of a series of agronomic and
handling practices, combined with post-harvest testing and dedicated milling operations, manufacturers can eliminate contaminants

59. Id. at 2802 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 101.91(a)(3)). Previously, the FDA
approved the use of "gluten-free" labels under its general authority to prevent misbranding of foods (i.e., so long as the claim is truthful and not misleading). 58 Fed.
Reg. 2850, 2864 (Jan. 6, 1993).
60. 72 Fed. Reg. 2795, 2802 (to be codified at 21 C.F.R § 101.91(a)(1)).
61. Id.

62.

Id.

63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id. at 2798 (discussing commingling and segregation issues).
Id.
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in oats and obtain purity levels below twenty ppm of gluten.' Although developed specifically to accommodate the issue with commingled oats, the twenty ppm standard would apply to all foods
marketed as gluten-free."
b. Labeling offood inherentlyfree of gluten
The other primary component of the proposed rule concerns
labeling of foods naturally free of gluten.' Such foods may bear a
gluten free statement so long as the label clearly indicates that all
foods of the same type, not just the brand bearing the label, are gluten free." The food must also have less than twenty ppm gluten.o
The one exception where the additional language would not be required would be on food containing oats. Although oats are naturally gluten free, not all oat-containing foods are in fact gluten free
due to the intermingling of oats with other grains during harvesting,
transport, or storage."
2. FDA's Current Regime
Although the proposed rule formalizes the agency's interpretation of the FALCPA, it does not significantly change the current
enforcement regime. For instance, in the preamble to the final rule
implementing the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990,2
the FDA suggested that "gluten-free" can be used so long as it is
truthful and not misleading, which would mean that the general
type of product might contain gluten, but the specific product at
issue does not contain gluten from grains such as wheat, barley, rye,
oats, and millet. In subsequent guidance documents, the FDA further clarified that "wheat," the allergen of concern for celiacs, is
"any species in the genus Titicum."7 3 Thus, the major food allergen
wheat includes "grains such as common wheat (Triticum aestivum L.),
durum wheat (Triticum durum Desf), club wheat (Triticum compactum
66. Id. at 2799. The FDA noted that two oat processors already have implemented segregation measures to ensure their respective products do not contain
gluten and would qualify as "gluten-free" under the proposed rule. Id.
67. Id. at 2802.
68. Id. (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 101.91(b)(2)).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 58 Fed. Reg. 2850, 2863 (Jan. 7, 1993).
73. Id.
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Host.), spelt (Triticum spelta L.), semolina (Triticum durum Desf), Einkorn (Triticum monococcum L. subsp. Monococcum), emmer (Triticum
turgidumL. subsp. dicoccon (Schrank) Thell.), kamut (Triticum polonicum L.), and triticale (x Triticosecale ssp. Wittm.)." 7 4
Because the FDA already treats wheat, rye, barley and their
crossbreeds as prohibited ingredients in gluten-free labeling claims,
the proposed rule does not create a functional change in enforcement. Rather, it creates an inverse rule of the requirements imposed by FALCPA. The Act requires disclosure on the labeling of
food containing a major food allergen, one of which is "wheat"." If
a food contains any of the prohibited grains classified as "wheat,"
the product label must state, "contains wheat."" Absent the disclosure, the food is misbranded.7 ' Hence, it cannot be labeled as
"wheat-free." As the proposed rule defines "gluten free," no product
that contains a grain that must be declared as a major food allergen
can be labeled as "gluten-free." Because the rule is basically formalizing the inverse of the mandatory allergen labeling definition, it is
making little effective change in the current regulatory regime. This
is evidenced by recent enforcement letters from the FDA, which has
warned companies producing foods containing spelt that the product labels must state "contains wheat" and cannot bear a "gluten
free" label."
The FDA's proposed label for foods (other than oats) that are
inherently gluten free also is consistent with previous agency guidance regarding the use of "free" on labels. In the above mentioned
preamble, the FDA suggested it might consider a "gluten-free" label
misleading if the food did not normally contain gluten.o The FDA
regulations on "free" labeling claims made for foods inherently free
of specific nutrients (e.g., sodium, fat) or other food substances
(e.g., cholesterol) require additional qualifying language, lest consumers mistakenly assume that only the particular brand making the
claim is free of the substance."' Likewise, the FDA is viewing the use
74. FDA, Guidancefor Industry: A Food Labeling Guide, Section VI. Ingredient Lists,
Food Allergen Labeling Question & Answer F11, April, 2008, available at
Information/Guidhttp://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatory
anceDocuments/FoodLabelingNutrition/FoodLabelingGuide/ucm064880.htm#abel.
75. 21 U.S.C. § 343(w) (2006).
76. 21 U.S.C. § 3 2 1(qq) (2006).
77. 21 U.S.C. § 343(w)(1)(A) (2006).
78. 21 U.S.C. § 343(w) (2006).
79. FDA Warning Letter to Jerusalem manufacturing, supra note 57.
80. 58 Fed. Reg. at 2864.
81. 21 CFR 101.13(e)(2) (1995).
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of a gluten-free labeling claim for a food inherently free of gluten to
be potentially misleading without the inclusion of additional qualifying language.' The caution about intermingling is also consistent
with current FDA labeling requirements. For example, the FDA
warns companies against labeling their foods as "GM" or "biotech"
free due to the risk of intermingling.'
3. Alcohol & Allergens
The Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) has authority to regulate labeling and advertising of wine, distilled spirits,
and malt beverages under the Federal Alcohol Administration Act
(FAA Act).' The FAA Act and regulations define the term "malt
beverage" as
a beverage made by the alcoholic fermentation of an infusion or decoction, or combination of both, in potable brewing water, of malted barley
with hops, or their parts, or their products, and with or without other
malted cereals, and with or without the addition of unmalted or prepared cereals, other carbohydrates or products prepared therefrom, and
with or without the addition of carbon dioxide, and with or without
other wholesome products suitable for human food consumption.

Alcoholic beverages also are subject to the FFDCA adulteration and
misbranding provisions, and implementing regulations because the
definition of "food" under the FFDCA includes "articles used for
food or drink" and thus includes alcoholic beverages." However,
pursuant to a memorandum of agreement between the FDA and the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF, TTB's predecessor), the TTB is responsible for promulgating and enforcing labeling
regulations for wine, distilled spirits and malt beverages."
On July 7, 2008, the TTB issued a ruling in which it determined
it does not have authority under the FAA Act to regulate the label82. 72 Fed. Reg. 2795, 2802 (Jan. 23, 2007).
83. See FDA, Guidance for Industry: Voluntary Labeling Indicated Whether Foods
Have or Have Not Been Developed Using Bioengineering; Draft Guidance, Jan. 2001,
available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guid-anceDocuments/FoodLabelingNutrition/ucm059098.htm.
84. 27 U.S.C. § 205(e)-(f) (2001) (the implementing regulations are in 27 C.F.R.
Part 7).
85. 27 U.S.C. § 211(a)(8) (2001); 27 CFR 7.10 (1982).
86. 21 U.S.C. § 321(f) (2006).
87. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Food and Drug Administration and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, MOU 225-88-2000, III.A
(Nov. 20, 1987), available at http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Partnerships Collaborations/MemorandaofLJnderstandingMOUs/DomesticMOUs/ucm116370.htm.
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ing of beers produced without malted barley and hops." As a result,
beers brewed from malt substitutes, such as rice or corn, are subject
to the FDA's labeling requirements." In response to this ruling, the
FDA issued a draft guidance on the labeling of beers made with
grains other than malted barley and hops in August, 2009." The
guidance essentially reminds producers that all products must comply with the FDA's labeling requirements in 21 C.F.R. Part 101, such
as front of label statements of identity, accurate statements of net
content, common or usual names of ingredients in ingredient labels,
nutrition labeling, the name and place of business of the manufacturer, and mandatory allergen labeling."
Because the TTB has labeling authority under the MOA, the
TTB generally initiates parallel rulemaking proceedings when the
FDA determines a substance "poses a recognized public health problem, and that the ingredient or substance must be identified on a
food product label." 2 As this article has already discussed, the FDA
requires labeling of the eight major food allergens. Somewhat differently from the FDA's rules, the TTB allows for voluntary labeling
of allergens." However, if a company chooses to declare one food
allergen, the TTB requires the product label to declare all food allergens.' In issuing its regulations, the TTB noted that the "vast
88. TTB Rulings 2008-3, Classification of Brewed Products as "Beer" Under the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and as "Malt Beverages" Under the Federal Alcohol
Administration Act, July 7, 2008, available at http://www.ttb.gov/ rulings/20083.pdf. TTB does have taxing authority over beer brewed from wheat substitutes,
due to the different definition given to beer in the Internal Revenue Code. Id. at 2-5
(citing 26 U.S.C. §§ 5051, 5052).
89. Id. at 4.
90. FDA GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: LABELING OF CERTAIN BEERS SUBJECT TO THE
LABELING JURISDICTION OF THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION; DRAFr GUIDANCE

(August, 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/ GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments/FoodLabelingNutrition/ucml66239.htm#refs.
91. Id. at § III.
92. Memorandum of Understanding Between the FDA and the ATF, supra note
87, § III.
93. 27 C.F.R. § 4.32a(b) (2009); 5.32a(b); 7.22a(b). TTB does require producers
to disclose sulfites in wine, spirits and malted beverages, FD&C Yellow number 5 in
spirits and malted beverages, and aspartame in malted beverages. 27 C.F.R. §§
4.32(e); 5.32(b)(5); 7.22(b)(4); 5.32(b)(7); 7.22(b)(6); 7.22(b)(7). FD&C Yellow No. 5,
sulfites, and aspartame are not considered food allergens because they do not cause
IgE (Immunoglobulin E)-mediated responses, but they may cause health problems
in certain individuals. Major Food Allergen Labeling for Wines, Distilled Spirits,
and Malt Beverages, 71 Fed. Reg. 42260, 42261 (July 26, 2006) (to be codified at 27
C.F.R. pts. 4, 5, and 7).
94. 27 C.F.R. § 4.32a(b); 5.32a(b); 7.22a(b) (2009).
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majority" of comments in response to proposed allergen labeling
supported mandatory allergen labeling, including a consolidated
comment from several major trade associations representing the
alcoholic beverage industry.' Consequently, the TTB made the voluntary labeling regulations an interim rule," and initiated rulemaking proceedings for mandatory labeling of major allergens." It appears the TTB has not taken further action."
4. Future Allergen Labeling Rules
The proposed rules for gluten-free labeling have a circular nature, as a food that does not have a "contains wheat" label on it logically must be gluten free. This raises the question - why invest
scarce resources in developing a duplicative rule? The obvious answer is because Congress has mandated that the FDA must define a
"gluten-free" label." Moreover, there are many gluten-free products
that attempt to replicate foods that traditionally contain gluten in
order to appeal to people with gluten allergies. Without the "glutenfree" label on the front of the package, these customers may otherwise pass by the product that has been formulated especially to meet
their needs. In addition, the proposed twenty ppm tolerance for
gluten-free labels under the proposed rule expands choices for those
seeking to eliminate gluten from their diet.
Furthermore, the establishment of a tolerance lowers compliance costs for manufacturers by allowing some degree of impurity
while also facilitating trans-Atlantic trade in gluten-free products as
the EU recently amended its gluten-free labeling rule to allow for a
twenty ppm tolerance."
An interesting issue this proposed rule raises is whether the
FDA will in the future propose similar inverse rules for other allergens. Again, the obvious answer is probably not unless directed specifically by Congress. Moreover, terms like "soy-free" and "egg-free"
are not commonly used in the market place. These terms, however,
95. 71 Fed. Reg., supra note 93, at 42262-42263.
96. Id. at 42263.
97. Id. at 42329 (July 26, 2006) (to be codified at 27 C.F.R. pts. 4,5, and 7).
98. See id. The proposed rule has docket number TTB-2007-0045-0001. Id. No
comments (or any other documents) have been posted on line for this docket.
99. FALCPA, supra note 9.
100. See Jefferson Adams, EU Debuts New Standardsfor Foods with Gluten-FreeLabel,
CELIAC, Feb. 6, 2009, available at http://www.celiac.com/articles/21734/1/EUDebuts-New-Standards-for-Foods-with-Gluten-Free-Label /Pagel.html. Commission
Regulation 41/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 16) 3, 4 (EC).
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may become increasingly common as the incidence of allergies continues to rise."' Given this likelihood, it would seem to make the
most sense for the FDA to have clear standards in place before the
rise of a labeling trend, rather than having to develop ad hoc rules
that may run counter to a processor's investment in new product
formulations and accompanying labels. Although Congress did not
direct FDA to develop additional inverse allergen labels, it did not in
any way restrict FDA's authority to issue these rules.
As noted above, however, it is somewhat troubling that the FDA
has not yet finalized this relatively straightforward rule, which does
not alter significantly existing policy, despite the congressional
mandate to complete this process by August 2, 2008. Perhaps the
agency is grappling with the threshold level, which originally garnered criticism from both sides-for setting a tolerance below previous European standards and for not being stringent enough by allowing some level of gluten. The agency may also struggle with the
issue of whether to include oats in the banned grains category as
some commenters submitted studies demonstrating that celiac patients are sensitive to the gluten in oats. "' Regardless of underlying
rationale, the extended delay in developing the gluten-free labeling
rules mirrors that of the lengthy time the agency required to develop rules for cochineal extract and carmine labeling. One hopes
that the agency will improve the speed with which it is able to develop future labeling rules-for the sake of consumers and the regulated industry.

101. A recent report by the CDC reported that the prevalence of food allergies in
children increased 18% between 1997 and 2007, up to 3.9%. AMY M. BRANUM AND
SUSAN

L.

LuKAcs,

CTR. FOR DISEASE

CONTROL, FOOD

ALLERGY AMONG

U.S.

(Oct. 2008), available at
http://www.cdc .gov/nchs/data/databriefs/dblO.pdf. The rise in peanut allergies
is particularly striking, with a 2002 study reporting a nearly two fold increase in
reported peanut allergies between 1989 and 1994-1996. Michael Ruff, Research
Shows Peanut Allergy Increasing in Children, ALLERGY AND ASTHMA ADVOCATE, (Am.
Academy of Allergy, Asthma & Immunology), Winter, 2003, available at
Jane
(citing
http://www.aaaai.org/patients/advocate/2003/winter/jaci.stm
Grundy, Sharon Matthews, Belinda Bateman, Taraneh Dean, & Syed Hasan Arshad,
Rising prevalence of allergy to peanut in children:Datafrom 2 sequential cohorts, 110J. oF
ALLERGY & CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY, 784-789 (2002)). Food allergies are somewhat
less prevalent in adults, because children often outgrow them. BRANUM ET AL.,
supra. However, some studies show that more than 3% of adults have one or more
food allergies. Hugh A. Sampson, Update on Food Allergy, 113 J. OF ALLERGY &
CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY 805; 806 (May, 2004).
102. FDA Gluten Free Docket 2005N-0279.
CHILDREN: TRENDS IN PREVALENCE AND HOSPITALIZATIONS,
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III. U.S. AND CANADA COME TO AGREEMENT ON ORGANIC
AGRICULTURE TRADE

As the FDA grapples with finalizing rules for "gluten-free" labels
with a 20 ppm threshold that could facilitate trade with the European Union, developments at FDA's former parent agency, USDA,
have facilitated trade opportunities in the organic sector. On June
17, 2009, the USDA and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency
(CFIA) (the Canadian equivalent of the USDA) finalized an agreement recognizing the equivalency of the other country's organic
certification system.'"3 This is the first agreement of its kind" and
could set precedent for future negotiations with the E.U. to liberalize trade in organic products.
Many view standards as the principal trade barriers in the WTO
era as they have the capacity to impede, as well as facilitate, internaAt the national level, organic food certification stantional trade.'
dards remain controversial and are subject to extensive negotiations,
revisions and even the occasional lawsuit." Stakeholders amplify
these concerns on the international stage as current trade in organic
products often relies upon certification to multiple similar, but not
quite equal, national standards. For example, products certified to
USDA organic standards may not enter the European Union market
under an organic label unless certified to the slightly different E.U.
103. Letter from Karen McIntyre, Executive Director, Agrifood, Meat, Seafood
Safety Directorate, Canada, to Barbara C. Robinson, Deputy Administrator, USDA
Transportation and Marketing Programs, United States (June 17th, 2009); Letter
from Barbara C. Robinson, Deputy Administrator, USDA Transportation and Marketing Programs, United States to Karen McIntyre, Executive Director, Agrifood,
Meat, Seafood Safety Directorate, Canada (June 17, 2009), both available at
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSvl.0/ams.fetchTemplateData.do?template=Templat
eN&nav ID=NationalOrganicProgram&page=USCanadaDeterminationofEquivalency&leftNav-NationalOrganicProgram&description=US-Canada%20Determination%
20of%2OEquivalency&acct-nopgeninfo.
104. News Release, USDA, Agriculture Deputy Secretary Merrigan Announces
U.S. - Canada Agreement for Organic Trade Equivalence, June 17, 2009, available at
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSvl.0/ams.fetchTemplateData.do?template=TemplateU&navlD=LatestReleases&page=Newsroom&topNav-Newsroom&leftNav--&rig
htNavl=LatestReleases&rightNav2=&resultType=Details&dDocName=STELPRDC5
077526&dlD=1 13862&wf-false&description=Agriculture+Deputy+Secretary+Merrig
an+Announces+U.S.+-+Canada+Agreement+for++Organic+Trade +Equivalence.
105. Department of Commerce., Standards & Competitiveness: Coordinatingfor
Results, Removing StandardsRelated Trade Barriers Through Effective Collaboration,at 1
(2004) available at http://ts.nist.gov/Standards/upload /trade barriers report2.pdf.
106. See, e.g., Harvey v. Veneman, 396 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2005).
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standard. To accommodate these variations, farmers and processors
must obtain dual certification, which drives up the cost for all involved. The proliferation of different standard and certification
systems undoubtedly has improved the reliability of the market, but
mutual recognition and equivalency among systems is very limited
and a major obstacle for continued development of the sector.
Prospects for harmonization'o' to a single international organic
production standard are low.' 8 One barrier to reaching agreements
has been the reluctance of the USDA to upset, via international negotiations, the carefully crafted domestic rules that were the result
of ten years of contentious rule making." Equivalence, on the other
hand, is a more workable approach."o The United States' and Canada's successful negotiation demonstrates that it is possible to develop workable trade agreements that facilitate and protect each
country's organic system.
A. The Catalystfor the Agreement

Since 1999, Canada, with the exception of British Columbia and
Quebec, operated under a voluntary national standard for marketing organic food."' This voluntary standard allowed the import of
organic products from the U.S. without the burden of dual certification. As a result, organic trade between the U.S. and Canada has
flourished. Imported goods comprise approximately 80% of organic
107. Harmonization is the adjustment of standards until they are same around
the world. David Livshiz, Updating American Administrative Law: WTO, International
Standards, Domestic Implementation and Public Participation, 24 WiS. INT'L L.J. 961,
968 (2007). In contrast, the International Federal of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM) defines equivalence as "a mechanism to recognize and accept another system by acknowledging that variations between systems uphold the respective systems' objectives." See Diane Bowen, Current Mechanisms that Enable International Trade in Organic Products, 1HARMONIZATION AND EQUIVALENCE IN ORGANIC

AGRICULTURE 25,at 29 (2004). Thus, whereas harmonization makes all the standards the same, equivalency recognizes each country achieves an approximately
equal result through an approximately equal process.
108. International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM), Summary Report International Task Force on Harmonization and Equivalence in Organic
Agriculture 2003-2008, at 6 (2008) [hereinafter ITF Summary Report].
109. Congress passed the Organic Foods Production Act in 1990. Pub. L. No.
101-624, 104 Stat. 3935 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6501 to 6522 (1990)).
However, the agency was unable to produce a final rule until 2000. 65 Fed. Reg.
80547 (Dec. 21, 2000).
110. ITF Summary Report, supra note 108, at 6.
111. Matthew Holmes, Canada, THE WORLD OF ORGANIC AGRICULTURE: STATISTICS
& EMERGING TRENDS 2008, at 202 (2008).
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sales in Canada, with the U.S., by far, the largest supplier."2 Canada
exports 80% of its own organic production (especially organic
wheat, flax and soybeans), with 40% destined for the U.S."' Likewise, in 2002 the ERS estimated that the U.S. imported between $1
and 1.5 billion in organic products, with Canada as one of its primary suppliers."' At that time, U.S. retail organic sales were worth
$8.6 billion."' ERS estimates that sales in 2008 were $21.1 billion."'
In September 2006, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency
(CFIA) (the Canadian equivalent of the USDA) proposed draft Organic Production Regulations to establish a mandatory regime similar to USDA's National Organic Program (NOP)."' Because the Canadian standards differ from the USDA NOP on a few key aspects
(antibiotics in dairy cattle, sodium nitrate, animal stocking rates, and
sources of off-farm manure), U.S. producers would be shut out of
the Canadian market and processors would lose access to essential
Canadian-produced raw materials unless the respective operations
obtained dual (USDA and CFIA) certification as of June 30, 2009the regulation's effective date."'
In anticipation of conflicting international standards, Congress
authorized the Secretary of the USDA to recognize foreign organic
regimes as "equivalent" to the USDA standard and thus avoid the
need for dual certification."' On June 17, 2009, the United States
and Canada signed an equivalency agreement recognizing each nation's organic regime, with a few technical exceptions."' This
agreement, signed less than two weeks before implementation of the
Canadian program, eliminated the need for dual certification and
112. Id. at 201. See also USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, Canada: Organics
Annual, Gain Report No. CA9039, at 13 (July 13, 2009) (noting the U.S. supplies
74% of organic products consumed in Canada).
113. Barbara Haumann, North America, THE WORLD OF ORGANIC AGRICULTURE:
STATISTICS & EMERGING TRENDS 2005, at 175 (2005).
114. USDA, ERS, Organic Agriculture: Organic Trade Briefing, available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/ Organic/Trade.htm.
115. Id.
116. CAROLYN DIMITRI AND LYDIA OBERHOLTZER, USDA ECONOMIC RESEARCH
SERVICE,

MARKETING

U.S.

ORGANIC

FOODS:

RECENT

TRENDS

FROM

FARMS TO

1 (Sept. 2009, available at http://www.ers.usda. gov/Publications/EIB58/EIB58.pdf.
117. Organic Products Regulation, Canada Gazette, Part I, Vol. 140, No. 35, pp.
2502-2514, (September 2, 2006).
118. SOR/2009-176, Canada Gazette, Part II, Vol. 143, No. 13, pp. 1018-1050,
(June 24, 2009).
119. 7 U.S.C. § 6505(b) (2006).
120. See Letters between Barbara Robinson and Karen McIntyre, supra note 103.
CONSUMERS,
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should facilitate the continued growth of the organic market in
North America. Moreover, the willingness of both countries to recognize that the different regimes perform substantially the same
function, in substantially the same way, with substantially the same
result, may bode well for reviving long-stalled negotiations with the
E.U. for access the its large organic market.
B. The OrganicRegulatory Systems in the United States and Canada
This section will detail the U.S. and Canadian systems, discuss
how the agreement handles differences between the two regimes,
and suggest ways this agreement may impact other areas of international trade in organics.
1. The United States Organic Regulatory System
The Organic Foods Production Act (OFPA), enacted at Title
XXI of the 1990 Farm Bill,"' established national standards governing the marketing of organic products in the United States."' The
United States National Organic Program (NOP) is under the purview of the USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS)."' The
government officially considers "organic" a process certification to
enhance the marketing of agricultural products, not an endorsement of the organic system's impact on the environment or the nutritional value or safety of the organic food product.'
The NOP consists of two distinct parts: (1) the establishment
and administration of national production, handling (processing)
and labeling standards for organic agricultural products, and (2) the
accreditation of third-party certifying agents who inspect organic

121. Organic Foods Production Act, Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104 Stat. 3935 (codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6501-6522 (1990)).
122. Id.
123. See 7 C.F.R. Part 205 (2009) (implementing Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104 Stat.
3935 and codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501- 6522 (1990)).
124. See National Organic Program, Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg 80548 (Dec. 21, 2000)
(to be codified at 7 C.F.R. §205) (stating that "OFPA was designed to certify a process for informational marketing purposes" and that "certification is a process claim,
not a product claim, and, as such, cannot be used to differentiate organic from
nonorganic commodities with regard to food safety..the [organic] seal does not
convey a message of food safety or more nutritional value.").
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production and handling operations and certify the operation meets
minimum USDA standards.'"
Organic Certification in the United States consists of three interrelated steps: (1) development of an organic systems plan, (2) use
of only approved substances/practices, and (3) verification through
inspections.'2 ' Requirements of organic systems plans vary by production activity (e.g., crops, livestock, processing) and are subject to
mandatory third party verification. For example, organic crop production requires a three-year transition in which farmers must follow organic production practices and avoid application of prohibited substances. In addition, operations must establish buffer zones,
develop plans to control soil erosion and maintain or improve soil
conditions; and implement crop rotations.'2 1 Organic livestock production requires 100% organic feed and has specific rules relating to
livestock origin and the use of synthetic vitamins and trace minerals.
In addition, rules prohibit synthetic hormones, growth promoters,
2
and antibiotics.'"
Animal confinement strategies must accommodate the health and natural behavior of the animal.'2 Rules for organic handling/processing emphasize segregation and organic pest
management, among other items.'

125. See Agricultural Marketing Services, National Organic Program, Program Overview, USDA, http://www.ams. usda.gov/AMSv1.0/ams.fetchTemplateData.do?template=TemplateA&navlD=NationalOrganicProgram&leftNav-NationalOrganicProgr
am&page=NOPNationalOrganicProgramHome&acctAMSPW (last visited Nov. 20,
2009).
126. For a more extensive discussion, see Harrison Pittman, A Legal Guide to the
National Organic Program, National Agricultural Law Center (Jan. 2006) available at
http://www.NationalAgLawCenter.org and Stephanie Jillian, Federal Regulation of
Organic Food: A Research Guide for Legal Practitionersand Food Industry Professionals,
National Agricultural Law Center (Mar. 2004) available at http://
www.NationalAgLawCenter.org.
127. 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.202-205 (2009).
128. 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.237-238 (2009).
129. 7 C.F.R. § 205.239 (2009). For a discussion of animal welfare requirements
of the NOP, see A. Bryan Endres, An Awkward Adolescence in the Organics Industry:
Coming to Terms with Big Organic and Other Legal Challengesfor the Industry's Next Ten
Years, 12 DRAKEJ. AGRIC. L. 17, 46 (2007); Chad M. Kruse, Comment, The Not-SoOrganic Dairy Regulations of the Organic Food Production Act of 1990, 30 S. ILL. U.L.J.
501, 509 (2006); Michelle T. Friedland, You call That Organic? The USDA's Misleading Food Regulations, 13 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 379, 389 (2005).
130. See generally 7 C.F.R. Part 205 (2009). Although not required, retail operations may seek certification. To maintain organic integrity, certified organic retail
operations must prevent commingling, ensure proper product labeling, maintain
records and use proper pest management practices. See e.g., Organic Consumers
Association, "Certified OrganicRetailers" Must Follow Strict Food Handling Guidelines to
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At the retail level, organic product labeling consists of three
categories: (1) "100% Organic"; (2) "Organic"; and (3) "Made with
Organic" ingredients. The "100% Organic" claim requires use of
100% organic ingredients, including processing aids.'"' Products using the "Organic" claim must conform 95% organic agricultural ingredients with the remaining 5% comprised of items from the National List.'3 2 Both the "100% Organic" and "Organic" claims may
use the USDA organic seal.'" The "Made with Organic" claim may
be used for products comprised of between 95% and 70% organic
agricultural ingredients and may state the organic ingredients on the
Principal Display Panel (the front of the package).'3 ' These packages
may not, however, use the USDA organic seal.' Items comprised of
less than 70% organic agricultural ingredients may not use the term
"organic," but may list the organic ingredients in the ingredients
list. '

2. The Canadian Organic Regulatory System
Although the provinces of British Columbia and Quebec have
provincial organic regulations, the balance of Canada operated under a voluntary national standard for marketing organic food from
1999 until December 2006."3 Under authority of Section 32 of the
Canada Agricultural Products Act (CAPA),"' the Canadian Food
Inspection Agency (CFIA) published proposed organic regulations
on September 2, 2006."3 After a seventy five-day comment period,
the CFIA published the Organic Product Regulations in Part II of
the Canada Gazette on December 14, 2006.40 CFIA subsequently

Keep Organics Separatefrom Conventional Products, CNBC, June 29, 2007, available at
http://www.organicconsumers.org/articles/article-5885. cfm.
131. 7 C.F.R. § 205.303 (2009).
132. The "National List" is a list of allowed and prohibited substances in organic
food processing. Organic Production Systems Permitted Substances Lists. See generally CAN/CGSB-32.311-2006.
133. Id.
134. 7 C.F.R. § 205.304 (2009).
135. Id.
136. 7 C.F.R. § 205.305 (2009).
137. Holmes, supra note 111, at 202.
138. Canada Agricultural Products Act, 1985 R.S., ch. 20 (4th Supp.) (1985).
139. Canada Gazette, supra note 117, at 2502, (September 2, 2006).
140. SOR/2006-338, Canada Gazette Part II, Vol. 140, No. 6 (Dec. 21, 2006).
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proposed a slightly revised set of regulations on February 14, 2009,"'
adopting them as final on June 24, 2009."
CFIA serves as the competent authority for the newly developed Canada Organic Regime (COR). In conjunction with the Organic Product Regulations, the Organic Production Systems General
Principles and Management Standards (Standard)14 and the Organic
Production Systems Permitted Substances Lists (PSL)14 form the
COR's operational basis."5 A fourth document of the COR, the
Quality Management System Manual, published by CFIA, outlines
the organizational and enforcement responsibilities of the CFIA's
Organic Office (COO)-the day to day manager of the COR."'
Under the COR, the CFIA enters into agreements with Conformity Verification Bodies (CVBs) to recommend the accreditation
4
CBs, in turn, inspect
of organic system Certification Bodies (CBs)."'
and assess the practices of organic production."' CBs will then "certify" operations and products meeting COR requirements."' A brief
summary of key details of the COR follows.

141. Canada Gazette, Part I, Vol. 143, No. 7, at 343, (February 14, 2009).
142. Organic Products Regulations SOR/2009-176, Canada Gazette, supra note 118
[hereinafter Organic Products Regulation].
143. Organic Production Systems General Principles and Management Standards,
CAN/CGSB-32.310-2006 [hereinafter Organic Production Standards].
144. Organic Production Systems Permitted Substances List, CAN/CGSB-32.3112006 [hereinafter PSL List].
145. A separate government entity within Public Works and Government Services
Canada, the Canadian General Standards Board (CGSB), rather than CFIA, developed the Standard and PSL, with the assistance of the organic industry. "Standards
committees are composed of representatives of relevant interests, including producers, consumers and other uses, retailers, governments, educational institutions,
technical, professional and trade societies, and research and testing organizations.
Any given standard is developed on the consensus of views expressed by such representatives." Id. Of course, the PSL and Standard must comply with the CFIA
Organic Products Regulation. SOR/2006-338, at 7.
146. Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Canada Organic Regime: Quality Managehttps://wwwl33.ssldomain.com/
at
available
Manual,
ment
System
cog/documents/QMS.en.pdf.
147. Canada Gazette, supra note
AGENCY, supra note 146, at 43.

118. See also CANADIAN

FOOD INSPECTION

148. The Quality Management System Manual defines "Organic Production" as
"the use of organic production methods on farm holding, as well as activities involved in the further processing, packaging and labelling of a product, in compliance with the objectives, principles and rules established in the Organic Products
Regulations." Id. at 43.
149. Organic Products Regulations, supra note 142, § 13.

246

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 5:223

a. General Pinciples/OrganicPractices
As a "holistic system designed to optimize productivity and fitness of diverse communities within the agroecosystem," operators
must select organic management methods to "restore and then sustain ecological stability within the enterprise and the surrounding
environment," maintain and enhance soil fertility, manage weeds,
pests and diseases with biological and mechanical control methods,
and select appropriate crop rotations to manage nutrient cycling
and the promotion of biological diversity."' In addition, organic
producers must provide livestock with organic feed and living conditions appropriate to their behavioral requirements to "minimize
stress, promote good health and prevent disease." 5'
The standard specifically disclaims any claims regarding the
health, safety or nutrition of organic products.'
Moreover, the
standards note that there is no assurance that organic products are
free of residues of prohibited substances because the source may be
beyond the operator's control.'
To ensure organic integrity, the COR, via the PSL, promulgated
a list of substances permitted in organic production and processing
systems.'" The PSL is a "positive" list, meaning it includes only the
items that may be used, thereby excluding all other substances. In
contrast, the NOP's National List is, in most part, a "negative" list,
such that all "non-synthetic" substances are eligible for use in organic production or processing unless specifically excluded via their
inclusion on the National List.'
b. Crop ProductionStandards
The Standard outlines organic crop production practices in
four primary areas: land and environmental requirements; "' seeds

150. Organic Production Standards, supra note 143, at iii.
151. Id. at iv.
152. Id. at iii.
153. Id. at iv.
154. PSL list, supra note 144, §§ 5-6.
155. Caren Wilcox & Matthew Holmes, Presentation at All Things Organic:
Equivalency, in, Chicago, Ill. (Apr. 29, 2008) (copy of presentation on file with the
author). One part of the National List is "positive." The NOP prohibits all synthetics unless specifically listed on the National List.
156. Organic Production Standards, supra note 143, §§ 5.1-5.2.
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and planting stock;'17 soil fertility, nutrient and manure management;" and crop pest, disease and weed management.'"
i. Land and EnvironmentalRequirements
Transitioning to organic production requires application of organic principles for at least twenty four months prior to the sowing
of an annual crop." In the case of perennials, the operator must
follow organic principles for at least thirty six months before the
first harvest of "organic" products."' Depending upon previous land
use, the CB may extend or shorten the transition period.'" In all
instances, the enterprise seeking certification must be under the
supervision and verification of a CB for at least the last twelve
months of transition.' The Standards do allow split operations (organic and non-organic production systems within the same enterprise), but prohibit parallel production (production of indistinguishable organic and non-organic crops, such as organic and conventional maize)."
The organic enterprise must take steps to minimize risk from
adjacent operations (e.g., spray drift or exposure to unauthorized
substances)."' If buffer zones are required, crops grown in the
buffer area are non-organic.'" In addition, operators must control
soil erosion via good management practices.'"
ii. Seed and PlantingStock
Operations must use organic seed, and other propagates, produced in accordance with the Standard.'
If an organic version is
not commercially available, the CB may authorize the use of nonorganic, untreated seed. 6 9

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. § 5.3.
Id. §§ 5.4-5.5.
Id. § 5.6.
Id. § 5.1.1.
Id. § 5.1.1.
Id. § 5.1.2.

163. Id. §5.1.1-5.1.4.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. § 5.1.5.
Id. § 5.21..
Id. § 5.1.8.
Id. § 5.2.2.
Id. § 5.3.1.
Id. § 5.3.2.1.
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iii. Soil Fertility,Nutrient and Manure Management
The object of this section of the Standard is to maintain or increase soil quality.o Methods include, where appropriate, crop rotations and incorporation of plant and animal matter from organic
production activities.'' The source of the organic matter ideally is
from the same enterprise, but may, in some circumstances, be supplemented with off-farm organic and non-organic nutrient sources."
Operators applying manure must first use all available on-farm manure, and only then may use manure from other organic operations
(off-farm).'
When a sufficient quantity of organic manure is not
available, non-organic sourced manure may be used if the nonorganic operation is not fully caged/restricted movement or a landdetached livestock operation (e.g., feedlots)." The CB, however,
must approve the specific source.'
iv. Crop Pest, Disease and Weed Management
Organic management practices include cultural practices, such
as rotations, establishing a balanced ecosystem, resistant varieties,
and mechanical techniques, such as sanitation, cultivation, traps,
mulches, grazing.' Operators may use biological or botanical substances from the PSL, so long as documented in the organic plan.'
Special production requirements also exist for apiculture,"
maple products,'7 mushrooms, sprouts,"' greenhouse crops,' and
wild crops.'

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. § 5.4.1.
Id. § 5.4.2.
Id. § 5.4.5.
Id. § 5.6.1.
Id.
Id. §5.5.1.
Id. §5.6.1.
Id. § 5.6.2. For a list of substances, see PSL List, supra note 144.
Organic Production Standards, supra note 143, § 7.1.
Id. § 7.2.
Id. § 7.3.
Id. § 7.4.
Id. § 7.5
Id. § 7.6.
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c. Livestock Production Standards
Animals must be fed a 100 percent organic feed ration to meet
their breed specific nutritional requirements.'" In the event of an
emergency, the CB, upon written request, may approve an exemption from the 100 percent organic feed standard."' Operators may
only use specific feed additives listed on the PSL.
Herbivores must have access to pasture and all other animals
must have access to open air runs.'" The Standard prohibits the use
of poultry or rabbit cages." Organic livestock may be subject to
temporary confinement during inclement weather, the animal's
stage of production, when the health of the animal could be jeopardized, or to prevent risks relating to soil, water or plant quality.'"
Stocking rates should account for climatic variations and feed production capacity.'" Although not banned, operations should "progressively eliminate" the use of chemical allopathic veterinary drugs,
including antibiotics."'
Livestock origin is subject to particular rules and exceptions. In
brief, animals used for meat must be the offspring of parents raised
under organic conditions and animals used for milk production
must be under continuous organic management for at least one
year.'" Separate rules govern the transitioning of an entire dairy
herd to organic production.'

d. Labeling
Only products comprised of more than seventy percent organic
ingredients are eligible for organic certification." Products containing less than seventy percent organic agricultural ingredients may
not make any organic claims except identification of any organic
Use of the govingredients in the product's list of ingredients.'
184. Id. § 6.4.1.
185. Id.
186. Id. § 6.4.4.
187. Id. § 6.1.3.
188. Id. § 6.8.
189. Id. §§ 6.8.3-6.8.6.
190. Id. § 6.1.4.
191. Id. § 6.1.5.
192. Id. § 6.2.2.
193. Id. § 6.3.1.
194. Id. § 10.7.4.
195. Organic Products Regulation, supra note 142, § 24; Organic Production
Standards, supra note 143, § 10.9.
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ernment's "Canada Organic Regime/R6gime Bio-Canada" logo is
allowed on multi-ingredient organic products comprised of at least
ninety five percent organic products." The remaining five percent
of the total ingredients may be non-organic so long as they are not
commercially available in organic form.'" Multi-ingredient products
comprised of between seventy and ninety five percent organic products must state the "%organic products" on the product's principal
display panel'" and may not use the COR logo.'"
C. The Agreement Between the United States and Canada
Officials from the United States and Canada executed an
equivalency agreement on June 17, 2009.'" The exchange of letters
recognizing the equivalence of the U.S. and Canadian organic regimes allows the importation and sale of products certified according to either the U.S. or Canadian program into both countries using either the USDA or COR organic logo."' In general, this means
that producers certified under one agency's program do not need to
obtain costly certification under the other regime in order to export
their products, which should facilitate trade between the two countries.
Some trading obstacles, however, remain. Although the organic systems are equivalent, U.S. and Canadian organic labeling
laws are not. The USDA, but not CRIA, authorizes a 100% organic
label."' Products offered for sale in Canada comprised of between
ninety five and seventy percent organic content must state the total
organic percentage on the product. In contrast, the U.S. label
196. Organic Products Regulation, supra note 142, § 23(1), (2).
197. Organic Production Standards, supra note 143, § 10.7.1(b).
198. Organic Products Regulation, supra note 142, § 24(2)(a).
199. Id. §§ 23(1), (2). The form of the Canada Organic logo is under revision and
is expected to be released along with the revised regulations in the near future.
200. Letter from Karen McIntyre, Executive Director, Agrifood, Meat, Seafood
Safety Directorate, Canada, to Barbara C. Robinson, Deputy Administrator, USDA
Transportation and Marketing Programs, United States (June 17th, 2009); Letter
from Barbara C. Robinson, Deputy Administrator, USDA Transportation and Marketing Programs, United States to Karen McIntyre, Executive Director, Agrifood,
Meat, Seafood Safety Directorate, Canada (June 17, 2009), available at
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSvl.0/ams.fetchTemplateData.do?template=Templat
eN&navlD=NationalOrganicProgram&page=USCanadaDeterminationofEquivalency
&leftNav-NationalOrganicProgram&description=US-Canada%20Determination%20
ofo20Equivalency&acct-nopgeninfo.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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would only state "made with [organic ingredient specified]."2 o' Even
if the agreements had allowed for equivalent organic labeling, federal and regional nutrition labeling and language requirements
would still differ.2' To resolve food labeling differences, the CFIA
would need to negotiate an equivalency agreement with the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration, which it has not done.
Although the agreement generally recognizes each program as
equivalent, each country has imposed some conditions and exceptions. Satisfying these requirements will impose some additional
documentation obligations for producers wishing to export their
product, but the burden is relatively minimal compared to requiring
dual certification.
1. Conditions
The conditions, which are the same for both nations, require
each agency to notify the other of any changes in competent authority and certifying agents, proposed changes in legislation or rulemaking that would affect the organic programs, and instance of significant non-compliance of a product with the organic certification
0 o Both countries also require, with advance notice, authorprogram."
ity to conduct on-site evaluations of certifying agents to verify conformity with standards."*
2. Exceptions
a. American Exception
The USDA has imposed only one exception on permitting Canadian products to enter the US market as "organic"-no agricultural products derived from animals treated with antibiotics.0 7

203. Press Release, Canadian Food Inspection Agency, US-Canada Agreement http://www.ota.com/pics/
available at
Industry,
to
Messages
Key
documents/COO-Key-messagesCanada US.pdf.
204. For instance, in Canada all mandatory labeling information must appear in
both French and English.. See CFIA, Guide to Food Labeling and Advertising § 2.4,
ch2e.shtml
available at http-//www.inspection.gc.ca/english/fssa/labeti/guide/
#a2_4.
205. Letter from Barbara C. Robinson to Karen McIntyre, supra note 200, at Appendix 1.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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b. CanadianExceptions
The Canadian government has imposed three exceptions on
what USDA organic products can be marketed as organic in Canada.
The first is that products produced with the use of sodium nitrate
shall not be sold or marketed as organic in Canada. In a letter to
the Accredited Certifiers Association (ACA), Barbara Robinson, the
NOP Deputy Administrator, explained that to satisfy this requirement "[fields do not have to undergo a three-year transition to
meet this requirement."20 Farmers must designate fields free from
the application of sodium nitrate and amend the organic plan to
reflect this restriction."
Second, agricultural products produced by hydroponic or aeroponic production methods do not qualify under the Canadian rule
and may not be sold or marketed as organic in Canada. As this is an
absolute prohibition on a production method, producers can do
little to adjust in order to export to Canada.
The final exception relates to animal density/welfare. Agricultural products derived from animals must be produced according to
livestock stocking rates as set out in CAN /CGSB32.310-2006
(amended October 2008). As Deputy Administrator Robinson explained in her letter to ACA, this will require organic certifiers to
"document and collect livestock density ratios for all operations certified for livestock, poultry, and eggs. Data required are animal
units per acre or per square foot (for swine and poultry) for all certified operations..tt]his does not apply to processed products."21 o
D. Implications of the Agreement
1. E.U. Negotiations
Although the ease of trade with Canada is a boon to U.S. producers, the other potentially profitable, and currently difficult to
access, market is Europe. In 2006, Europeans spent 14.3 billion Eu-

208. Id.
209. Letter from Barbara C. Robinson, Acting Director, National Organic Program Deputy Administrator, Transportation & Marketing Programs, USDA-AMS to
all USDA-ACAs re. U.S.-Canada Determination of Equivalency (July 1, 2009), available at http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName-STELPRDC50778
59&acct=nopgeninfo.
210. Id.
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ros (18.1 billion U.S. dollars)211 on organic foods.2 1 2 In contrast, the
U.S. spent 17.7 billion U.S. dollars'13 and Canada spent one billion
Canadian dollars (1.13 billion U.S. dollars). 2H,2 Like the U.S. and
Canada, which both saw over twenty percent growth in 2006,
European countries experienced up to thirty-three percent growth
in the market at the same time.1 Even if growth in the European
market has waned during the current recession, it still represents a
vast source of potential sales for U.S. producers. Furthermore, the
rapid growth in demand resulted in supply shortages in many European countries." U.S. production could help alleviate these shortages and smooth out the resultant price spikes that create a false
impression that organics are prohibitively expensive.
Both the U.S. and the E.U. stand to benefit from an equivalency
agreement that would ease trade barriers. Nonetheless, negotiations
have been unsuccessful thus far. Because the U.S.-Canada agreement establishes a precedent for how countries can accommodate
other's systems, while still protecting the interests of their domestic
industries, it could help further negotiations between the U.S. and
E.U. Furthermore, through the use of specialized tariff codes, Canada tracks the imports of selected organic products.' This recordkeeping will provide valuable statistics on the growth of trade in organics and hopefully demonstrate the success of the agreement in
furthering industry growth.
2. Implications for US & Canada Imports from Other Countries
This agreement may have collateral benefits for producers in
other countries. Because the USDA's program has been in effect for
ten years, there has been sufficient time for USDA accredited certi211. See Foreign Exchange Rates (Annual); http://www.federalreserve.gov/ releases/g5a/20070103/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
212. Padel, Susanne et al, The EuropeanMarket for Organic Food in THE WORLD OF
ORGANIC AGRICULTURE: STATISTICS AND EMERGING TRENDS 2008, at 131 (2008).
213. Haumann, Barbara, The United States in THE WORLD OF ORGANIC
AGRICULTURE: STATISTICS AND EMERGING TRENDS 2008, at 192 (2008).
214. http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g5a/20070103/ (last visited April
1, 2010).
215. Holmes, supra note 111, at 201.
216. Haumann, supra note 213, at 192; Holmes supra note 111, at 201.
217. Padel, supra note 212, at 143.
218. Id.
219. Certified Organic Commodity Harmonized Import Codes, http://www4.
agr.gc.ca/AAFC-AAC/display-afficher. do?id=1199997881628&lang=eng (last visited Nov. 23, 2009).
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fying agents to develop networks in other countries that produce
products with high U.S. demand, such as organic coffee. Under the
U.S.-Canada agreement, a USDA accredited certifying agent in a
third country could certify a producer's product to the USDA standard, which could then facilitate importation not only to the U.S.,
but also to the Canadian market, bearing either the USDA or COR
organic logo.22 o Presumably, as Canada's organic program expands,
its certifying agents could do the same. Eventually, this may expand
American access to important new supply channels. In the long run,
the facilitation of global trade in organic products may create momentum for eventual harmonization of international standards for
organic certification.
IV. LITIGATION

Four interesting food-related cases warrant discussion in this
version of the Update-two involving allegations of misbranding, one
resolving a question of the role of state unfair competition claims
within the context of the national organic program, and one relating
to the intersection of food safety regulations and the takings clause
of the Fifth Amendment. A brief discussion of each case follows.
A. Sugawara v. Pepsico, Inc."'
Plaintiff Janine Sugawara initiated a putative class action against
defendant Pepsico, the parent company of The Quaker Oats Company, alleging various claims for misrepresentation and breach of
warranty under California law in the sale of its Cap'n Crunch with
Crunchberries cereal." Sugawara contended that the pictures of
crunchberries, combined with the word "berry" in the product name
implies that the product is "not all sugar and starch, but contains
redeeming fruit," when in reality the product contains no berries of
any kind and the only fruit listed as an ingredient is strawberry fruit

220. U.S.-Canada Determination of Equivalence, Questions and Answers, available
at http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMS v1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5077525
&acct=nopgeninfo.
221. Sugawara v. Pepsico, Inc., 2009 WL 1439115 (E.D. Cal., May 21, 2009).
222. Specifically, plaintiff alleged intentional misrepresentation, breach of express
warranty, and breach of implied warranty under the California Business & Professions Code and a violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Action, under the
California Civil Code. Id. at 1.
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concentrate." This marketing of the product allegedly was deceptive and likely to mislead and deceive a reasonable consumer."
The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the lawsuit
22
In reaching its result, the
without leave to amend the compliant."
court noted that it is not aware of any actual fruit referred to as a
"crunchberry" and, more importantly, the fanciful crunchberry depicted on the principal display panel as "round, crunchy, brightlycolored cereal balls" included the phrases "sweetened corn & oat
cereal" and "enlarged to show texture."2 A reasonable consumer,
according to the court, could not be deceived into believing the
"Cap'n Crunch with Crunchberries" cereal contains a fruit that does
not exist."' Moreover, plaintiff acknowledged that upon closer inspection the "crunchberries" on the principal display panel of the
cereal box are not really berries.22 ' Accordingly, the court held that
plaintiff could not establish that a consumer would justifiably rely on
the crunchberry depictions to reach a conclusion that the product
actually contained fruit.22"
The court also noted that the Central District of California previously had dismissed a similar claim brought by the plaintiffs attorneys alleging the packaging of Fruit Loops cereal was deceptive.so
With consecutive losses, perhaps this will be end of these unfruitful
claims against cereal manufacturers.
B. United States v. Farinella'"
In the Farinella case, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explored the difference between "best buy" and "sell by" dates
on a product within the context of a criminal conviction. The underlying facts of the case are as follows. ACH Foods purchased
from Unilever (the manufacturer) a substantial quantity of salad
dressing nearing the end of the "best when purchased by" date."
ACH sold 1.6 million bottles of the salad dressing to the defendant,
Farinella, who subsequently pasted a new label on the bottle that
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. at 1.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 5.
Sagawara,supra note 221, at 3.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 3 (citing McKinnis v. Kellogg USA, 2007 WL 4766060 (C.D. Cal. 2007)).
United States v. Farinella,558 F.3d 695 (7th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 697.
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extended the "best when purchased by" date approximately one
year.2 " The trial court convicted Farinella of wire fraud and introducing into interstate commerce a misbranded food with intent to
fraud or mislead.
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act provides that a food
is misbranded if it is "false or misleading in any particular."" Accordingly, a false or misleading "best when purchased by" label
could trigger a finding of misbranding. The statute and implementing regulations, however, are silent with respect to "best when purchased by" labeling statements. 23 ' At trial, the parties presented no
evidence that "best when purchased by" has a uniform meaning in
the trade.3 ' Nor did the parties present any case-civil, criminal or
administrative-in which a tribunal found unlawful an alteration of a
"best when purchased by" date.2 " The court speculated that given
the ambiguity as to when the taste of a product may decline, anyone
in the production and distribution chain could make a judgment as
to when the product is "best" and label accordingly.' This is in contrast to a labeling indicating a "sell by" or "expires on" date, the
commonly understood meaning of which is that one should not consume the product after the date for safety reasons. 240
The allegedly misbranded salad dressing, however, is "shelf stable," has no expiration date, and "so far as appears . . . is edible a
decade or more after it is manufactured." 4 ' The prosecutor, however, incorrectly attempted to redefine the term "best when purchased by" as equivalent to "sell by" or "expires on" date, for a
product that does not expire.2 A conviction for fraudulent misrepresentation requires the jury to receive evidence of the meaning of
the representation (i.e., what is meant by "best when purchased by"),
which the government failed to provide." Accordingly, the gov-

233. Id.
234. Id. at 696-97.
235. 21 U.S.C. § 343(a)(1).
236. Farinella,558 F.3d at 698. The court noted that an FDA employee testified
in an incoherent manner when he stated that he did not know the agency's position
with respect to "best when purchased by" dates and that he did not know what a
"best when purchased by" date meant. Id. at 700.
237. Id. at 698.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Farinella,558 F.3d at 697.
241. Id. at 698.
242. Id. at 701.
243. Id. at 700.
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ernment failed to provide sufficient evidence of misbranding, entitling the defendant to an acquittal."'
C. In re Aurora Organic Dairy Corp. OrganicMilk Marketing and
Sales PracticesLitigation15
The Spring 2008 version of this Update analyzed the current debate regarding the amount of pasture required for organic livestock
Included in that discussion was a description of the
and dairy.
USDA's consent agreement with Aurora Organic Dairy Corp.
(Aurora) to decertify one of its eight dairy operations and to deSevvelop an amended organic systems plan for a second facility.
eral consumers filed class action lawsuits against Aurora alleging
that the company "mislead them into believing that the milk they
were purchasing was "organic" or "USDA Organic," when the milk
failed to meet organic standards," and thus violated, inter alia, sev248
eral state consumer protection laws.
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the
lawsuits in the Eastern District of Missouri and the court directed
Defendants subseplaintiffs to file a consolidated compliant.2
quently filed, inter alia, motions to dismiss, which the court granted
with prejudice. 2 0 A brief discussion of the court's preemption analysis leading to dismissal follows.
Plaintiffs challenged the organic nature of Aurora's milk. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the milk produced by Aurora did not
meet the standards for organic production established by the USDA
under the National Organic Program25 ' and that it should not have
been labeled as organic.2 12 As a result of the purported organic la-

244. Id.
245. In re Aurora Organic Dairy Corp. Organic Milk Marketing and Sales Practices
Litigation, 2009 WL 1576928 (E.D. Mo. June 3, 2009).
246. A. Bryan Endres, United States Food Law Update: Food Safety Planning,Attribute
Labeling, and the IrradiationDebate, 4J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 129, 143-146 (2008).
247. Id. at 145.
248. In re Aurora OrganicDairy Corp., 2009 WL 1576928 at 2.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 13.
251. The National Organic Program, 7 C.F.R. Part 205, implements the Organic
Foods Production Act, 7 U.S.C. §6501 et seq. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that
Aurora failed to provide the animals appropriate housing, pasture conditions, access to pasture, bedding and feed rations complaint with organic standards. In re
Aurora OrganicDairy Corp., 2009 WL 1576928 at 8.
252. In re Aurora Organic Dairy Corp., 2009 WL 1576928 at 4.
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bel, plaintiffs argue they paid more for the milk than they otherwise
would have."
The problem with plaintiffs' argument is that during the time in
question Aurora's farms and processing plant held an organic certification from co-defendant Quality Assurance International, Inc.
(QAI).2' The USDA had accredited QAI as an organic certifying
agent.5 Because Aurora's products held the proper organic certification under the federal regulations, plaintiffs' state law claims
would require the court to disregard the certification issued at the
federal level.
Although "[c]onsumer protection is quintessentially a 'field
which the states have traditionally occupied"'2 " and the Organic
Foods Production Act does not expressly preempt state organic programs,2 " allowing the state claims to proceed could result in states
creating state-level organic programs different from the federal standard (i.e., plaintiffs could apply state laws to prohibit certified organic producers from using the federally-authorized organic seals
and statements)." To allow the states to deviate, by way of consumer protection claims, from the national standard is in direct conflict with Congress' objective of creating a single, consistent national
standard and facilitating interstate commerce.2 " Accordingly, the
court found the plaintiffs' claims preempted under the doctrine of
conflict preemption.
Moving forward, this case presents a problem for stakeholders
seeking to maintain the integrity of the national organic program.'

253. Id.
254. Id. at 4, 9. The Colorado Department of Agriculture also served as an organic certifier for some of Aurora's operations in Colorado. Id. at 3.
255. Id. at 3.
256. Id. at 5 (quoting Waters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 35-36 (2007)).
257. Id. at 6.
258. Id. at 7.
259. Id. at 7 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 6501 (stating in the preamble that the purpose of
the statute is to establish consistent standards and to facilitate interstate commerce
in organic products)).
260. Id. at 9.
261. The integrity of the program is subject to considerable debate as organic
"purists" confront the evolution of the organic industry into larger corporate entities. For a discussion of these topics, see generally, Philip H. Howard, Consolidation
in the North American Organic Food ProcessingSector, 1997 to 2007, 16 INT'LJ. SOC. OF
AGRIC. & FOOD 13 (2009); A. Bryan Endres, An Awkward Adolescence in the Organics
Industry: coming to Terms with Big Organics and Other Legal Challengesfor the Industry's
Next Ten Years, 12 DRAKEJ. AGRIc. L. 17 (2007); SAMUEL FROMARTZ, ORGANIC, INC.
(Harcourt, Inc. 2006); MARK ALAN KASTEL, MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF ORGANIC
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In dicta, the court stated it was immaterial whether or not Aurora
actually followed the federal organic production requirements.
Because Aurora was a certified organic operation, it could label,
market and sell its products as "organic" until the certifying body or
the USDA suspended or revoked its certification.2 " Accordingly, the
sole remedy for stakeholders seeking to prevent alleged circumvention of the national standard is to lodge a complaint with the
USDA.2" This course of action, however, is subject to significant
agency enforcement discretion;2 5 itself a topic subject to considerable controversy.
D. Rose Acre Farms v. United States2 7
The last case to be discussed has been dragging its way up and
down the courts for seventeen years. The claim in the litigation is
that USDA regulations effected a regulatory taking when the government restricted the interstate sale of eggs from chickens that
tested positive for salmonella.
Rose Acre Farms (Rose Acre) operates eight layer hen farms
containing millions of hens.2 1 Its eggs primarily are sold as table
eggs which are raw poultry eggs sold in their shells. In 1990,
shortly after the regulations were first implemented, Rose Acre had
three farms (Cort Acres, White Acres and Jen Acres) that the gov(Cornucopia Institute
2006), available at http://cornucopia.org/
dairysurvey/OrganicDairyReport/cornucopia milkintregrity.pdf.
262. In re Aurora OrganicDairy Corp., 2009 WL 1576928 at 8.
263. Id. at 9.
264. See USDA, Agricultural Marketing Service, National Organic Program; File a
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/ams.fetchTemplateData.do?temComplaint,
plate=TemplateE&navlD=FileAComplaintNOPNationalOrganicProgramHome&rig
htNavl=FileAComplaintNOPNationalOrganicProgramHome&topNav-&leftNav-NationalOrganicProgram&page=NOPFileaComplaint&re
sultType=&acct-nopgeninfo (last visited Mar. 18, 2010).
265. See Endres, supra note 261, at 145-146 (describing the consent agreement
between USDA and Aurora that allowed the company to remain in the organic
market and avoid any fines despite alleged willful violations of the Organic Foods
Product Act and the NOP).
266. Mark Alan Kastel, Forward/Update 2008 (Cornucopia Institute) (detailing
alleged failure of the USDA to investigate complaints regarding organic certifications and the failure of the agency to issue fines for standards violations)
http://www.cornucopia.org/dairysurvey/OrganicDairyReport/Dairy_.Report-Upda
te.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2010).
267. 559 F.3d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
268. Id. at 1262.
269. Id.
MILK
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ernment identified as sources of salmonella contamination.!o Once
identified as a source, the regulations required testing of flocks and
prohibited the interstate sales of eggs from those farms except for
uses requiring pasteurization."' As a result, Rose Acre had to sell a
portion of its eggs as breaker eggs rather than as table eggs.' It took
twenty-five months for Rose Acre to depopulate, clean, and disinfect
the poultry houses and obtain USDA inspection and approval to
resume selling table eggs.'" Rose Acre claimed that the regulations
amounted to a regulatory taking of its right to sell table eggs.
The Court analyzed Rose Acre's taking claim under Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City." Penn Central requires the
court to consider (1) the economic impact of the action on the
claimant, (2) the effects of the governmental action on the reasonable investment backed expectations of the claimant, and (3) the
character of the governmental action.2 ' These issues were addressed
in previous appeals and remands, so that the primary issue to be
decided in this case was how to calculate the economic impact of the
regulation.
The trial court found that the balance of factors favored Rose
Acre because it suffered a 219% diminution in return on eggs from
the three affected farms, and awarded $8.7 million in just compensation, interest, attorney fees, expert fees, and expenses."
The
Court of Appeals issued two primary critiques of this conclusion.
First, "the vast majority of takings jurisprudence examines ... not lost
profits but the lost value of the taken property."2 7 1 Second, "a diminution in return is an inherently relative term, the magnitude of
which is dependent on the magnitude of the starting profit margin.""7 The primary problem with this is that the percent diminution in return increases as margin of profitability decreases, even if

270. Id. at 1264.
271. Id. at 1263.
272. Rose Acre, 559 F.3d at 1264.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 1266-67, (citing Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104 (1978)).
275. Id. at 1267.
276. Id. at 1266. Because of the fixed input costs of operating the farms, a 10.6%
diminution in value (which is the value the eggs lost when diverted to cracking operations) resulted in a transition from 4.8% profitability to 6.3% in losses. Id. at
1268.
277. Id. (citation omitted).
278. Id. at 1269.
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the absolute dollar value of the product is reduced only by pennies
on the dollar.7
Part of the problem with the trial court's decision stemmed
from a failure to identify properly the contested parcel. Rose Acre's
expert at trial focused on the diminished profitability of the three
farms, while the government's expert focused on the lost value of
the eggs themselves.2 ' The Court of Appeals held that the proper
parcel to consider was the eggs themselves (further supporting the
argument that the proper methodology for analyzing the loss was
diminished value) and pointed out that, if looking at the business as
a whole, the 219% decrease in profits at the three farms provides no
useful information on the overall lost profitability of the nine
farms.28 ' The other six farms may have been able to absorb the lost
profits and support the ongoing profitability of the business as a
whole."

The other issue in the case was the intervening decision of the
Supreme Court in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,"' which changed the
regulatory analysis of the third prong of the test. Courts must no
longer look at "whether the means chosen by government advance
the ends or whether the regulation chosen is effective in curing the
alleged ill.""2 Instead of looking at the rationality of the regulation,
courts must consider "the actual burden imposed on property
rights, or how that burden is allocated."8 " The Court of Appeals
found that, even though the regulations could have been drafted
more broadly to encompass egg handlers and the egg-consuming
public, they were not overly burdensome on one entity because they
targeted all egg producers.2 ' Therefore, the character of the regulations did not favor Rose Acre.2 " The court also concluded that the
holding in Lingle had no effect on the public safety and health aspects of the character prong of the analysis, especially given the long
history of food regulations meant to protect public health and
safety.28

279.
strate
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id. at 1269-70. The court gave helpful charts and calculations that demonhow the Diminution in Return differs from the Diminution in Value.
Id. at 1273.
Id.
Id. at 1273-74.
544 U.S. 528 (2005).
Rose Acre, 559 F.3d at 1278.
Id. (citing Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543).
Id. at 1278-79.
Id. at 1279.
Id.
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Taking all of these factors together, the Court of Appeals concluded that there had not been a regulatory taking because the economic impact on Rose Acre was not severe, the reasonable investment-backed expectations were not strong enough to be dispositive,
and the character of the government's regulations strongly favored a
non-taking." The Court of Appeals stated, "the law of regulatory
takings does not generally compensate property owners when a
regulation's economic impact is slight and temporary but the potential for physical harm to the public is significant."2 0 Under the Penn
Central standards, the salmonella regulations "were not functionally
comparable to government appropriation or invasion of private
property.
Consequently, Rose Acre was not entitled to compensation.
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

As the forty-fourth president settles into the task of governing,
several long sought-after events have taken place regarding food
labeling. For food allergy sufferers, the carmine and gluten-free
labeling rules are a welcome step forward and may signal the beginning of further regulatory oversight of allergen-labeling-a market
many expect to grow if food allergies continue to increase at recent
rates. In addition to regulatory actions, in the second half of 2009
courts resolved two important misbranding cases: the case of the
missing "Crunchberry" and modified "best buy" labels. In an increasingly competitive market faced with an economic recession,
challenges to labeling practices are likely to increase as competitors
seek market advantage.
Organic foods remains a bright spot despite the economy. The
U.S-Canadian Organic Equivalency agreement promises to keep
open this major market for U.S. organic products. On the other
hand, the court's dismissal of a state unfair competition claim challenging the organic marketing practices described in the Aurora case
will place further pressure on the USDA to ensure the integrity of
the organic label as it loses this potential secondary enforcement
model.

289.
290.
291.

Rose Acre, 559 F.3d at 1283.
Id.
Id. at 1284.
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Finally, the Rose Acre Farms regulatory takings case raises interesting issues for many regulatory agencies as they seek to move
forward and enact the aggressive consumer safety rules promised by
this new administration.

292. The White House, Office of the Vice President, Obama Administration Delivers
on Commitment to Upgrade U.S. Food Safety System, (July 7, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/obama-administration-deliverscommitment-upgrade-us-food-safety-system; The White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, Statement by the President on House Passage of the Food Safety Enhancement Act of 2009, (July 30, 2009), available at http://
www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-house-passage-food-safetyenhancement-act-2009 (noting that passage of food safety legislation is critical).

EUROPEAN UNION FOOD LAW UPDATE
Emilie H. Leibovitch *
I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2009, citizens of the European Union elected a new
European Parliament. Some Members of the European Parliament
(MEPs) were reelected while some were not. The majority party is
the EPP, the Group of the European People's Party, and the Group
of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists & Democrats has the second
majority of the seats. The elections were still governed by the Treaty
of Nice, since up until very recently, the future of the Treaty of Lisbon was still uncertain. The Treaty of Lisbon was up until now rejected by a few Member States, who, by their reluctance to sign, prevented it from taking effect throughout the entire union. At the
end of October 2009, the Czech Republic signed the Treaty, which
makes ratification increasingly probable.
The elections at Parliament level have slowed down the legislative process. In several cases, the policymakers decided to wait for
the new elected officials to continue negotiations or the process of
enactments of legislation. That is why this update is shorter than
usual.
The following is an overview of the recent developments that
have taken place in the areas of genetically-modified organisms,
novel foods, feed safety, transmissible spongiform encephalopathy,
food additives, food contact materials, food quality, food labeling,
and nutrition/health claims.
II.

GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS

In April 2009, Germany banned the cultivation of MON810 Bt
maize in Germany with immediate effect, relying on the safeguard
clause of article 23 of Directive 2001/18/EC on the deliberate re-
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lease into the environment of genetically modified organisms.' Article 23 allows a Member State to "provisionally restrict or prohibit
the use and/or sale" of a GMO on its territory" if it has enough scientific information that gives this Member States "detailed grounds
for considering that a GMO as or in a product which has been
properly notified and has received written consent under this Directive constitutes a risk to human health or the environment."2 Since
the scientific GMO Panel of EFSA held that there is no new scientific-based evidence tojustify a national ban on MON810, Monsanto
had announced it might take legal action against the ban. Monsanto
filed an appeal but it was rejected by the administrative court in
Brunswick on the ground that the safeguard clause does not require
new scientific evidence of an absolute risk to be presented.! Rather,
evidence giving reasonable grounds to believe a risk might exist is
enough.
In September, following a series of notifications received
through the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF), the
European Commission ordered Member States to remove from the
shelves food products derived from unauthorized genetically modified linseed and coming from Canada.' The flax comes from Canada and is not authorised in the EU. In September, a total of eight
notifications were received by the European Rapid Alert System for
Food and Feed (RASFF). Canada has suspended shipments of linseed to the EU for now.
III. NOVEL FOODS
The debate over novel foods, and especially over whether
cloned food should be included in the new Novel Foods Regulation,
has intensified. At Council level, Member States disagreed on
whether offspring of cloned animals should be excluded from the
* Emilie H. Leibovitch is a member of the Arkansas Bar and the District of
Columbia Bar, and is an associate member of the Brussels Bar. She practices international law and U.S. law at her law office located in Brussels, Belgium.
1. GMO Compass, Germany: Minister Aigner bans MON810 Bt maize, April. 14,
2009, http://www.gmo-compass.org/eng/news/432.docu.html (last visited Jan. 8,
2010); Directive 2001/18/EC, article 23, 2001 O.J. (L 106) 1, 13.
2. Directive 2001/18/EC, article 23, 2001 O.J. (L 106) 1, 13.
3. GMO Compass, German court's initial ruling: Cultivation ban of geneticallymodified
MON810
maize
upheld,
May
5,
2009,
http://www.gmocompass.org/eng/news/440.docu.html (last visitedJan. 8, 2010).
4. GMO Compass, GM linseed: Products being taken off the market, Oct. 1, 2009,
http-//www.gmo-compass.org/ eng/news/467.docu.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2010).
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regulation altogether or whether they should be covered over several generations. Some Member States also supported the European Parliament's position that cloned food should not be dealt with
in the Novel Foods Regulation and should instead be addressed in a
separate piece of legislation. In June 2009, the Council adopted a
political agreement on the draft novel food regulation.' The Council clarified the definition of novel food and the scope of the regulation and agreed that the new regulation explicitly applies to food
produced from cloned animals, and that the regulation covers food
from the offspring of cloned animals. In addition, the Council "invites the Commission to report on all aspects of food from cloned
animals and their offspring within one year after the entry into force
of the regulation and to submit, if appropriate, a proposal for a specific legislation on this topic."' Following this agreement, which differs from the Commission's initial proposal, the proposal on a novel
foods regulation went back to the European Parliament for a second
reading. After the European Parliamentary elections, the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety Committee confirmed that
MEP Kartika Liotard would remain rapporteur for the Novel Foods
Proposal.
With respect to nanotechnology, the Council and the Parliament might disagree on whether food products resulting from
nanotechnology should be labeled or not. The Parliament is requesting such a labeling while Member States are still undecided on
the issue.
IV. FEED SAFETY
Regulation (EC) No 767/2009 of 13 July 2009 on the placing on
the market and use of feed was published in the Official Journal on
September 1, 2009.' This new text amends Regulation (EC) No
1831/2003 (on additives for use in animal nutrition) and repeals
Council Directive 79/373/EEC (on on the marketing of compound
feedingstuffs), Commission Directive 80/511/EEC (authorizing, in
5. Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on novel foods and amending Regulation (EC) No
XXX/XXXX, Political Agreement, June 17, 2009, available at http://
Press
release,
register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/stI0/st0754.enO9.pdf;
Council agrees on new rules for novel foods, Council of the European Union, June 22,
2009, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/
pressdata/en/misc/108678.pdf.
6. Press release, Council agrees on new rulesfor novel foods, supra note 5.
7. Regulation (EC) No 767/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 229) 1.
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certain cases, the marketing of compound feedingstuffs in unsealed
packages
or containers),
Council
Directives
82/471/EEC
(concerning certain products used in animal nutrition),
83/228/EEC (on the fixing of guidelines for the assessment of certain products used in animal nutrition), 93/74/EEC (on feedingstuffs intended for particular nutritional purposes), 93/113/EC
(concerning the use and marketing of enzymes, micro-organisms
and their preparations in animal nutrition) and 96/25/EC (on the
circulation of feed materials) and Commission Decision
2004/217/EC (adopting a list of materials whose circulation or use
for animal nutrition purposes is prohibited).
The labeling rules for feed are now aligned with those for food
designed for human consumption. Nutrition claims are allowed if
they are "objective, verifiable by the competent authorities[,] understandable [by the feed user]" and scientifically based, and health
claims are prohibited except for the case of coccidiostats and histomonostats.' In addition, the regulation provides for the creation of
an EU Catalogue of feed materials, where feed producers are to list
their feed materials in a common catalogue to provide information
to feed users." Moreover, the new Regulation calls for the Commission to encourage the development of Community Codes of good
labeling practice for pet food and for compound feed for food producing animals.'
V. TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
This year's EU Veterinary Week saw the announcement by
Health Commission Androulla Vassiliou of a consultation on a future EU Animal Health Law." This law would aim at providing a
"single, clearer regulatory framework for all EU animal health legislation and ... a coherent basis for all future EU actions concerning
animal health.""
On September 28, 2009, the Commission issued Decision No
2009/719/EC authorizing some Member States to revise their an8. Id. art. 13, at 10.
9. Id. art. 24, at 13.
10. Id. art. 25, at 14.
11. Press release, Androulla Vassiliou Member of the European Commission, responsible for Health "Animals + Humans = One Health" Opening Speech at the EU Veterinary
Week
Conference
in
Brussels,
28
September
2009,
available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/09/415&for
mat= HTML &aged=&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
12. Id.
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nual BSE monitoring programmes." Following an EFSA scientific
opinion concluding that in Slovenia, less than one BSE case would
be missed every year in some Member States if the age of the bovine
animals subject to the monitoring was increased from 24 months to
48 months," the Commission decided to authorize some Member
States to monitor animals that are over 48 months instead of 24
months.
VI. RAPID ALERTS
On 16 July 2009, European Commissioner for Health Androulla Vassiliou launched the Rapid Alert System for Food and
Feed (RASFF) Portal website, composed of an electronic database of
RASFF notifications." This database allows RASFF members to post
notifications according to a number of criteria, and make this information readily available to the general public. RASFF notifications can be either market notifications or border rejections. A
market notification refers to a notification sent when a risk is detected in a feed or food product placed on the market, while a border rejection helps to inform the public when a product is refused
entry in the geographical zone of the network. Market notifications
can either be alert notifications (sent when a rapid action on the
part of members is required: when a food or feed presenting a serious health risk is on the market, such a notification is sent in order
for RASFF members to determine whether the product in question
is on their market and take the required rapid action) or information notifications (sent when there is a risk about a food or feed
product placed on the market, but no rapid action is required on
the part of the other members either because the product has not
reached, is no longer present on, these members' market, or because the nature of the risk for some reason does not require rapid
action). In addition, any food or feed safety information that is
deemed interesting to the control authorities is communicated in
the database as news. The notifications are also divided in three
product type categories: food, feed, and food contact materials. The
13. Commission Decision 2009/179/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 236) 35.
14. Scientific Opinion of the Panel on Biological Hazards on a request from the
European Commission on the updated risk for human and animal health related to
the revision of the BSE monitoring regime in some Member States. The EFSA Journal (2009) 1059, 140.
15. European Commission, RASFF Portal - online searchable database
(last
rasff portal-database-en.htm
http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/rapidalert/
visitedJan. 8, 2010).
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network is composed of the EU Member States as well as those of
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which thus adds Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland to the list of countries
involved in RASFF.
VII. FOOD ADDITIVES

In August 2009, EFSA published the data requirements for the
evaluation of food additive applications." Pursuant to the new regulation, Regulation (EC) No 1333/2008 on food additives, food additives should be approved and used only if they fulfill the criteria laid
down in it: food additives must for instance be safe when used, there
must be a technological necessity for their use, and their use must
not mislead the consumer." According to the EFSA document, information should be provided on "the applicant and the application
dossier (administrative data), the identity and characterisation of the
additive (including the proposed specifications and analytical
method), the manufacturing process, the stability, reaction and fate
in foods to which the additive is added, the case of need and proposed uses, the existing authorisations and evaluations, the exposure
assessment, and the biological and toxicological data."'
VIII.

FOOD CONTACT MATERIALS

In May 2009, the Commission enacted Commission Regulation
(EC) No 450/2009 of 29 May 2009 on active and intelligent materials and articles intended to come into contact with food." This new
regulation sets out additional requirements to Regulation (EC) No
1935/2004 (on materials and articles intended to come into contact
with food) for active and intelligent materials and articles to guarantee their safe use; it also introduces an authorization scheme for
substances that are used in food contact materials for active and
intelligent functions.

16. Scientific Statement of the Panel on Food Additives and Nutrient Sources
added to Food on data requirements for the evaluation of food additives applications following a request from the European Commission. The EFSA Journal
(2009) 1188, 1-7 [hereinafter EFSA Statement on Food Additives].
17. Regulation (EC) No 1333/2008, art.6, 2008 O.J. (L 354) 16, 21.
18. EFSA Statement on Food Additives, supra note 16 at 4-5.
19. Commission Regulation (EC) No 450/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 135) 3.
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IX. FOOD QUALITY

In May 2009, the Commission issued a Communication to the
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on agricultural product
quality policy.' The document makes several suggestions, including
a proposal to require labeling of the place where the product was
produced, setting up a register of geographical indications, and creating good practice guidelines for the implementation of schemes
linked to agricultural product quality. This communication represents the first formal step in the process leading toward a proposal
for a regulation. MEP Giancarlo Scotta' (EFD, Italy) has been named
rapporteur to issue the report for the European Parliament AgriculRapporteur
ture and Rural Development (AGRI) Committee.
Scotta' published his Draft Report on October 19, 2009."
X. FOOD LABELING
Given that a vote on Rapporteur Renate Sommer's Draft Report on the Commission's Proposal on the Provision of Food Information to Consumers" had not taken place at Parliament level before the elections, Mrs. Sommer decided to wait for the new composition of the European Parliament Environment, Public Health and
Food Safety (ENVI) Committee to rewrite her draft report. This
second draft report is supposed to take into account the many
amendments submitted by other Members of Parliament (MEPs),
but at the time of writing of this article, the draft report in question
has not been published yet. Chances are that Rapporteur Sommer
will follow a line of reasoning similar to the one she used in her first
draft report, but if she does take into account the variety of opinions
of the other MEPs, differences might transpire in her new text.
20. Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on agricultural
product quality policy, May 28, 2009, COM (2009) 234 final, at 5, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/policy/com2009_234_en.pdf.
21. European Parliament, Draft Report on Agricultural product quality policy:
what strategy to follow?, Giancarlo Scotta', Oct. 19. 2009, (2009/2105(INI)), availhttp-://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//
able
at
NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-430.362+01+DOC+PDF+V//EN&language=EN.
22. Sommer Draft Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the Provision of Food Information to Consumers,
available at http://www.europarl
7,
2008),
(Nov.
2008/0028(COD)
.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef--//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE415.015+0 1+DOC+PDF=VO//EN& language=EN [hereinafter Sommer's Draft Report].
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XI. NUTRITION AND HEALTH CLAIMS

Nutrient profiles are still in interservice consultation, which is
an internal consultation within the Commission, and it is very likely
that the Commission will wait for the new College of Commissioners
to continue addressing this matter. The new College of Commissioners was to take office in November 2009; however, given the
uncertainties regarding the status of the Lisbon Treaty, discussions
took place on whether to extend the current Commission's mandate
until February 2010. However, with the recent turns of events, the
delay might be shorter.
In addition, to this date, the European Food Safety Authority
(EFSA) is still in the process of reviewing health claims falling under
Article 13 of the EC Regulation on nutrition and health claims No
1924/2006. On October 1, 2009, EFSA issued a first series of opinions on 'general function' health claims, which are defined as
"health claims other than those referring to the reduction of disease
risk and to children development and health,"2 3 and can refer to the
role of a nutrient or substance in growth, the development and the
functions of the body, psychological and behavioral functions,
slimming and weight control or reduction of hunger, increase of
satiety or reduction of available energy from the diet.4 Out of the
five hundred health claims submitted, only one third of them received a favorable evaluation because they were substantiated by
sufficient scientific evidence.

23. Draft Briefing document for Member States and European Commission on
Article 13.1 health claims list, EFSA's Scientific Panel on Dietetic Products, Nutrition
and
Allergies,
at
1,
available at http://www.efsa.europa.eu/
cs/BlobServer/EventMeeting/
NDA.briefing_%20docArt_13_claims.pdPssbinary=true.
24. Id.

CANADIAN FOOD LAW UPDATE
PatriciaL. Farnese'
INTRODUCTION

Provided below is an overview of developments in Canadian
food law and policy in 2009. This update primarily analyzes the
regulatory and policy developments and litigation activities by the
federal government. This focus reflects the significance of federal
activities in the food policy realm. In 2009, regulatory and policy
developments continue to be dominated by the 2008 Listeriosis outbreak in ready-to-eat, deli meats. Other noted activities include
Canada's ongoing efforts to minimize the effects of infectious diseases related to meat production, Canada's request for a WTO
panel to consider the effects of American Country of Origin Labelling, and an initiative to clarify the application of food labelling
regulations to probiotics. The federal government, however, has
yet to reinitiate legislative action to overhaul the Food and Drugs
Act (FDA)' despite repeated signals that it would do so after the
death of Bill C-51 in 2008.'
REACTIONS AND RESPONSES TO LISTERIOSIS

Canada experienced its most acute food safety crisis in recent
time during the summer of 2008. Listeria monocytogenes was found in
ready-to-eat meat products distributed nationally. By the time the
listeriosis outbreak was contained, fifty-seven people became seri1. Patricia Farnese is an Assistant Professor in the College of Law at the University of Saskatchewan and a practicing member of Law Society of Saskatchewan.
Professor Farnese is a graduate of the LL.M. Program in Agriculture and Food Law
at the University of Arkansas.
2. This update is current to November 21, 2009.
3. R.S.C., ch. F-27 (1985) [hereinafter FDA].
4. A detailed description of proposals contained in Bill C-51 and the reason for
its death can be found in Patricia L. Farnese, Canadian Food Law Update, 4J. Food
L. & Pol'y 313, 319-22 (2008).
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ously ill of which twenty-two people were confirmed to have died as
a result of consuming contaminated food.' In the aftermath of this
crisis, the effectiveness of regulations and policies shaping the government's response to the outbreak as well as those designed to prevent and detect food borne illness have faced significant scrutiny.
As a result, regulations and policies aimed at preventing, detecting,
and responding to food borne illnesses have dominated regulatory
and policy reform in 2009.
THE INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATOR'S REPORT

In January 2009, an independent investigation of the events
contributing to the Listeriosis outbreak was ordered by Prime Minister Harper.' The investigator was tasked with determining the cause
of the outbreak and evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of
the government's response. The investigator was also asked to make
recommendations on how to prevent a similar outbreak in the future and to better facilitate product recall. The investigator, however, was specifically precluded from commenting on potential
criminal or civil liability stemming from the outbreak.' The investigator issued her Final Report in July 2009, which contained fiftyseven recommendations." These recommendations targeted both
the federal departments and agencies engaged in establishing, implementing, and enforcing food safety policies and regulations as
well as the private meat processors.'
Of the fifty-seven recommendations, the majority addressed
four critical weakness of the Canadian Food Safety Regime. The
first weakness was described as a lack of focus on food safety by senior management in government and at Maple Leafs Food (MLF).o
This lack of focus resulted in the adoption and implementation of
food safety procedures that did not require employees to notify ei5. Sheila Weatherill, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATOR INTO THE 2008
available at
http://www.listeriosisOUTBREAK,
July
2009,
LISTERIOSIs

listeriose.investigation-enquete.g.ca/lirs-rpt e.pdf [hereinafter Final Report].
6. Press release, Office of the Prime Minister, Prime Minister Harper announces appointment of independent investigator into the listeriosis outbreak (Jan.
20, 2009) availableat http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category= 1&id=2392.
7. Press release, Office of the Prime Minister, Prime Minister announces terms
of reference for an independent investigation of the listeriosis outbreak (Sept. 6,
2008) available at http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category= 1&id=2268.
8. Final Report, supra note 5.
9. See id.
10. See id at xi.
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ther senior management of MLF or the Canadian Food Inspection
Agency (CFIA) inspectors, despite positive Listeria tests." Likewise,
existing policies, procedures, and controls failed to clearly define
expected outcomes or distinguish between foods that were at high
risk of becoming contaminated and those that were at a lower risk. 2
This "one-size-fits-all approach" left much open to interpretation by
industry and specifically did not require increased scrutiny of riskier
products." Last, a lack of focus on food safety was blamed for the
CFIA's decision to under staff inspector positions at the MLF and
for not ensuring that the inspectors that were employed at MLF had
the training and capacity to be effective."
The second weakness identified in the Final Report concerned
the failure of governments and agencies to be prepared to respond
to this crisis. In particular, the level of coordination and communication between key agencies and departments within the federal
government and with their provincial counterparts was repeatedly
criticized. Many in authority were unaware of the Foodborne Illness Outbreak Response Protocol (FIORP), an intergovernmental,
inter-agency policy in place to coordinate a unified response to such
a crisis." As a result, a leadership void existed in the first few weeks
of the outbreak that delayed and undermined the effectiveness of
the emergency response." Likewise, key agencies, including laboratories required to identify the source of the outbreak, lacked the
necessary pre-planned, surge capacity to immediately deal with the
crisis." Finally, the report repeated calls for increased coordination
between the various laboratories throughout Canada that track and
confirm illness and disease."
The government and industry's initial failures to treat this outbreak as an urgent concern was the third weakness identified in the
Final Report. The outbreak was not originally viewed as a public
health emergency primarily because this crisis involved a food borne
illness rather than an infectious disease." As a result, there was a
delay by the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) in assuming a
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See id.
Id. at xii.
See Final Report, supra note 5 at xii.
See id. at xi.
Id. at xii.
Id. at 63.
Id.
Final Report, supra note 5, at 72-73.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 67.
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leadership role.2 ' The PHAC's reluctance to view listeriosis contamination as a public health emergency occurred within the context of a larger debate between the public health and food safety
sectors concerning the appropriate approach to responding to food
borne illness. In particular, the debate is focused on the timing of
product recall.' Characterizing food borne illness as a public health
emergency supports the adoption of a precautionary approach to
product recall. Many argue, however, that the significant and lasting
economic consequences of product recalls warrants laboratory confirmation of the source of contamination. Laboratory confirmation
would ensure that only the source of the contamination is identified
as causing illness thereby preventing the mistaken recall of 'innocent' products."
Finally, the Final Report identified weaknesses in the timing,
method, and content of the government's communication with the
public. There were specific concerns about the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-food acting as the lead spokesperson during the outbreak rather than the Minister of Health." The Minister of Agriculture and Agri-food was perceived to be in a conflict of interest as he
is tasked with supporting the food industry.25 Therefore, the health
information provided to the public was viewed as suspect. In addition, the Final Report criticized the fact that early communications
with the public did not explain that certain populations were more
vulnerable to becoming sick." The Final Report also called for an
advance communication strategy that has material ready for use
prior to an outbreak that will accurately inform the public on how
best to minimize risks associated with that specific, food borne illness.2 ' Likewise, the Final Report recommended consideration of
the use of precautionary labeling, in the advance of an outbreak, on
food products that pose particular risks for vulnerable populations.
THE REGULATORY AND POLICY RESPONSE

Upon release of the independent investigator's Final Report,
the Canadian government committed to take action on all of the
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id. at
Final
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Final

xiii.
Report, supra note 5, at xiii.
xiv.
xiii.
xiv.
Report, supra note 5, at xiii.
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recommendations.'
However, prior to the release of the report,
the CFIA, Health Canada (HG), and the PHAC conducted internal
investigations and had begun considering and implementing
changes to policies and regulations." Although the consequences
of the listeriosis outbreak may suggest to some that significant flaws
exist in Canada's food safety regime, a comprehensive overhaul of
this regulatory regime has not been recommended. Instead, the
resulting regulatory and policy changes have been primarily characterized by minor adjustments aimed at clarifying governmental roles
and responsibilities and improving the system for monitoring of
By streamlining response procedures, these
disease incidents.
changes have been designed to increase the efficiency of the government's response to a crisis." The burden for preventing, monitoring, and reporting food contamination remains with the meat
processing industry.
The most concrete outcomes from the various reviews and investigations into government and industry responses to the Listeriosis outbreak have targeted the section concerning Listeria contained
in the Meat Hygiene Manual of Procedures (MOP). The MOP outlines
the mandatory food handling, testing, and safety reporting practices
that must be followed at registered meat processing facilities in
Canada." Changes to the MOP following the Listeriosis crisis include mandatory testing of surface areas that come in contact with
food, the performance of trend analysis on regular test results, and
the immediate reporting, to senior industry management and the
CFIA, of all food contact surface listeria tests that test positive for
Listeria."
The majority of the government action in response to the report has targeted internal processes. Various government departments and agencies have reported hiring more staff and facilitating
more training of existing staff to improve food borne illness detection and response capacity." Likewise, inter-agency discussions have
29. Press Release, Can. Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), Government of Canada
Takes Action to Improve Food Safety (Sep. 11, 2009) available at
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/corpaffr/newcom/2009/2009091 1e.shtml.
30. CFIA, MOVING FORWARD ON FOOD SAFETY ACTION ON LISTERIA, available at
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/ english/fssa/movava/movavae.shtml.
31. See Murdoch and Bellemare, supra note 29.
available at
PROCEDURES,
OF
MANUAL
HYGIENE
MEAT
32. CFIA,
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/fssa/meavia/ man/mane.shtml#intro [hereinafter MOP].
33. Id.
34. Final Report, supra note 5, at Appendix C.
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occurred to clarify responsibilities of the CFIA, HC, and the PHAC
in the event of a similar crisis in the future." Commitments for improved cooperation have also been made between federal agencies
and their provincial and territorial counterparts." In the absence of
a significant food borne illness outbreak, however, it is difficult to
assess the impact of these initiatives.
ON-FARM BIOSECURITY

In addition to initiatives directed at minimizing incidents of
food borne illness, the Canadian government has continued to focus
on improving on-farm biosecurity practices to limit infectious diseases related to meat production. Prior to the detection of an infectious disease of concern, the government had mandated few biosecurity practices. For the most part, Canada's approach to on-farm
biosecurity continues to utilize voluntary programs. This approach
reflects the government's confidence that infectious diseases can be
controlled through biosecurity practices by ensuring "what is inside
stays in and what is outside stays out."" In 2009, the government
continued to fund and endorse voluntary, industry-led standards.
The National Avian On-Farm Biosecurity Standard is the latest
voluntary biosecurity standard targeting livestock and poultry producers that has been endorsed by the Canadian government." The
standard was developed in consultation with producers, processors,
the poultry science industries, veterinarians and academia." In practice, producers are participating in a variety of programs created by
provincial industry associations, the national On-Farm Food Safety
Program, and by processors. The Avian Standard attempts to identify and address any of the shortcomings of other programs without
imposing one universal standard."o
Recommended practices are said to reflect an "objective, impartial science-based approach" and a cost/benefit analysis." Restrict35. Id.
36. Id.
37.

CFIA, NATIONAL AVIAN ON-FARM BIOSECURITY STANDARD (2009), available at

http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/biosec/aviafrme.shtml.
[hereinafter
Avian Standard].
38. Id.
39. Press Release, CFIA, Protect Poultry, Prevent Disease: National Standard is
2009),
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/corpaffr/
Launched
(Oct.
6,
newcom/2009/20091006e.shtml (last visited January 14, 2010).
40. AVIAN STANDARD, supra note 37, at i.
41. Id.at ii.
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ing access by humans, animals, and equipment in and out of production is a key component of the Avian Standard. Similarly, the
Avian Standard recommends disinfection as people, equipment, and
animals move between production areas as well as daily sweeps of
flocks to monitor health status of the animals."
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN LABELING

The Canadian government has long been concerned with the
imposition of mandatory country of origin labeling (COOL) in the
United States." As Canada's largest agricultural trading partner, any
perceived barrier to market access in the United States is alarming."
Consequently, Canada has requested that the WTO establish a panel
to consider its complaint that the American COOL requirements
unfairly discriminate against Canadian hog and cattle producers."
The panel was requested after two official WTO consultations with
the United States failed to alleviate Canada's concerns. Canada is
joined by Mexico in alleging that American COOL regulations violate WTO trading rules." On November 19, 2009, the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body established a panel to consider these complaints pursuant to Article 9.1 of the WATO's Dispute Settlement
Understanding."
The American COOL regulations require retailers to inform
consumers of the origin of products listed as "covered commodi42. See id. at Section 1.
43. See id. at Sections 2 and 3.
44. Seee.g., LORIE SRIVASTAVA, LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT, PARLIAMENTARY
RESEARCH BRANCH, COUNTRY OF ORIGIN LABELING, PRB 03-02E ( 2003).
45. AGRICANDAGRI-FOODCAN, AGRI-FOOD TRADE POLICY: CANADA-UNITED STATES
http://www.agr.gc.ca/itpdTRADE
(2003)
available
at
AGRICULTURAL

dpci/amr/4858-eng.htm.
46. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Canada on United States - Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, WT/DS384/8 (Oct. 9,
/cases-e/
2009), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu-e/
ds384_e.htm. [hereinafter Canada Complaint].
47. Press Release, Dep't of Foreign Aff. and Int'l Trade of Can.Canada Requests
WTO Panel on U.S. Mandatory Country-of-Origin Labelling (Oct. 7, 2009) available
at http://www.international.gc.ca/media-commerce/comm/news-communiques/
2009/296.aspx?lang=eng [hereinafter DFAIT].
48. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Mexico on United States - Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, WT/DS386/7 (Oct. 13,
2009), availableat http-//www.worldtradelaw.net/pr/ds386-7(pr).pdf.
49. Press release, WTO, DSB authorizes Brazil countermeasures in "cotton"
case, establishes "COOL" and poultry panels (Nov. 19, 2009), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news09_e/dsb_19nov09_e.htm.
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ties."" The inclusion of pork and beef as covered commodities is of
particular concern to Canada." Canada alleges that these regulations violate Article 2.1 of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade dealing with favourable treatment, Article 2.2 requiring
trade restrictions to have a legitimate objective, and Article 2.4 requiring regulations be based on relevant international standards."
Moreover, if the United States claims that the COOL regulations are
sanitary or phytosanitary measures, Canada asserts that the regulations do not conform to requirements outlined in the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures."
Furthermore, Canada alleges that the American COOL provisions result in Canadian beef and pork being treated less favourably
in the marketplace than American beef and pork.' Both the 1994
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the WTO Agreement
on Rules of Origin require the uniform, impartial and reasonable
application of trade restrictions among member countries." Thus,
any measure that purports to assign a benefit to local products over
foreign products is suspect. By requesting a Dispute Settlement
Panel, Canada seeks relief for Canadian producers from these alleged trade barriers."
PROBIOTICS GUIDANCE

In April 2009, HC released a guidance document to clarify the
acceptable use of health claims related to probiotic microorganisms
(probiotics) on food labels." For many, the Probiotics Guidance is
long overdue as many foods in the marketplace have been labeled as
containing probiotics for some time now.' These labels have been
50. Final Rule on Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling of Beef Pork, Lamb, Chicken,
Goat Meat, PerishableAgricultural Commodities, Peanuts, Pecans, Ginseng, and Macadamia Nuts, published on 15 January 2009 as 7 CFR Part 65.
51. DFAIT, supra note 47.
52. Canada Complaint, supra note 46.
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Art. X:3(a) (1994); The Agreement on the Rules of Origin, Art. 2(e)(1994).
56. Canada Complaint, supra note 46.
57.

FOOD DIRECTORATE, Heath Canada, GUIDANCE DOCUMENT - THE USE OF

PROBIOTIC MICROORGANISMS IN FOOD at 2, (April, 2009) available at http://www.hc-

sc.gc.ca/fn-an/legislation/guide-ld/probiotics-guidance-orientation_

probiotiques-

eng.php. [hereinafter PROBIOTics GUIDANCE].

58. Gary Gnirss, Regulatory Affairs: Understanding Probiotics, FOOD IN CANADA,
October 2009.
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accompanied with specific claims of the health benefits associated
with the probiotic contained within the food. The Probiotics Guidance will be used by the CFIA to assess whether any product that is
labeled as containing probiotics complies with provisions of the Food
and Drugs Act that prohibit labelling food "in a manner that is false,
misleading or deceptive or is likely to create an erroneous impression regarding its character, value, quantity, composition, merit or
safety.""
Interestingly, the guidance does not define which microorganisms qualify as probiotics. Rather, the guidance refers to Expert
Consultation for the meaning of probiotics undertaken by the Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO).' In food, the FAO/WHO consultation defined a
probiotics as "live microorganisms which when consumed in adequate amounts as part of food confer a health benefit to the host.""
Therefore, to label a food as containing a probiotic, the probiotic
microorganism must be present in sufficient quantity to confer a
health benefit.
LITIGATION

In addition to regulatory and policy activity, the federal government was involved in three court cases that warrant mentioning.
The first involves the legality of regulations prescribing compositional standards for certain cheeses. The second case challenged the
federal government's rejection of an application to test market baby
food in non-standardized containers. Finally, a poultry processor
received a significant fine for violating animal transport regulations.
SAPUTO INC. v. CANADA (ATTORNEY GENERAL)

New compositional standards for cheese took effect in December 2008. Unlike many food products, cheese is subjected to two
Compositional standards for cheese are found
sets of regulations.
in both the Dairy Products Regulations of the Canada Agricultural

59.

R.S. 1985, c F-27, §5(1) [hereinafter FDA].

60.

PROBIoTIcs GUIDANCE, supra note 57, at 3.

6 1. Id.
62.

MATHIEU

FRIGON,

"COMPOSITIONAL

STANDARDS

LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT 26 December 2007at 1.

FOR

CHEESE"

OTAWA,
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ProductsActe and the Food and Drug Regulations of the FDA." Before
the amendments were made, there appeared to be an inconsistency
between the two standards as only the DPR permitted cheese to be
made from "other milk solids." Domestic dairy processors argued
that the inclusion of "other milk solids" in the DPR permitted
cheese to be made from a broader range of milk solids than those
specifically listed in the FDR." In the alternative, Canadian dairy
farmers argued for restricting the meaning of "other milk solids" to
those milk products listed in the FDR because a broader definition
permitted the import of less expansive milk products that could be
used in place of fresh milk for cheese production.' With the corresponding loss in the domestic cheese production market, dairy
farmers must sell their fresh milk at a lower cost to alternative markets such as the animal feed market."
The three largest dairy processors in Canada, Kraft Canada
Inc., Parmalat Canada Inc., and Saputo Inc., initiated an action in
The
Federal Court for judicial review of the new regulations.'
processors challenged the constitutionality of the new regulations
and alleged that the regulations were invalid as they were beyond
the scope of the regulation-making authority granted under the
CAPA and the FDA.
The federal government relied on s.91(2) of the Constitution Act,
1867,' known as the federal trade and commerce power, to assert
that the cheese compositional standards were validly enacted. Because marketing legislation directed at extra-provincial trade has
been found to be a valid exercise of the authority granted to the
government in s.91(2)," Martineau J. considered whether the cheese
compositional standards targeted either inter-provincial or foreign
trade of cheese. After reviewing the content of the regulations, the
court concluded that the legislative intent and purpose of the regulations were to establish compositional standards for cheese des-

63. Dairy Products Regulations, SOR/79-804 at §2 [hereinafter DPR]; Canada
Agricultural Products Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.20 (4' Supp.) [hereinafter CAPA].
64. Food and Drugs Act,C.R.C., c.870 at §B.08.001.1 [hereinafter FDR].
65. Frigon, supra note 62 at 2.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Saputo Inc. and Others v. The Attorney General of Canada [20091 FCJ No.
1016(Can.) [hereinafter Saputo].
69. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C., No.5
(Appendix 111985).
70. Labatt Brewing Co. v. Canada, [1980] 1 SCR 914, 915 (Can.).
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tined for interprovincial, import, and export trade." As a result, the
provisions were found to be a valid exercise of the federal government's constitutional authority.
Likewise, Martineau J. rejected the processor's claims that the
regulations exceeded the regulation-making authority granted by the
FDA and the CAPA. Instead, Martineau J. described the enabling
statutes as providing the Governor in Council with broad authority
and concluded that the "new Regulations fit squarely within the obMoreover, Martijectives and powers outlined in the provisions."
neau J. expressly rejected the processors' claim that the purpose of
the regulations was to transfer economic benefit from the processors to the dairy producers after finding the processors' evidence
unpersuasive." The application was, therefore, dismissed in its entirety."
Saputo Inc. and Kraft Canada Inc. have recently filed an application to appeal the trial decision with the Federal Court of Appeal." Parmalat Canada Inc., however, is not listed as an appellant
on the appeal."
SELECT BRAND DISTRIBUTORS INC. V. CANADA (ATTORNEY GENERAL)

The plaintiffs brought an application to the Federal Court for
judicial review of the CFIA's refusals to allow non-standardized size
jars of Gerber brand baby food to be test marketed in Canada."
Although the Processed Products Regulations of the CAPA only permit
baby food to be sold in two sizes, " §9.1 creates a process wherein
one can apply for approval to sell a product in a non-standardized
size for the purpose of testing the market. The applicants' requests
were refused on the grounds that applicants had failed to establish
that non-standardized sizes would not disrupt normal trading patterns as required by §9.1(5)(a)."
71. Saputo,[2009] F.C. at 122.
72. Id. at 130.
73. See id. at 142.
74. Id. at 189.
75. Cheese ProducersAppeal New Rules On Milk Content, CBC, Nov. 20, 2009, available at http://www.cbc.ca/money/story/2009/11/20/kraft-saputo-cheese-regulation.html.
76. Id.
77. Select Brand Distributors Inc. v. Canada, [2009] F.C.547(Can.).
78. Processed Product Regulations, SOR/82-701(Can,) at Schedule III, Table III,
Container, Section (2) [hereinafter PPR].
79. Select Brand Distributors,supranote 77 at 18.
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Similar to the discussion in Saputo, the court considered
whether the regulations exceeded the scope of regulation-making
authority outlined in the CAPA." Hughes found the legislative intent of CAPA was "the provision of food to the Canadian marketplace for its consumption."" As such, Hughes took issue with the
attempt to direct patterns of the marketplace contained in
§9.1(5)(a). The court found that regulating the marketplace fell
within activities prescribed pursuant to the Competition Act,' thus its
inclusion in the PPR was ultra vires." §9.1(5)(a) was struck down and
the CFIA was ordered to allow the applicants to test market baby
food for up to 24 months.'
Perhaps more interesting than the ultimate outcome of this decision, however, is Hughes evidentiary conclusions regarding the
CFIA's handling of the applicants' requests and the nature of the
market for baby food in Canada. In obiter, Hughes indicated that
even if §9.1(5)(a) had not been found ultra vires, the CFIA's refusals
to allow the applicants to test market baby food would have been set
aside for being unreasonable.' The court concluded that the CFIA
had no evidence before it from which to draw any conclusions about
the impact of the test market on normal or usual trading patterns.'
As such, CFIA's decisions to refuse the applicants' requests were
described as "..flawed, lacking transparency and, unreasonable."" In
addition, Hughes J. expressed distress about the monopolistic nature of the baby food market in Canada and suggested that the
Competition Bureau should be concerned.'
R V. PRAIRIE PRIDE NATURAL FOODS LTD. AND MR. BRUCE ARABSKY

In July, Prairie Pride, a poultry processor, and Mr. Arabsky pled
guilty and were fined $440,000 for contravening provisions of the
Health of Animals Regulations" mandating the conditions for the hu-

80. Id. at 120.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 128.
Competition Act, R.S.C., c. C-34 (1985).
Select Brand Distributors,supra note 77 at 30.
See id. at 135.
Id. at 132.
Id.. at 18.
Id. at 33.
Select BrandDistributors,supra note 77, at 118.
C.R.C., c. 296(2009) [hereinafter HAR].
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mane transport of animals." According to the Prosecution Bulletin
released by the CFIA after sentencing, the accused, after being
warned, continued to violate HAR regulations limiting the amount
of time an animal can be in transport and the conditions of that
transport.9' §140(2) prohibits the transportation of animals in
crowded conditions that are likely to cause the animals injury or
undue suffering. Likewise, §148(1) provides that poultry cannot be
in transport for over 36 hours. On a number of occasions, despite
the warning, the defendants shipped large quantities of live birds
from Saskatchewan to British Columbia.' Many of the birds were
dead when they arrived at the processors in British Columbia.'
Because the defendants pled guilty, there is no published decision from the Provincial Court outlining the finding of facts. Thus,
little information about the circumstances leading to the conviction
is known. The penalty, however, is of a magnitude rarely seen in
Canada resulting from CFIA prosecutions. Unfortunately, it is difficult to assess the significance of this case as CFIA prosecutors rarely
face not guilty pleas. As a result, there is no body of reported court
decisions from which to analyze comprehensively trends or patterns
in CFIA prosecutions.

90. CFIA, Prosecution Bulletin, Prairie Pride Natural Foods Ltd. and Bruce
Arabsky Fined $440,000 For Humane Transport Violations (Sept. 14, 2009) available at http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/corpaffr/projud/2009/20090914e.
shtml.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.

